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 V 
Abstract 
The objective of this PhD thesis is to explain why and under what conditions the EU 
cooperates with the UN in the field of security and development. It focuses specifically on the 
Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). To do so, the thesis presents and analyses a 
broad empirical research that I carried out on 6 case studies across the Maghreb, Levant and 
Middle East, via extensive direct observation, expert interviews and the use of primary 
sources, in addition to the study of secondary literature.  
The research adopts an original rationalist meta-theoretical approach using insights 
coming from rational-choice institutionalism, liberalism, organizational theory, neo-
functionalism and bureaucratic politics to identify the key explanatory factors: capacity and 
legitimacy, unity and integration. It then carries out a comparative qualitative analysis based 
on 12 variables and a typology of approaches to cooperation (dependent, ceremonial, 
predatory, dismissive), applicable both to the EU as a whole and its component actors.  
The findings show that the EU’s individual decisions to cooperate with the United Nations 
tend to be inversely linked to its relative power and cohesiveness over a specific issue. The 
picture is one of instrumental multilateralism, motivated mostly by resource dependence on 
the UN or by Europe’s frequent lack of cohesion, particularly in the MENA region. 
Collectively, the EU adopts multilateral strategies of cooperating with the UN when it is 
obliged by the context, when it is divided, fragmented or generally weak. 
This is confirmed also by contrasting development and security policy. It would seem that 
the tendency to cooperate is greater in the high politics security field, which is characterized 
by inter-governmental policy-making, diverging policy preferences of EU member states and 
a high need for international legitimacy. EU Cooperation with the UN on development policy 
is often more elusive. EU member states use the UN both to mask their division on a policy 
and to reinforce their independent status and role within the international system. The 
European institutions, instead, tend to use cooperation with the UN to gain ground and voice 
in areas from where they would be otherwise excluded.   
The thesis is divided in 8 chapters. The Introduction presents the key questions and 
research design. Chapter 2 looks at the conceptual framework more in detail and 
operationalizes the explanatory factors and variables. Chapter 3 provides an analytical 
overview of the mechanisms and logics of EU-UN cooperation across development and 
security. Chapter 4-6 analyse the specific case studies in the MENA. Chapter 7 synthesizes 
and illustrates the key findings against the two main hypotheses on resources and cohesion 
and other intervening factors. Lastly, the Conclusions discuss the significance and limitations.   
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THE WEAK LINK: 
EU-UN COOPERATION AND EFFECTIVE 
MULTILATERALISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
PART I 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between the European Union 
(EU) and the United Nations (UN) and to explain the circumstances and factors that 
favour or hinder their consistent cooperation in the field of security and development. 
Specifically, I will look at how this relationship articulates in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, the bridge for Europe between the regional and the 
global. 
The UN has a central role in the international system and a key function as 
international legitimizer (Claude 1966). Consequently, as the EU was progressively 
increasing its activity in international affairs, its presence within - and interaction with 
- the UN became an important frontier and benchmark for the development of a 
common European foreign policy framework. Eventually, the EU came to peg its own 
international identity to that of the UN, framing itself as an ‘instinctive’ multilateralist 
and a ‘natural partner’ of the United Nations (Ferrero Waldner 2005). Yet, beyond the 
comfortable image and the apparent political, financial and operational commitment 
of the EU to the UN lays a much more nuanced reality, which deserves to be 
researched and understood for its crude motivations and underpinnings as much as for 
its rhetoric. The EU’s commitment to the UN is actually a weak commitment 
grounded on weakness.  
In this introductory chapter, I explain how I intend to demonstrate this “weak link” 
throughout my thesis. I will now turn to define more clearly the topic, research 
question and argument. I will then look at how the key literature has addressed and 
attempted to answer the puzzle of EU’s commitment to multilateralism. Finally, I will 
look at my research design and my methods, before providing a brief outline of what 
is next.    
I.1 Relevance, research question and main argument 
To illustrate the multitude of areas where the EU and its member states can interact 
with the UN and UN agencies and the relevance of this problem to international 
relations and European studies, I will start by briefly looking at the 2011 international 
engagement on Libya, across the security-development spectrum. The international 
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military intervention (with a strong European participation) was launched under an 
extensive mandate from the UN Security Council (Res. 1973 of 11 March 2011). The 
compromise was reached in New York after intense negotiations with an important if 
ambiguous contribution of the four EU member states present in the Security Council, 
three of which voted in favour (France, the United Kingdom and Portugal), while one, 
Germany, abstained. This resolution and the preceding one provided also the template 
for the international sanctions against the Gadhafi regime, which were enforced and 
expanded by the EU and its institutions. The EU also launched a Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission on Libya (EUFOR Libya), which never became 
operational but was supposed to be initiated at the request of the United Nations.  
In the heat of the crisis, intense interaction occured on humanitarian and long-term 
development issues. Humanitarian relief inside Libya and at the borders was led by 
the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the actions for 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building were prudently but busily prepared in 
New York by the UN secretariat and the various relevant UN agencies. Eventually a 
UN political mission (UNSMIL) was launched in the fall of 2011 to facilitate 
coordination of the international support to Libya’s political transition. The EU and its 
member states are funding these activities and have also been involved in responding 
to the humanitarian situation and relaunching longer-term development cooperation. 
But the UN is not only active now; it was present in Libya already before the crisis 
with various agencies and a resident coordinator, supporting the country’s 
development in various sectors including gender equality, migration and agricultural 
development. So was the EU, which had set up a small but growing cooperation 
programme and was in the process of negotiating its first legally binding agreement 
with Libya when the crisis started.  
All these constitute “interaction opportunities” between the EU and the UN, whose 
functional and geographic mandates in Libya as elsewhere strongly overlap. Yet, a 
close observation of the specific case of Libya shows that cooperation is not a given 
nor smooth. Rather, interaction often translates in divergent strategies, latent or open 
conflict, frustration, and poor outcomes. Clarifying what are the conditions 
determining cooperation can contribute to our understanding of what is the nature of 
the EU as an international actor and whether indeed, it is motivated to work with the 
UN by ideas about multilateralism in world politics or rather by interests.  
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I.1.1 Research question 
How can we explain these varying degrees of collaboration, competition and conflict, 
both from a political and operational perspective? Is this changing over time and 
across policy issues? And what is it that motivates the EU and the UN to cooperate, 
when they do? Why does practice so often not match the rhetoric? And why, how and 
when are the EU and the UN able to overcome their differences and work together 
across the security and development spectrum? The guiding research question of this 
thesis will, then, be:  
Why and under what conditions does the EU cooperate with the United Nations?   
This question calls not only for an investigation of structure, that is the conditions or 
parameters within which the EU and the UN can cooperate, but also for an 
understanding of agency: the motifs that actually lead the foreign policy actors, states 
and institutions, to chose to work with the UN. Importantly, the question focuses on 
how the EU interacts ‘with the UN’ as a political framework and as an operational 
actor. It does not look in detail at how the EU coordinates ‘within the UN’ or on its 
‘internal effectiveness’ within the various bodies of this organization. The aim is to 
understand how different conditions and factors affect the capacity and willingness of 
the EU to cooperate with the United Nations for its foreign policy goals.  
Finally, the question is specifically targeted to the security and development field and 
to the MENA region. The Middle East and North Africa brings some specific features 
to the understanding of EU-UN relationship. Its centrality to EU foreign policy, the 
high level of institutionalization of the policy framework with a strong role for 
supranational institutions, in parallel with the continuous strong interest by member 
states make it a salient and interesting case, in understanding EU-UN cooperation 
across time and policies. The study of development and security further allows me to 
grasp the varying responsibilities and logics across pillars and the different patterns of 
cooperation in “high” or “low” politics. In short, the case study will help clarify the 
effect of proximity and relevance on the EU’s determination to work with the UN. To 
what extent is the objective to promote a prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood 
consistent with the mantra working with the UN? 
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I.1.2 Argument 
I argue that the EU’s willingness to cooperate with the United Nations tends to be 
inversely linked to its resources and cohesiveness, that is to its power. Depending on 
the level of analysis, this lack of power can be identified in the single component 
actors of the EU foreign policy, whose role and autonomy vary across the system, or 
in the system as a whole. Ultimately, the thesis of Robert Kagan that multilateralism 
is the strategy of the weak might be closer to truth than one might think (Kagan 2002). 
This research suggests that the more the EU is weak, the more it will be motivated to 
work with and through the United Nations structures.  
The narrative that depicts the European Union as essentially or ‘instinctively’ prone to 
channel its policy through multilateral institutions conceals what is actually a clearly 
self-interested, instrumental and rational behaviour by the various actors participating 
in the European foreign policy system, including member states and supranational 
institutions. Collectively, the EU adopts multilateral strategies of cooperating with the 
UN, when and where it is obliged to do so by the context, when it is divided, 
inexperienced or lacks resources and coherent policies of its own. Conversely and 
perhaps speculatively, it can be argued that, to the extent that the EU foreign policy 
becomes more consistent, coherent and assertive (in other words, “strong”), the EU’s 
tendency to work through multilateral institutions is going to decline.  
A comparison of development and security policy could help to elucidate this. Inter-
organizational interaction varies from sector to sector, but the tendency to cooperate 
seems greater in the “high politics” security field, which is characterized by a weak 
role of supranational institutions, intergovernmental policy-making, diverging policy 
preferences of EU member states and a high need for international legitimacy. The 
UN provides legitimacy for member states independent policies, status within the 
international system and cover for possible intra-EU divisions. Cooperation with the 
UN is often more elusive on development policy, where EU supranational institutions 
have a stronger role and the pressure to coordinate the member states’ remaining 
independent policies is lower. 
In other words, EU-UN cooperation can be described as a resultant of opposing bids 
for legitimisation both on the world stage (member states) and at the internal EU level 
(European supranational institutions). EU member states use the United Nations both 
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to mask their division on a policy and to reinforce their independent status and role 
within the international system. The European supranational institutions, instead, tend 
to use cooperation with the UN to gain ground and voice in areas from where they 
would be otherwise excluded. In this sense, when member states are cohesive on a EU 
initiative or where the European institutions have a strong and established role (such 
as the European Commission in long-term development cooperation), working 
through the UN is often perceived as a costly business (for effectiveness, visibility 
and control), in which it is not worthwhile to embark.  
In the next section, I will examine a few suggestions coming from academic literature 
on how to tackle the problem of EU cooperation with the United Nations, which will 
help me in building up my own case for an eclectic and problem-driven approach.  
I.2 Literature review: suggestions for an eclectic problem-
based approach 
Studies over the nature and purpose of the EU’s relations with the UN have multiplied 
in the last six years, following the pioneer volumes by Karen Smith and Katie 
Laatikainen and Wouters and al in 2006, which attempted the first comprehensive 
overviews from an International Relations and legal perspective (Hoffmeister, 
Wouters, and Ruys 2006; Laatikainen and Smith 2006). In 2009, Jørgensen could still 
make the point that research on the relationship between European foreign policy and 
multilateral institutions was unsatisfactory because scarcely integrated and organized 
(Jørgensen 2009a, 2). Yet, since 2006 the academic response has been rich and has 
increasingly concentrated around coherent research projects and networks. This 
literature has been predominantly stemming from and targeted to EU studies and EU 
foreign policy specialists but has also attempted to open a debate about 
multilateralism in general within International Relations; in particular, by contrasting 
the approach of the EU with the established literature on the United States (Foot, 
MacFarlane, and Mastanduno 2003; Patrick and Forman 2001; Ruggie 1992, 1993, 
1998).  
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An effort to systematize the various possible factors influencing the EU’s presence in 
international organizations was attempted more recently by the edited books of 
Jørgensen (2009b) and Blavoukous and Bourantonis (2010). Among other things, this 
literature has tackled the central question of this study, namely why and under what 
conditions, does the EU cooperate with international organizations, looking in 
particular at internal, external and constitutive factors. In the next pages I present the 
main suggestions offered by the varied literature organizing them around the three 
analytical concepts of Ideas, Interests and Institutions. The objective is to explore 
alternative explanations of my initial puzzle, before I present my own research design.  
I.2.1 Ideas: identity and rhetoric 
An important strand of the literature on EU Foreign Policy, particularly of that which 
has worked on modelling and conceptualising the EU as a “normative power” 
(Aggestam 2008; Laïdi 2008; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Manners 2002; Whitman 
2011) has linked the tendency of the EU to work with the UN to a set of ideational 
concepts (ideas, values, norms) that constitute its identity or strategic culture as an 
international actor. The starting point and key empirical underpinning of this literature 
is often official discourse from institutions and member states. References to the UN 
and to the commitment of the EU to work within and empower the multilateral system 
are ubiquitous in the founding documents of EU Foreign Policy, including the Lisbon 
Treaty and the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003; European Union 
2009). In this view, one of the constitutive features of the EU’s self image as a post-
modern international actor is its inclination to pursue multilateralism as a goal for 
itself (Cooper 2004), notwithstanding the costs that this might have in terms of actual 
effectiveness (Manners 2008). The concept and idea of ‘effective multilateralism’ has 
played a pivotal role in this narrative, in building the EU’s identity and sustaining its 
determination to work with and within the UN. It is not the purpose of this thesis to 
analyse the complexities of this term, but literature has amply underlined the way this 
concept has developed in the short term, particularly in the aftermath of the Iraq 
debacle to compose the divide within EU member states and to distinguish the EU 
nascent strategic identity from that of the US - particularly under the G.W. Bush 
administration (Biscop and Andersson 2007; Bouchard and John Peterson 2010). 
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However, while several authors have stressed the role that ideas play in international 
relations (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Goldstein 1993, 5; Hurrell 2002), how these ideas 
feed into the policy process and materialize into actual decisions and operational 
consequences remains difficult to pin down. Beyond constructivist and sociology 
literature, which has introduced the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Checkel 2006; March 
and Olsen 2004), a notable attempt to look for causal mechanism has come from the 
normative institutionalist literature (Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009; Thomas 
2011a), through the concept of “rhetorical entrapment” (Schimmelfennig 2001). In 
applying this concept to EU-UN relations, Lewis, for example, tried to show how 
entrapment into the “work with the UN” mantra, provides an explanation of why EU 
member states decided to channel funds for reconstruction through the United Nations 
in Iraq, following the division over the US-led invasion in 2003 (Lewis 2009). 
The role of ideas on EU’s approach towards multilateralism has therefore been 
recognized by academia, also thanks to the conspicuous tendency of the EU to declare 
its passion for multilateralism in its official discourse. However, two key problems 
remain with ideas as explanatory factors. Firstly, weighting and testing the impact of 
ideas remains an elusive endeavour and empirical corroboration is still rather anaemic. 
Secondly, as noted earlier, considering that the rhetorical commitment to the UN has 
remained rather constant, it is difficult to explain through ideas how and why there is 
practical variation in EU-UN cooperation. Ideas however do provide a very powerful 
tool to benchmark reality against rhetoric (Manners 2008). Let’s now turn to interests 
and institutions.  
I.2.2 Interests: states between legitimacy and power 
It would be naïve to assume that the EU only has a principled approach to 
multilateralism. Its motivations are often inspired by rational considerations and the 
‘logic of consequences’: ultimately by preferences and interests (Fearon and Wendt 
2002; Pollack 2006, 32). In particular, in approaching the problem of EU-UN 
cooperation from the side of interests, authors coming from the rationalist schools of 
neo-realism and liberal-institutionalism have tried to answer the question of why do 
states build up and then use multilateral institutions to promote their interests. Neo-
realists look at power balancing and perhaps at voice opportunity (Grieco 1996, 289). 
In this view, the EU (and the UN) is mostly seen as a vehicle of the member states’ 
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foreign policies, which collaborate only when their preferences converge in order to 
obtain more leverage on the international system (Moravcsik 1993). Neoliberalism, 
instead, would look at the lack of information and at the need to lower transaction 
costs for states as a motivation to decide to create or delegate their power to 
institutions (Keohane 1984). In the next paragraphs I will look mainly at interests of 
states, power and legitimacy. I will then close by mentioning the interests beyond or 
before the state.  
At what level of analysis do we place these interests and preferences (Singer 1961; 
White 1999)? In EU studies, just as in International Relations interests are first and 
foremost associated with nation states as a key level of analysis. A general concern 
has therefore been to distinguish between various member states on the basis of their 
preferences towards working with the UN related at different levels with their relative 
power, closeness to US policies, interventionist culture or Europeanism. The variation 
in the member states preferences will then also explain the variation in strategies at 
the UN (Hill 2010). A useful distinction has been made also between the big three, 
and France and the UK in particular as UN Security Council permanent members 
(Hill 2006), and middle powers within the EU, particular the Nordic states (Brantner 
and Gowan 2009, 44; Laatikainen 2006). Chapter 3 will provide a map of EU member 
states preferences towards working with the UN.  
With the aim of identifying the sources of preferences, scholars have looked at the 
problem of power (Baldwin 1979; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 130–135; Toje 
2010). Some explain Europe’s penchant towards multilateralism as a consequence of 
its relative weakness in terms of hard power (Kagan 2002; Toje 2010, 29–30) and its 
need to rely on strong multilateral organizations. This view has been criticized by 
those who point to the fact that the US was very powerful when it set up the 
foundations of the post war multilateral system (Jørgensen 2006, 203; Ruggie 2003). 
While this criticism is very valid when discussing about the establishment of 
multilateral institutions, deciding whether to use or not institutions that already exist 
may indeed have something to do with power (Grieco 1996, 287–290). 
As for any authority, legitimacy, both internal/domestic and external/international is 
considered an important interest for states. Some authors have suggested that working 
with and through the UN reinforces internal, domestic legitimacy of member states 
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(and the EU as a whole) as in Europe the UN has a positive image in the public 
(European Commission 2011b; Toje 2010). Concerning external legitimacy, Claude 
argued already in 1966 that the UN, while being clearly inefficient during the Cold 
War, still served a crucial function as a forum for collective legitimation and 
recognition of states (Claude 1966). EU member states can seek legitimization by 
working through the United Nations directly, or by making the EU work with the UN. 
Finally, any review of how interests affect foreign policy-making cannot transcend 
from covering the interests of non-state actors, which are gaining considerable 
influence in today’s international relations, as well as sub-national actors such as 
bureaucracies or interest groups (Allison and Halperin 1972). This includes 
transnational groups, lobbies and NGOs that can play an active role, for instance in 
international agenda setting (Jørgensen 2009a, 10); epistemic communities, which 
tend to be particularly important on technical matters, as can be for instance 
development cooperation as opposed to crisis management (Adler and P. M. Haas 
1992; P. M. Haas 1989). Finally, also institutions if considered as agents rather than 
as structures, have interests of their own. This perhaps, brings us back to the original 
question on the level of analysis. Let’s then turn to how the literature has treated 
institutions.  
I.2.3 Institutions: agents and structures of EU-UN cooperation 
The debate on EU-UN relations obviously has an institutionalist bias, as both the EU 
and the UN are institutions. EU foreign policy in particular is a highly 
institutionalised environment, where it is hard to deny that institutions play an 
important role both as agents and structures.  
Agents 
As we finished the previous section discussing possible institutional interests, we will 
begin this one by considering the institutions as agents. Within the EU, this agency is 
associated with the European Commission or with the High Representative for CFSP 
and his/her staff. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the External Action Service and the 
new High Representative and Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP). But 
agency, albeit a very composite one, can be attributed also to the EU as a whole, 
depending on the level of analysis (Carlsnaes 2007, 546,555). In general, the focus 
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given to institutional agents in understanding EU-UN interaction has been rather weak 
and has focused around three areas.  
Firstly, institutions have an interest in working with the UN as a means to reinforce 
their own position within the system, increase coordination and integration and gain 
power (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 12–13). This debate has looked at the 
strategy pursued by institutions to increase their presence and interaction in 
international organization in order to also increase their role and presence in EU 
internal coordination (Taylor 2006). This can be linked to neo-functionalist 
explanations around opportunism and spill over across pillars and issues, particularly 
in areas where competences are overlapping (E. Haas 2004), for example across the 
development-security spectrum. Another explanation comes from the Principle-agent 
schematization, which has been used extensively in EU studies, to conceptualize the 
tendency towards autonomisation or slack of institutions (agents)(Klein 2010; Pollack 
2007).  
Secondly, inter-organizational theory has tried to map how two or more organizations 
establish and consolidate their interaction (Jonsson 1986; Tardy 2005; Haugevik 
2007; Biermann 2009; Koops 2011). Everything stems from initial functional or 
geographic overlap, or what we called above “interaction opportunity”. This has 
generally increased after the end of the Cold War. Once the overlap is established, this 
literature has highlighted the choice existing between cooperation (ranging from 
‘information sharing’ to ‘coordination’ until ‘joint decision-making’) adaptation and 
conflict between separate institutions (Biermann 2007, 165). This choice will 
primarily depend on the asymmetry in the relationship, as overreliance on another’s 
resources is generally avoided (Ibid 2007, 168) but also on different organizational 
cultures (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 719).  
Thirdly, studies have highlighted the tendency that institutions have to copycat, 
emulate or reproduce by default their own structures in the cooperation with other 
organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Literature on ‘isomorphism’ has been 
important in discussing the tendency of the EU to reproduce itself (particularly in the 
Mediterranean, Bicchi 2006), but also to create structures that attempt at adapting and 
reducing the contrasts. Interaction, in general will lead to more institutionalization and 
structuration (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This literature will tell us more about how 
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cooperation is formatted but is less powerful in explaining when and why cooperation 
occurs.  
One way to do that is to break up organizations into their component parts, including 
different bureaucrac services or elites (Allison and Halperin 1972). European foreign 
policy analysis (Hill 2002; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; White 1999) has 
dissected institutions as places inhabited by persons who have themselves their 
strategies, their preferences and tend to inform their behaviour in accordance to those 
and not only based on what the states principals tell them to do. Turf war and 
bureaucratic politics are clearly a major issue in EU foreign policy (Dijkstra 2009) 
and play a role also on interaction with the UN. Similarly, it has been noted that the 
high level of instability and fragmentation of executive power in the EU could also be 
a potential explanatory factor (Jørgensen 2009a, 11).  
Structures  
Let’s now consider institutions as structures. This second level of analysis brings us 
back to more traditional International Relations theory considerations, namely to 
liberal institutionalism and neo-institutionalism. Without going back again at the 
question of why international institutions are established in the first place (Keohane 
1984, 1988), research has focussed on the effects of the EU institutional structure on 
its capacity and tendency to work with the UN. Abundant evidence has been given of 
the costs of intra-EU coordination (not least in terms of time and resources) on the 
EU’s external impact in terms of actual policies, capacity to negotiate, build coalitions 
and influence the wider UN membership (Brantner and Gowan 2009; Laatikainen and 
Smith 2006; Rasch 2008; Smith 2006). The EU seems to prioritize internal cohesion 
over external effectiveness, strategic thinking and “outreach”. Others have looked at 
how the EU’s performance varies depending on the type of international organization 
and at its decision-making procedures (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010; Kissack 
2010). 
Finally, legal issues and institutional navel-gazing have also been a major area of 
focus. Legal scholars have problematized the fact that the EU institutions don’t fit 
well within the UN framework (Capiau, Govaere, and Vermeersch 2004; Hoffmeister, 
Wouters, and Ruys 2006) and looked at legal or political personality, representation 
rights and membership in various UN bodies (Emerson et al. 2011). Some 
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commentators also discussed the impact of EU institutional reform on European 
performance, particularly in the UN Security Council (Drieskens 2008; Van 
Langenhove and Marchesi 2008; Pirozzi, Juergenliemk, and Spies 2011).  
I.2.4 Gaps and problems 
The idea of this literature review was to provide an orientation on possible 
explanations of EU-UN cooperation based on three key analytical dimensions: ideas, 
interests and institutions. Taking this literature as a starting point it is possible to 
argue that commentators have given preponderant importance to internal factors in 
understanding why the EU cooperates with the UN. Be it the preferences of member 
states, the need for domestic legitimacy or the internal institutional structure of the EU. 
All this, of course, happens within a post Cold War structural context, which has seen 
a substantial enhancement of the role of both the UN and the EU in peace and security.  
There are some key gaps in this literature. I mention four here, which will then be 
addressed in the following section on research design. 1) There is insufficient analysis 
of the impact of power at various levels within the EU, on the commitment of the EU 
to work with the UN. 2) It is still not clear what are the drivers and processes that lead 
the various EU foreign policy actors to choose to cooperate with the UN, when they 
do. In particular, the role of institutions such as the European Commission within this 
relationship is under-researched. 3) The literature is still strongly focussed on 
security1. Comprehensive work on the area of development cooperation is scarce.  4) 
There has not been any major treatment of the MENA region taken as a whole and at 
the impact of geography on this relationship. 
Finally, two more overarching issues deserve mentioning. Firstly, the role of 
institutionalization is still prone to conflicting interpretations, which should be 
clarified. Much of the literature has argued that more institutionalisation of EU-UN 
interaction would help cooperation by making the relationship more efficient, 
 
                                                
1 See for instance the recent edited volume on EU-UN cooperation in the security field by 
Krause and Ronzitti (2012).  
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structured and oriented to mutual learning (Adriaenssens 2008; Koutrakou 2011; 
Tardy 2005). Indeed, institutionalization is an observable trend in EU-UN relations 
but to what extent has that really helped cooperation? Did it increase the “UN reflex” 
in states as well as EU institutions? Or did it instead increase rivalry? Secondly, the 
question of Europeanization or EU integration remains open. What is the impact EU 
institutional reform on the inclination to work with the UN and through multilateral 
institutions? Is what makes the EU favour multilateralism its sui-generis character as a 
non-state semi-supranational and semi-intergovernmental polity (Cooper 2004; 
Jørgensen 2009a, 11)? This thesis will explore this line of argument, by identifying 
and controlling the evidence coming from the field.  
The next section elucidates my research design and how I intend to take stock of the 
existing literature to build a fresh understanding of why the EU and its actors 
cooperate with the UN.  
I.3 Research design 
This section will look at the research design of my thesis in order to clarify how I 
intend to answer my research question concretely. As already mentioned, the scope of 
the research is EU-UN interaction in development and security in the MENA region. I 
will look at the theoretical framework and sketch some provisional hypotheses. And 
will then discuss my case study approach and show how this is relevant for my work. 
First of all, though, I will give a few short definitions of the terms of the analysis.  
I.3.1 The EU and the UN: definitions 
The European Union 
This study looks at European Union foreign policy as “a multi-pillar, multi-level and 
multi-locational web of interlocking actors and processes” (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan 2008, 34). This open and multi-layered definition of EU foreign policy 
allows to compare the cases when member states decide to voice their policy through 
the European Union institutions and when they decide to act independently (White 
2004). Member states independent activity (national foreign policy) will also be 
marginally analysed, as it is part of the broader EU foreign policy system, in as far as 
these policies are relevant to the EU. Equally, this definition allows factoring in the 
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independent contribution of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat to 
the EU’s foreign policy, particularly in the policy areas where these have a strong 
competence. My analysis, therefore, will look both at the level of the individual 
European composing actor and at the level of the EU as a whole. 
The United Nations 
Part of the complexity that characterizes EU-UN relations comes from the different 
roles and functions that the UN can play in its relations with the EU. In this study I 
take two main perspectives on the UN. The UN is (1) a legal/ normative/political 
framework, providing legitimacy and cover for specific policies or operations and (2) 
an independent operational actor on its own right, with its agencies and programmes 
and with the peacekeeping, peace-building and political mediation operations around 
the world. The different actors in the EU have different priorities. Member States tend 
to view the UN as a political and legal reference in their foreign policy concepts. On 
the other hand, the European Commission is most often confronted with the UN at the 
operational level, particularly in the development field, where the UN and specialised 
agencies and programmes are key partners in various countries and sectors. Each 
example of cooperation with the UN will be analysed for this double function of 
“Political Framework” (structure) and “Operational Partner” (agent), to see how EU 
foreign policy actors’ motivations can change across this distinction.   
Having broadly defined the objectives of this study, the scope and definitions, in the 
following section I will provide a first sketch of the key theoretical underpinnings and 
hypotheses, which will be expanded and operationalized in the next chapter.  
I.3.2 Independent and intervening variables: sources of weakness 
The meta-theoretical approach of this thesis is rationalism (Pollack 2006; Snidal 
2002). The normative or constructivist arguments for cooperation that were analysed 
above in the literature review will be used mainly as a benchmark for alternative 
explanations and perhaps to compare the reality with the rhetoric used at the official 
level. Actors within the EU (member states and supranational institutions) are 
informed by necessity, by instrumentality and by utility-seeking considerations within 
a set of constraints. Beyond this crucial rationalist assumption the approach is 
problem-driven analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). I will use the 
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insights of various theoretical paradigms (liberal-intergovernamentalism, neo-
functionalism, rational-choice institutionalism, organizational theory and bureaucratic 
politics), without trying to synthesize them into a single framework. The fact of 
working on one single geographic region (the MENA), allows me to consider external 
factors (e.g. the role of external players) relatively constant and to focus instead on 
internal factors.  
Two provisional hypotheses 
Within this theoretical narrative, my first hypothesis is oriented toward linking 
cooperation with the UN to a specific series of needs, on the part of the EU foreign 
policy actors. These needs can be grouped broadly in terms of legitimacy (ideational 
needs) and capabilities (material needs). In practice, the EU tends to work with the 
UN when it has specific institutional or political needs/interests to do so. I 
preliminarly assume these needs/interests to depend on the lack of expertise, access, 
and resources as well as on the lack legitimacy 
Hypothesis 1: The less the EU has expertise, access, resources or legitimacy towards 
a particular issue, the more it will seek cooperation with the United Nations.  
The impact of lack of expertise, access, resources and legitimacy as a driver for 
cooperation will be explored and tested in the case studies. These four dimensions 
will vary across time, issue area and actor involved (or level of analysis). They are 
valid not only in relations to the specific external action objective problem, but are 
also related to the institutional struggle for power within the European Union 
(Koenig-Archibugi 2004).  
The second hypothesis is complementary to the first one and is also based on internal 
dynamics. However, in this case we look at the impact of EU cohesion on EU-UN 
cooperation.  
Hypothesis 2: The more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is 
institutionally integrated, the more it is likely to work with the United Nations.  
Both in academia and in policy, it is often assumed that internal EU cohesion 
(member states’ alignment in terms of preferences and institutional coherence) will 
strengthen the natural inclination of the EU to work with the UN. This assumption 
was reinforced by the “Iraq trauma”, which led an important part of the scholarship to 
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associate lack of EU consensus with the incapacity to work with the United Nations. 
On the contrary, I put the accent on the observation that EU-UN cooperation is the 
product of the current fragmented nature of EU foreign policy. On the one hand, EU 
member states often revert to the UN to dissimulate their internal division (Koops 
2011, 83–87) and promote their national interests. On the other hand, the contested 
nature of European integration in foreign policy produces incentives for the various 
EU institutions to seek cooperation with the UN.  
Intervening variable: inter-organizational institutionalization 
Finally, the study tests the impact of institutionalization of cooperation over time. 
Literature on international relations has generally agreed on the fact that over the last 
decades, there has been a general increase in interdependence, institutionalisation and 
structuration in the international system (R. O. Keohane and Nye 2011). A diachronic 
analysis looking at the period from 1991 to 2010 will allow me to assess the impact of 
this process on EU-UN cooperation. This is not a principal hypothesis like for the two 
preceding one, but is considered an intervening variable, because it tests the impact of 
a strategy (not always intentional) which is supposed on enhance cooperation. The 
objective is to see whether the array of institutional structures that have been created 
over the years to enhance and facilitate cooperation between the EU and the UN (e.g. 
Communications, legal and administrative agreements, partnerships, joint trainings), 
have actually played a role (including in fostering socialization between the two 
organizations).  
Intervening variable: The more institutionalized the relationship between the EU and 
the UN, the more cooperation.  
The thesis suggests that the institutionalisation of the relationship is mainly 
ceremonial and routine-oriented and can be explained as a case of organizational 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). As such, it has not had a major impact on 
the tendency to cooperate and work with each other and actually has sparked rivalry 
on some issues.  
I.3.3 Case studies: from sphere of influence to effective multilateralism?  
After building deductively the conceptual tools for analysis and providing an 
appropriate further operationalization of explanatory factors, the thesis will work its 
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way across an inductive qualitative analysis of a series of cases studies of EU-UN 
interaction in the MENA region. I have selected a range of bounded “micro” case 
studies – instances of EU-UN interaction - that was representative of the population 
(interaction between the EU and the UN) allowing for variation across the cooperation 
– non-cooperation spectrum. Micro studies are grouped in three “macro” cases/areas 
according to geographic and analytical criteria: (1) the Maghreb (Algeria and 
Morocco); (2) The Mashreq (Lebanon and Palestine) and (3) countries formally 
outside of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Iraq and Libya). Of course, the 
MENA region will be assessed and evaluated also in reference to existing empirical 
studies of operations in other regions of the world, particularly in the Balkans and in 
Africa in order to ensure that some general lesson can be drawn.  
Due to their total number (6) the micro cases studies will have to be represented in a 
simplified qualitative way, but a more detailed picture will come per sub-regions 
(macro-case), which will allow for a clear understanding of the differences and of the 
impact of the context. This in turn, will allow a further refining of the concepts and 
the testing of hypotheses and explanatory factors. 
The next section will discuss in more detail how the three sub-regional macro case 
studies are relevant to my research question, the logic behind my case selection and 
how I intend to proceed.  
A. Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara 
The focus on the Maghreb will allow me to zoom in into a region, which is extremely 
close to the EU, highly economically dependent on the EU with a supposedly high EU 
leverage. I assume that this entails a tendency of the EU to adopt a “sphere of 
influence approach” based on its self-interest (Mckinlay and Little 1978; McKinlay 
and Little 1977; Walt 1987; Marchesi 2008; Pace 2011), rather than giving priority to 
working with multilateral institutions. EU Foreign Policy is strongly embedded within 
the institutionalized framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This entails a strong and established role for 
supranational institutions (especially the European Commission). At the same time, 
some member states maintain strong bilateral links with these countries while the rest 
of the EU membership is less active. The UN is present on the development front with 
specific agencies and programmes as well as on security, on the Western Sahara 
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conflict. In this context, our hypotheses seem to suggest that cooperation is going to 
be limited, although the case of Western Sahara will be particularly interesting.  
Within this context, my micro cases (instances of EU-UN interaction) are:  
1. The EU bilateral external cooperation portfolio (articulated across 
exclusively development issues and security related) for Morocco and Algeria 
(1995-2012) – To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN? And why?  
2. The EU foreign policy interaction with the UN on the Western Sahara 
conflict (1991-2010) (support to political mediation, participation in 
MINURSO). To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN? And Why?  
B. Levant: West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process 
EU engagement in the Levant is more articulated as compared with what happens in 
the Maghreb. This region has been a strategic priority for European foreign policy 
since the beginning of European Political Cooperation. The EU has a strong presence, 
which is embedded on the long-term in the EMP and ENP but also in other strategic 
frameworks such as the 2000 Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region. On 
short-term crisis management, though, member states’ preferences divergence is a 
constant. The salience for international politics also increases the need for 
international legitimacy. The institutional framework is more diversified both on the 
EU side (with stronger presence of Council Secretariat, High Representative and EU 
Special Envoy) and on the UN side (which is very active diplomatically and on the 
field). The continuous, painful persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict makes the 
whole area particularly fragile and reinforces the security nexus for all development 
operations. This also means that all operations are at the “border” between issue areas 
and pillars within the EU. This context favours turf wars and competition for policy 
space and intra-EU legitimacy between states and institutions. According to our 
hypotheses this should stimulate cooperation with the United Nations. The micro 
cases should allow us to better test and weight the explanatory factors.  
Within this context, my micro-cases (instances of EU-UN interaction) are:  
3. EU external cooperation portfolio (articulated across exclusively 
development issues and security related) in the West Bank and Gaza (1995-
2011). To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN and why? 
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4. EU foreign policy interaction with the UN on the Middle East Peace 
Process (2003-2010), including diplomatic initiatives and crisis management 
in Lebanon and Gaza. To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN and 
why?  
C. Outside of the Euro-Med Partnership: Iraq an Libya 
Obviously, this case is on many grounds internally heterogeneous. However, I used it 
to control and test the effect of high institutionalization of foreign policy on EU-UN 
cooperation, given that both Libya and Iraq, while being linked to the MENA region 
in various ways, are excluded from the EMP and ENP mechanisms. There is also an 
issue of lack of access in general/operational terms, as in both cases the EU 
institutions had no presence on the ground. Proximity plays a role in Libya while for 
Iraq external actors (and namely the US) are a strong intervening factor. Finally, both 
countries were the subjects of an international military intervention. In general, this 
macro case is extremely salient to EU foreign policy and in particular to my puzzle of 
why and under what conditions does the EU work with the UN.  
My micro cases in this context will be two:  
5. Crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in 
Iraq (2003-2011). To what extent did the EU cooperate with the UN and why? 
6. Crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in 
Libya (2011). To what extent did the EU cooperate with the UN and why?  
I.3.4 Comparative analysis 
Above I have explored the key parameters of my case studies. These will be further 
developed in the coming chapters. What was important here was to show the basic 
research design that will be adopted to answer the research question.  
Scientific knowledge is always based on some form of explicit or implicit comparison 
(Gerring 2001, 157) and my work is not an exception to this rule. My hypotheses will 
be refined and tested across the set of cases that are compared through qualitative 
comparative analysis (Ragin 2000). Table 1 provides a schematic impression of how 
the cases are organized analytically.  
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Table 1. Conceptual matrix of EU-UN cooperation and Case Studies2 
  Functions of the United Nations 
Foreign policy issues Political framework Operational partner 
Development 1; 3 1; 3 
Border areas (Conflict 
prevention and post-
conflict peace-building 
activities, etc.) 
4; 5; 6 2; 3; 4; 5; 6 
Security 2; 4; 5; 6 2; 4; 5; 6 
 
Obviously, a study that aims at offering such a wide, broad view of a phenomenon is 
bound to sacrifice in depth and parsimony. Some simplifications and a degree of 
descriptive imprecision are necessary to bind together such a complex and diverse 
subject (Gerring 2001, 200–229). However, there are key advantages in this 
comprehensive design. First, it allows a comparatively more wide-reaching 
understanding of EU-UN cooperation. Referring to a resolution of the UNSC and 
cooperating on the ground with UNDP are certainly very different things. Yet, a solid 
analysis can also identify common features and similar factors affecting both these 
dimensions of multilateral action. Secondly, it provides a more representative 
understanding of EU-UN interaction, at least in the Middle East and North Africa. At 
this level, the picture that I will provide is pretty precise. Thirdly, in comparison with 
a smaller-N and “deeper” study, it will lead to a more probabilistic understanding of 
the situation. In social science in general, and when attempting to understand the 
causes behind the interaction of two large organizations in particular, deterministic 
explanations are suspicious at best, inaccurate in many cases. Finally, this study will 
 
                                                
2 The numbers (1-6) refer to the list of case studies made in the previous section (I.3.3). As 
will be clear in the empirical part of the thesis, the case studies might overflow the 
categorization offered by the table as many of the issues covered present both security and 
development dimensions at the same time. In this sense, the use of “units of analysis”, e.g. 
more simple and circumscribed instances of interaction will help refine the analysis. All 
together I have analysed 15 such “units” (see Table 38 in Chapter 7).  
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be relevant to other smaller and more specialized accounts of EU-UN cooperation, 
contributing, I hope, to the understanding of the general puzzle.  
Before moving on to chapter 2, the next section will briefly discuss my methods.  
I.4 Methods:  qualitative comparison and observation 
In this section I will look at methods. This aspect represents an important part of the 
originality of my work. Although this might be considered a “large-N” study, for the 
various instances of interaction (or ‘units of analysis’) that I identified, the analysis 
remains mainly qualitative. However, it is also informed by an original compilation of 
quantitative data on aid funding levels and peacekeeping contributions. As a result, 
the qualitative variables are measured as much as possible through objectively 
verifiable indicators, allowing for a limited use of graphs and statistics, which will 
help illustrate the key findings.   
I.4.1 Sources 
As is shown in the last section of this introduction, the outline of the thesis is quite 
straightforward, with a conceptual first part and then an empirical part. The analytical 
and conceptual framework is largely based on secondary literature from International 
Relations and European Studies. I have given a flavour of this literature earlier in this 
chapter, but references to existing studies have informed my all work. Importantly 
secondary literature contributed also to my empirical chapters, as it was not possible 
to carry out specific field studies for each and every one of the case studies. Historical 
accounts and explanations already established of some of the cases were used to 
provide the comprehensive picture that was needed to answer my research question.  
The bulk of my work, however, is based on the first-hand internal documentary 
information that I gathered through direct observation in four years working within 
the European Union on the MENA region.3 In addition to various missions carried out 
 
                                                
3 My direct experience in the EU, over the period 2007-2012, include the Cabinet of External 
Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner Ferrero Waldner, the MENA 
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“on the job” mainly in the Maghreb and in Palestine, I have also carried out three 
specific research missions in New York (2007 and 2011), Palestine (2008) and Jordan 
(2011), where I interviewed personnel from both the UN and the EU. In Brussels I 
had the opportunity to meet and interview (semi-structured interviews or unstructured 
observation complemented by field notes) most of the experts involved on this topic 
in the EU and the UN. Expert interviews as well as observation allowed me to explore 
possible explanations, clarify empirical doubts and retrace decision-making processes 
(Flick 2009, 165–175). I also used some key surveys carried out internally by the 
European Commission on staff working with the United Nations.  
I.4.2 Participant observation: risk and opportunity 
Factoring in this “participant observation” into a scientific research product is a 
critical methodological problem (P. A. Adler and P. Adler 1987; Manheim and Rich 
1995, 199–221). “Participant observation” method is rarely used and can be contested 
on the grounds of its lack of objectivity (and replicability), which can lead to the 
production of highly subjective data. It can also entail ethical problems in disclosing 
information. Yet, direct observation has the important advantage of providing a very 
high level of external validity, as the researcher has the possibility to directly verify 
the data and behaviours that he seeks to explain (Manheim and Rich 1995, 201). It has 
been noted how the inherent weakness in terms of subjectivity and risk of bias can be 
tempered through appropriate techniques and a rigorous methodology (Ibid 1995, 
214–220).  
In my case field notes were a crucial instrument and it is very important to ensure that 
they contain sufficient detail and that they are reliable. Triangulating with hard data 
(official documents, papers, reports, publications, notes, briefings, etc.) issued by the 
institution while I was working within it, was important to ensure scientific rigour.  
While my closer colleagues in the European Commission were largely aware that I 
was also doing research while working, most interlocutors did not know (this 
excludes the ones who I explicitly contacted for a research interview and that are cited 
                                                                                                                                       
unit of DG DEVCO/Europeaid in the European Commission and the Delegation of the EU in 
Libya. 
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in the text). The long period that I had for making observations insures that I could 
fully “blend in” into the organization, without ever being perceived as a possible 
threat. This allowed me to access all the main information and processes relevant to 
my research. However, this did create pressure towards “going native” and adopting 
the identity of the particular institution I was to study. Coping with this issue has not 
always been easy, and it was important to maintain my constant contact with 
academia, with my supervisor and with other researchers/colleagues. Overall, direct 
participation has been very useful for my research, and the advantages it gave me in 
terms of direct understanding of the problem of EU-UN interaction largely outweigh 
the costs.  
Finally, the ethical questions are also an important factor with direct observation, as 
and more than with other research methods. Ensuring that I had the necessary 
authorization from the EU to carry out the research was an important precondition to 
work. For the interviews I had to ensure confidentiality and make sure that specific 
statements or positions were checked by the people responsible.  
I.5 Outline and structure 
The thesis is divided in eight chapters. After the introduction, Chapter 2 will provide 
elaborate the analytical framework. It will discuss the two main hypotheses in detail 
and operationalize them into testable explanatory factors. Chapter 3 opens the 
empirical part by mapping the key actors and procedures of EU-UN cooperation in 
the security and development field and zooming on the specificities of the MENA 
region. A detailed set of statistical data will be provided and discussed on EU-UN 
funding in the Mediterranean region. Chapters 4 to 6 will focus on the case studies, 
respectively the Maghreb, Mashrek and Iraq/Libya. Chapter 7 synthesizes the main 
findings and closes the empirical part of the thesis. Finally, Chapter 8 provides the 
conclusive remarks and considerations.  
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Chapter 2. Analytical Framework: a Tale of Weakness 
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate an analytical framework to explain the problem 
of why and under what conditions the EU cooperates with the UN. From the outset, I 
have committed to focus my study on this problem rather than on demonstrating a 
specific theory. As a consequence I will adopt an eclectic analytical approach to test 
various complementary explanations. Analytical eclecticism does not attempt to 
create a new synthetic and intrinsically coherent theory but tries primarily to get 
closer to the resolution of a particular puzzle, while maintaining an organic 
perspective (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).4 
EU-UN relations have intensified after the end of the Cold War in a context that has 
multiplied the opportunities for interaction. Functionalism and then liberal 
institutionalism explain this ‘fact’ as the result of the increasing economic and 
political interdependence and ‘problem pressure’ linked to globalization (Haas 1961; 
Keohane 1984). This has raised the demand for international regimes and, put more 
simply, for international - and inter-organizational - cooperation (Biermann 2009). 
Against this theoretical backdrop, we still have to understand what are the conditions 
that motivate and explain the specific decision within the EU to cooperate with the 
UN on a particular issue and to not cooperate on another.  
My approach to this builds around two guiding theoretical assumptions. The first is 
rationalism.5 We assume that actors are generally able to calculate their interests on 
the basis of cost/benefit analysis and will try to pursue these interests within 
constraints. The second assumption, is based on the acknowledgement of the deeply 
fragmented, multilevel and multi-actor nature of the EU foreign policy system 
 
                                                
4 “Eclecticism underscores the value of research that consciously and selectively adapts 
specific components from diverse explanatory frameworks originally developed in separate 
research traditions. Analytical eclecticism frames and analyzes problems as they are 
understood and experienced by political actors rather than focusing on problems intended to 
illustrate the intellectual coherence of a particular explanatory framework or the rigorous 
application of a specific methodological tool. Eclectic approaches are essentially pragmatist 
in their orientation.” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 3). 
5 For a discussion of this meta-theoretical perspective see Snidal 2002 and Pollack 2006 
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(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; M. E. Smith 2004; White 1999).6 Within this 
narrative, rationality and agency in the decisions to cooperate with the UN have to be 
looked for in the actors composing the EU foreign policy system. Yet, the interests 
and preferences of these actors are partly based on their relative position and 
power/resources within the system itself. This implies the need to open the EU “black 
box” and to focus on a series of internal factors such as national preferences, actor 
resources and institutional structures (See for instance discussion by Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis 2010, 169-177).  
In the first section of this chapter, I will look more in detail at the dependent variable 
of my study: cooperation. I will define it and then analyse the different functions 
(external and internal) of EU-UN cooperation within the EU foreign policy system. In 
the second section, I will focus on operationalizing the two main hypotheses that I 
have briefly spelled out in the introduction as stemming from rational and institutional 
theoretical narratives. Having identified the explanatory variables I will be able to 
explore and test them qualitatively in the empirical part of this thesis.  
2.1 EU-UN cooperation and its functions 
2.1.1 The dependent variable: cooperation 
A clear definition of ‘cooperation’ as the dependent variable and explanandum of my 
thesis is essential. The central problem is defining variation. Using a rational-choice 
scheme we argue that for any given ‘opportunity for interaction’, which occurs when 
there is functional or geographic overlap on a common problem, different EU actors 
will intentionally move on a continuum of cooperation options. Inter-organizational 
theory has offered some definitions of these options or types of cooperation (Jonsson 
1986; Biermann 2007, 161,165–166; Haugevik 2007;). EU actors can decide to 
simply ignore the UN (1), to share information and loosely coordinate with it (2), or 
to adopt joint decision-making mechanisms and pool/transfer resources (3). Along 
this continuum of increasing cooperation, the dependence between the EU and the UN 
 
                                                
6 We have already defined EU foreign policy as “a multi-pillar, multi-level and multi-location 
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will increase. The most intensive (and demanding) type of cooperation will be 
substantiated through the commitment of troops to peacekeeping operations, the 
engagement in joint political initiatives or the channelling of funds through UN 
structures. For my analytical comparison, I will assign three values from 0 to 1 to 
each type of cooperation, from the least intensive to the more intensive (see table 
below). 
Table 2. Variation in the dependent variable (cooperation) 
Interaction opportunity 
 (Common problem, functional and geographic overlap) 
 Type of interaction Value 
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 D
ep
en
de
nc
e No cooperation 0 
Information Sharing/ 
Loose Coordination or Reference 
0.5 
Joint decision making/ 
Transfer or Pooling of Resources 
1 
 
Having given this relatively simple and workable definition of ‘cooperation,’ I will 
now explore this concept a little further to elucidate what are the functions, external 
and internal, that cooperation with the UN plays within the EU foreign policy system. 
Analysing these functions can help me identify the main drivers and variables that 
affect the decision to cooperate.  
2.1.2 External functions: is multilateralism effective? 
External effectiveness is a key function and explicit goal of foreign policy, as the EU 
and its member states have to respond to external crises and challenges coming from 
the outside world. From this angle, working with the UN can be seen as a means to 
achieve a particular result such as stabilizing Libya, bringing peace to the Middle East 
or safeguarding Europe’s interests in North Africa. Member states and actors that 
                                                                                                                                       
web of interlocking actors and processes” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 34). 
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have the possibility of carrying out independent foreign policy towards specific 
problems will evaluate the need to work through the United Nations to obtain the 
desired results. This is true also for supranational institutions in areas where they have 
autonomous powers and legal competences. The EU is committed to an ‘effective 
multilateralism’. Working with the UN, therefore, is not only a “milieu goal” per se, 
but also an instrument to obtain results (Kissack 2010, 17–19). Within this 
instrumentalist paradigm actors will therefore calculate the benefits against the costs 
of a multilateral approach (Caporaso 1992). 7   
On the benefits side, cooperation with the UN can provide the concrete capacities 
(material resources) that are needed to achieve a set goal (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 13). 
It can provide specialized staff and other assets that allow, for example, launching a 
robust peacekeeping mission in Africa, delivering humanitarian aid in Haiti or 
brokering a peace-settlement in the Caucasus. Secondly, the UN will bring legitimacy 
to the action, by increasing its global inclusiveness, representativeness and 
impartiality (Claude 1966). Legitimacy here is not an abstract, immaterial concept but 
can have very tangible effects on a foreign policy initiative. It will provide more 
international acceptance, the possibility to engage other actors and share the burden of 
implementation. It will also reassure the recipient of the policy against possible 
allegations of neo-colonial interventionism on the part of the promoters. Finally, in 
the longer term, it will provide for a solution to scale down the effort, and eventually 
pull out if necessary: an exit strategy. In short, legitimacy and capacities can be 
looked at from an effectiveness perspective as concrete reasons to work with the UN.  
There are also costs. As discussed in the previous section, cooperation is often 
associated to a loss of independence. In addition to this, pooling resources and sharing 
decision-making power with the UN implies transaction costs, endless negotiations 
and discussions in formal forums such as the UN Security Council or 5th committee of 
the UN General Assembly, as much as in coordination meetings among donors. 
Cooperation can sometimes translate into implementation nightmares and obligations, 
 
                                                
7 In a key study on rational choice motivations for states to work through international 
organizations, Abbott and Snidal (1998) mention in particular two key logics: centralization 
(which calls mainly on the I.O.s capacity to pool resources, assets and risk of different states) 
and independence (which ensures both legitmacy and efficiency to a particular action).  
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which rarely contribute to a more effective final outcome. This is why, particularly 
when one of the actors has acquired what it perceives as sufficient experience or can 
count on its independent sources of legitimacy (for example domestic legitimation, or 
broad regional support), cooperation is seen as a burden, or even as an obstacle 
towards the desired result8. In sum, the impact of working with the United Nations for 
external effectiveness will have to be assessed on a case by case basis and will depend 
largely on the resources of the EU in each particular policy context.  
2.1.3 Internal functions: cui prodest? 
EU foreign policy, however, does not serve only external goals. It needs to be 
understood also for its internal functions (Bickerton 2011). Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan have attempted to typify these various dimensions of EU foreign policy 
and in addition to external objectives they have identified “inter-relational objectives” 
(increasing cooperation and socialisation with the other EU member states), 
“integration objectives” (promoting the process of European integration) and “Identity 
objectives” (asserting the European identity versus the others) (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan 2008, 13). In the next paragraphs I will apply this typology to EU-UN 
cooperation  
Inter-relational - dissimulating 
EU foreign policy-making serves the purpose of diffusing tensions inside the EU, 
producing solidarity and reinforcing internal interdependence. One of the primary 
purposes of the EU after all, is to facilitate relations among the EU members 
themselves. The importance given by EU states to internal coordination is a typical 
example.9 Bickerton maintains that this gives the “illusion of foreign policy” to a 
 
                                                
8 In Kosovo, for instance, European states, together with the US, did not feel like they needed 
to wait for the UN Security Council mandate to launch a NATO air campaign against Serbia. 
The Balkans were primarily a European problem and an agreement within the “West” was 
considered sufficient to legitimize a military intervention. For a comprehensive discussion of 
the Kosovo case see the volume by Sterling-Folker 2006 
9 There is extensive research on the formalistic nature of European foreign policy and on the 
priority of process/form over content/substance. See for instance, Weiler and Wessels “EPC 
collective shelter against the call for more active foreign policy” (1988, 251); Allen and 
Wallace (1977). The ‘process’ mind-set has been also applied to multilateral cooperation, for 
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series of countries that have implicitly decided to retreat from international affairs 
(Bickerton 2011, 15,23–25). The United Nations, with its plurality of forums of 
discussion, offers the perfect setting for this “epiphenomenal” foreign policy 
(Bickerton 2011, 24–25). As argued with my second hypothesis, working with the UN 
as an actor and coordinating within the UN as a political forum, is also a way to 
dissimulate the inconsistencies and the divisions that fester within the EU. It shows 
activeness and relevance even when the EU disagrees or lacks interest. Some times, 
this is done in the knowledge that discussions at the UN are not going to lead to any 
solution and that the status quo will persist10. EU coordination within the Security 
Council is an example of this internal function of the United Nations. Information 
sharing, briefing and meetings have increased over the years11 with the placet of 
France and the UK, who saw these as a way to diffuse the pressure to reform 
substantially the EU presence within the UNSC and perhaps lose their privileged 
position as permanent members (Hill 2006; Marchesi 2010).  
Identity – symbolizing and differentiating 
Foreign policy also serves the function of reinforcing identity (Lucarelli and Manners 
2006; Manners 2002). Sometimes the real purpose behind an initiative is to wave the 
flag at the camera and show to the world and to the domestic public that the EU exists. 
Often the more the EU is divided and uncertain about the substance of a policy, the 
more it will be obsessed about visibility and protocol. In this sense, as a universal 
forum, the UN offers a unique stage for the EU to show its presence on the world 
stage. The image of the EU as a “Champion of Multilateralism” (Lucarelli 2007, 12) 
and a frontrunner in the UN (European Commission 2003) has come to symbolize the 
EU’s specific identity in comparison particularly with the US. This dynamic works 
quite consistently in the security sector, because here cooperation with the UN is at 
                                                                                                                                       
example by Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2010, 6). For the first discussion of epiphenomenal 
policies see Majone 2005, 40–50 
10 Toje considers the status quo orientation as one of the main features of EU foreign policy 
(Toje 2010, 29,153). Our discussion in the following chapters of the conflict of Western 
Sahara draws very much on the inter-relational and dissimulative function of the United 
Nations 
11 The EU@UN website refers proudly to more than 1000 a year http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/ (accessed on 6 March 2012) 
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the centre of the EU’ identity since the European Security Strategy (European Council 
2003, 2008; Toje 2010). In the development sector, the identification with the UN is 
weaker. In fact, within the myth of the EU as the “global Good Samaritan” (Bickerton 
2011, 29–32; Carbone 2007), the UN has a place as a normative reference for the 
Millennium Development Goals (European Commission 2008, 2010c), but it is not 
essential. As a result, the insistence on visibility for EU operations has been identified 
both in the EU and in the UN as a major obstacle to more cooperation in development 
and humanitarian affairs (European Court of Auditors 2009, 15). 
Integration – empowering 
Finally, foreign policy within the EU has always been looked at from the perspective 
of European integration in general (Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Pijpers, Regelsberger, 
and Wolfgang Wessels 1988; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). This is true, not only in 
terms of institutional reforms and arrangements but also in terms of informal and 
operational practices. Interacting with the UN can be a promise of more integration 
for some member states or for the EU institutions themselves who have a vested 
interest in promoting more transfer of powers (Krotz 2009, 560). In this sense, the UN 
can play the role of empowering certain actors within the EU foreign policy system in 
relations with others. It can act as a bridge between pillars and competences 
particularly by reinforcing the need for cross-pillar coordination of positions and for 
common representation. Table 3, below, synthesizes the different functions that the 
UN can play for the EU foreign policy system both externally and internally.  
 
Table 3. External and Internal Functions of EU-UN Cooperation 
External Functions  
  - Enable 
- Mentor 
- Share burden 
- Coordinate, centralize 
- Motivate-provide policy  
- Legitimize (independence, impartiality) 
Internal Functions  
Identity - Brand 
- Identify 
- Symbolize  
- Distinguish 
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Inter-relational  
 
- Dissimulate 
- Coordinate 
- Diffuse tensions 
- Reinforce status quo 
Integration - Empower 
- Facilitate integration 
- Reinforce need for common representation 
- Issue linkage – functional spill-over 
 
In sum, understanding the functions that EU-UN interaction play within the system of 
EU foreign policy can help identify the conditions and factors that stimulate or 
obstruct cooperation with the UN. The next section will look at these factors in 
greater detail.  
 
2.2 Making the hypotheses operational 
In this section I elaborate more in detail and operationalize a set of variables that can 
condition EU-UN cooperation. In the introduction, I formulated two main hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 links the motivation to cooperate with the UN with the lack of material 
and ideational resources on the part of the EU and its actors. Hypothesis 2 links 
cooperation to the lack of unity and integration in the European Foreign Policy system. 
When relevant, I will adapt the variables identified both to the level of the individual 
European composing actor (level 1) and to the level of the EU as a whole (level 2).  
2.2.1 Hypothesis one: material and ideational resources 
Hypothesis 1 was roughly defined in the introduction as follows.  
• The less the EU has expertise, access, resources or legitimacy towards a 
particular issue, the more it will seek cooperation with the United Nations.  
Rational-choice institutionalism would postulate that, as interaction with the UN 
comes at a cost in terms of autonomy, a rational actor will seek deep cooperation, 
including pooling of resources and decision-making powers (the most costly category 
of interaction) only when it calculates that there is a benefit in this. As noted by 
Biermann, “ the struggle to reduce dependence is a major factor limiting the quality of 
cooperation” (Biermann 2007, 168). To be rational, the decision to cooperate should 
not be narrowly considered as ‘the most efficient’. Rather, it is the one that better 
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responds to the specific needs of an actor in a specific situation and within given 
constraints (Pollack 2006; Snidal 2002). Needs depend on the power of each specific 
actor: the resources that it has to achieve its objectives.12 Barnett and Finnemore, 
effectively explain that power in international organizations can derive from at least 
two sources:  
“(1) The legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over 
technical expertise and information”(Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 707). 
Without following the constructivist interpretation taken by Barnett and Finnemore, I 
expand the two sources of power to the broader concepts of ‘ideational 
resources/legitimacy’ and ‘material resources’. These concepts are applied both to 
states and institutions. I will begin from material resources.  
Material resources: capacities 
Material resources can be associated with the organizational strength, material assets, 
skills and knowledge of an actor: what we will broadly define its ‘capacities’. I 
distinguish here between four variables. (1) The actor’s expertise on a particular field, 
which is based on the time that it has spent working on it (experience). (2) The 
possibility that the actor has to work on a problem or region (access). (3) The human 
and other capital available to the actor such as staff, funding, knowledge and 
information (capabilities). (4) The existence or not of an independent vision, strategy 
or approach towards a particular problem (policy). According to rationalist literature 
(including both realist and liberal accounts) states use international organizations to 
achieve their specific interests and goals.13 The UN, in particular, has accumulated a 
considerable amount of competences, skills and capabilities in a variety of fields from 
development to security, which can serve the specific needs of states and other 
organizations such as the EU. Based on this instrumentalist interpretation of 
 
                                                
12 Other institutional and social constraints such as habit, socialization and norms (March and 
Olsen 1984) can produce appropriateness motivated behaviour and path dependence. 
However these constraints vary mainly in the medium to long term (Pierson 2000), so in 
explaining decisions over specific instances of interaction we can maintain these factors 
constant. 
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multilateralism, it is expected that the more an actor is in need of material resources, 
the more it will turn to the United Nations system and to multilateral solutions to 
achieve its objectives. A materially strong actor, in contrast, will have at least the 
option to act unilaterally.  
Assessing the value for each variable is primarily a qualitative endeavour but will 
entail a detailed analysis of the case studies, including in quantitative terms.14 To 
provide a better comparative basis for the analysis I have attributed a fuzzy set of 
values from 0 to 1 to describe the variation of the variables.15 Importantly, the four 
variables can ‘add up’ independently to give a low or high value of ‘material 
resources’ from 0 to 4. 
Table 4. Variation on “Material Resources" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideational resources: legitimacy 
Ideational resources, on the other hand, are associated primarily to the elusive concept 
of legitimacy (Kratochwil 2006), which we pragmatically define as the authority 
(legal, moral, political) of an actor within its broader environment. I have divided this 
concept in four variables. (1) In highly institutionalized contexts such as EU foreign 
policy, legitimacy is linked typically to a specific ‘legal competence’ based on a 
Treaty or other formal document. (2) More politically, legitimacy can be related to a 
mandate coming from principals or peers. In this sense, it can also derive from the 
                                                                                                                                       
13 For a discussion see for instance Abbott and Snidal (1998) 
14 I base this analysis on a number of objective indicators such as quantitive analysis of the 
level of aid flows and peacekeeping contributions, analysis of the organizational capacities for 
each case study, historical analysis of the context and of national and European positions. 
15 For a discussion of fuzzy-set comparative qualitative analysis methodology see (Ragin 
2000). On qualitative comparative analysis see also (Gerring 2001, 107–109). 
Material resources (capacities) Variation 
Experience 0 0.5 1 
Access 0 0.5 1 
Capabilities 0 0.5 1 
Policy 0 0.5 1 
TOTAL 0 - 4 
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degree of inclusiveness of the decision making process and on the general domestic 
support. I synthesize all this “input” perspective on legitimacy in the variable of 
‘political support’, which can be applied both to states and institutions. (3) Thirdly, 
legitimacy can derive from external ownership or the ‘acceptance’ by the recipients of 
the specific policy. This can be marked, for instance, on a direct call from the target 
country for a EU operation. (4) Finally, we can relate legitimacy to outputs and 
therefore to the ‘reputation’ and prestige of an actor based on previous experience in a 
particular domain or country.16  
As in the case of material resources, we hypothesize that the weaker an actor will be 
in terms of ideational resources/legitimacy, the more it will rationally turn to the UN, 
as a key source of legitimacy in international affairs (Claude 1966, 367; Finnemore 
and Barnett 2009, 50–51; Hurd 2008). The table below illustrates the values that I 
have attributed to the variables, which add up to a maximum of 4. 
Table 5. Variation on “Ideational Resources" 
 
 
 
 
 
Both sets of variables therefore, are expected to be inversely proportional to 
cooperation with the UN. A relatively low level17 of either legitimacy or of capacities 
is sufficient to generate cooperative behaviour.  
 
                                                
16 In this case, the assessment will be imminently qualitative but will also be based on 
objective indicators such as competences established by the treaties and informal practices 
(see chapter 3), interviews and surveys to establish ‘reputation’ and analysis of the historical 
contexts and positions of the various actors involved (‘acceptance’ and ‘political support’).  
17 For the statistical elaboration and graphic illustration I fixed the demarcation point at 2. 
Ideational resources (Legitimacy) Variation 
Legal competence 0 0.5 1 
Political support 0 0.5 1 
Acceptance 0 0.5 1 
Reputation 0 0.5 1 
TOTAL 0 - 4 
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2.2.2 Typology of approaches to interaction 
Material and ideational resources are obviously interdependent. Expertise and 
capabilities have an impact on credibility, reputation and effectiveness over a 
particular issue. They therefore affect ‘output-legitimacy’.18 However, for conceptual 
clarity I will maintain these two dimensions distinct, which allows me to assess how 
their chemistry affects the approach of the EU to cooperating with the UN. I argue 
that the level of material and ideational resources of each actor within the EU foreign 
policy system in any given circumstance conditions its intention and motivation to 
interact with the United Nations. This, in turn, affects the EU´s approach to 
interaction. The interplay of these variables can produce four possible configurations. 
Dependent approach 
If there is a need for both legitimacy and material resources, actors will express their 
full dependence on the UN. Dependence will produce substantial cooperation 
including joint decision-making and pooling or transfer of resources. Within this 
constellation of variables the UN is a key enabler for the EU or for a EU actor to 
operate. However, dependent cooperation, as noted above, is generally avoided. 
Therefore, in the long term I expect the EU to try to reduce its dependence on the UN, 
if possible, by increasing its legitimacy and material resources.  
Ceremonial approach 
In cases where the specific EU actor possesses important capacities (material 
resources), but weak legitimacy (ideational resources), the pattern of interaction will 
tend to be largely ceremonial (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Ceremonial interaction is 
based more on rituals, myths and symbols of multilateralism than on substantial 
cooperation. It normally entails arrangements for information sharing and loose 
coordination, without leading to a meaningful involvement in decision making or 
channelling of policies and funds. In short, cooperation will occur under these 
 
                                                
18 For distinction between input and output legitimacy applied to multilateralism and the UN 
see Keohane (2006). For the general debate applied to the EU see Scharpf (1999) and Lord 
and Magnette (2004) 
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circumstances and can be relatively stable in time, but it will be more based on form 
than on substance. Under this configuration specific EU visibility is not a problem as 
the primary objective of cooperation is really to show alignment with the UN and 
therefore acquire legitimacy. 
Predatory approach 
When there is a large level of ideational resources (i.e. the actor is legitimate within 
the system) but a low level of capacities, the approach to cooperation will be 
predatory. Instrumentalism in this case is more pronounced, because the actor or the 
EU as a whole approaches the United Nations to achieve specific practical objectives 
while being relatively confident of its own authority and status. Under this 
configuration of variables our European actor plunders the assets of the UN 
organization that it needs (e.g. access, expertise, human resources) on an ad hoc basis. 
In turn, if the EU decides to transfer resources to the UN in these circumstances, it 
will be very concerned about its own visibility, control and representation in the 
management of the operation. This situation can lead to conflict and frustration about 
the need to cooperate. 
Dismissive approach 
If the actor within the EU, or the EU as a whole can count on considerable ideational 
and material assets, its behaviour will tend to be dismissive towards the United 
Nations. In this case, we expect interaction to be rather atrophic in scope and quantity 
and limited to loose coordination and information sharing, with operations remaining 
separate. Importantly, lack of cooperation under this configuration should be 
distinguished from a simple burden sharing or division of labour arrangement. Rather, 
a clear interaction opportunity would exist, the UN is ready to cooperate more 
ambitiously but the EU has no interest to do so.  
Figure 1 below illustrates the four possible configurations of variables. These are 
obviously not deterministic straightjackets but just qualitative scenarios that can help 
characterize EU-UN interaction. They will orient my empirical analysis and facilitate 
comparison.  
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Figure 1. Matrix of interaction – Legitimacy and Capacities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Hypothesis two: unity and integration 
While the first hypothesis can be adapted both to level 1 (internal EU actors) and level 
2 (EU as a whole), the second hypothesis is relevant particularly to ‘level 2’ analysis, 
looking at the EU as an unitary actor. In the introduction I had tentatively defined it as 
follows.  
• The more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is 
institutionally coherent, the more it is likely to work with the United Nations.  
Given the complexity of the EU system, its fragmentation and the reticence of 
member states to relinquish sovereignty in external relations, coherence has been a 
critical problem for EU foreign policy, both in theory and practice (Nuttal 2005).19 
 
                                                
19  Nuttal, has distinguished three dimensions to this problem, looking at institutional 
coherence (that is agreement and common purpose among the various institutions that 
compose the EU, including Council and Commission/community), horizontal coherence (that 
is coherence among different policy issues such as trade, development or security) and 
perhaps most importantly, vertical coherence (that is agreement amongst the member states, 
 
Predatory Dismissive 
Dependent Ceremonial 
Capacities 
Legitimacy 
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Keeping the system together and achieving a sense of unified and integrated activity 
has been a constant preoccupation in the evolution of the EU as an external actor and 
has also been studied by constructivists as motivated by appropriateness-driven 
behaviour and socialization (Thomas 2011). Yet, although the quest for coherence 
comes at a price, particularly in multilateral forums (Smith 2006), European Foreign 
Policy literature has generally associated it to a search for effectiveness, impact, scale 
and credibility in the international scene (Ginsberg 2001). The mantra is that if the EU 
is not cohesive it does not exist and cannot exert influence internationally.  
Unity 
In the previous section (2.1) we have discussed how producing unity and identity is 
one of the primary internal functions of the EU foreign policy. Reference to UN 
processes and resolutions (or to an even more elusive commitment to multilateralism) 
often serves EU member states as a default minimum common denominator 
agreement on a divisive issue. Also, working through the UN even in the absence of a 
EU mandate, gives a benefit to France and the UK who have a privileged status in that 
organization.  
If the EU is completely divided, it will probably not be capable of deploying a EU 
operation. However, member states might decide to support a UN action nationally 
and, at the same time, deploy an accessory EU operation (e.g. humanitarian aid or 
economic sanction), in support of the UN.20 In contrast, when the EU is united on a 
particular issue, it can decide not to work with the United Nations but put forward a 
unilateral EU policy. In this case, its approach to cooperation will not be obsessed by 
ritualistically referring to the UN but will be relatively more shrewd21 and problem-
oriented. It will choose to work with the UN depending on the specific context and 
need, namely, depending on the variables linked to hypothesis one (capacities and 
legitimacy). 
                                                                                                                                       
and between the member states and the European institutions) (Nuttal 2005). Coherence is 
particularly important in the EU as a hybrid and constantly contested political actor in foreign 
policy. 
20 Note that in this situation of substantial division EU support for the UN will tend to be 
rather ‘ceremonial’ following the definition presented in the previous section. 
21 Term borrowed from Koops 2011.  
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The level of unity, therefore, will be an important factor in understanding the 
motivation of the EU to work with the United Nations, complementing the factors 
elaborated under hypothesis 1. We identify here two main variables/indicators looking 
at (1) the member states’ ability to reach a common position and/or (2) to identify a 
joint line of action. The less the EU is capable of achieving a unified position or 
launching a joint action, the more it will need the UN to act as a formal anchor of 
agreement. The table below shows how we have operationalized the variables linked 
to unity focussing indeed on positional unity (position) and operational unity (action). 
As with the previous variables, the range for unity is fixed between 0 and 4.22  
Table 6. Variation on “Unity” 
Unity Variable 
Position 0 1 2 
Action 0 1 2 
TOTAL 0-4 
 
Integration 
A second factor under hypothesis 2 puts the focus back on institutions and has to do 
with what we call the ‘level of integration’. Some authors coming from both realist 
and liberal traditions (Cooper 2004; Toje 2010) have linked the EU’s tendency to 
work with the United Nations to its postmodern character as a polity that is not fully a 
state nor an international organization but is based on an ambiguous balance between 
supranational and intergovernmental features. Intergovernmental features, based on 
sovereignty are more adapted to United Nations. The European Commission, for 
instance, as the pivotal institution of the ‘community method’ and supranationalism, 
is notoriously excluded from full membership in most of the UN’s forums, 
 
                                                
 
22 Qualitative analysis (literature and interviews) willl allow me to establish a degree of unity 
on this simple scale for both variables where 1 will measure the middle ground situation 
where a certain consensus exists but some states disagree without completely preventing a 
common position or a joint action.  
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programmes and agencies. One could argue then, that in the areas where the EU 
displays a more integrated profile it is less prone to working with the United Nations.  
We identify two indicators for this meaning of integration. (1) First, integration is a 
function of the ‘decision-making procedures’ existing in a particular policy field. 
Whereas in development cooperation decisions are taken by majority voting and at 
least for the EU budget the European commission/EEAS can count on a strong 
mandate, in CFSP/CSDP unanimity remains the rule. I expect that intergovernmental 
policy making increases the incentives to cooperate with the UN as states actors 
obtain benefits from this. With majority voting, these incentives are weaker. (2) A 
second indicator is the degree of ‘institutional coherence’, as defined by Nuttal. This 
is linked to the ability of institutions within the EU foreign policy system (mainly the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat structures and the EEAS) to produce synergies 
on key problems and challenges; the clear division of labour among them and 
therefore the lack of turf wars and bureaucratic wrangling about who does what.  
As discussed in the previous sections, the UN can help an institution increase its 
legitimacy and capacities within a contested foreign policy system. Therefore, the 
more a field is crowded by institutions, the more there will be competition for 
visibility and recognition and hence cooperation with the United Nations. Institutional 
coherence is typically low in areas that span across pillars or in new policy fields, 
where EU institutions are exploring their mandate and the possibility to expand it. In 
short, the level of integration as a whole will depend largely on the issue area at hand, 
ranging from security and development and passing through grey/across pillar areas. 
The table below displays the two variables with the total value for ‘integration’ 
ranging from 0 to 4.  
Table 7. Variation on “Integration” 
Integration Variable 
Decision Making Procedures 0 
Intergovernmental 
1 
Mix 
2 
Community 
Institutional Coherence 0 
(Grey areas) 
1 
(Security 
2 
(Development) 
TOTAL 0-4 
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This second hypothesis can complement the first one on ideational and material 
resources adding a layer of complexity and increasing the explanatory power of the 
framework. In terms of interaction approaches I will consistently use the typology that 
I have introduced above (dependent, ceremonial, dismissive and predatory) but I will 
adapt them when discussing unity and integration. At this level in fact, the main 
dividing line is really between ceremonial cooperation and more substantive 
approaches. But one can also expect that the EU will cooperate more in security than 
in development with the UN, because in security it is less integrated, more fragmented 
and more often divided. Maximum cooperation will be experienced in areas that 
articulate across pillars, where intra-EU legitimacy is contested and cooperating with 
the UN is an opportunity to build up credibility and expertise. This discussion will be 
expanded further in the next chapter, which will map the different policy fields.  
Figure 2. Matrix of interaction – Unity and Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Summing up 
My objective in this chapter was to establish an analytical framework for my study. 
First I gave a definition of the dependent variable and analysed the functions that EU-
UN cooperation play within the EU foreign policy system. Cooperating with UN does 
not only serve external purposes for the EU but plays also a series of important 
internal functions for its different actors, fostering interrelations, promoting 
Substantive 
Integration 
Unity 
Ceremonial 
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integration and building identity. Secondly, against the backdrop of the EU’s multi-
actor and multilevel system I have deductively identified four internal factors that can 
be reconciled with a rational-choice and institutional perspective on cooperation. Each 
variable has been operationalized through a set of objectively measurable 
variables/indicators that will be useful for comparative analysis. These variables will 
be tested empirically on six cases taken from EU-UN interaction in the Mediterranean 
and Middle East region, 23 with the objective also to establish the correlation between 
each of them and EU-UN cooperation.  
Before moving the specific case studies, Chapter 3 will draw up a general map of EU-
UN cooperation across the development and security field, assessing the actors 
preferences in each field and beginning the zoom on the Middle East and North Africa 
region.  
 
 
                                                
23 Due to their internal heterogeneity each case study was also split into 2 or 3 more bounded 
“units of analysis” (in total 15). These instance or examples of interaction allowed a sharper 
analytical focus.  
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Chapter 3. Mapping EU-UN Cooperation 
This chapter will spell out the main mechanics of EU-UN cooperation in security and 
development, outlining how players take the decision to cooperate with the UN and 
what are their general preferences. The main objective is to explore the different 
policy processes and assess their impact on EU-UN cooperation in accordance with 
the analytical framework elaborated in the previous chapters. The Lisbon Treaty has 
eliminated formally the EU pillar structure but this subsists in substance.24The policy 
processes and the distribution of power among actors remain very different in security 
and development.  
I will first look at the security field, namely at the ‘CFSP/CSDP pillar’, and then at the 
development cooperation sector, within the ‘Community pillar’. Thirdly, I will 
analyse how cooperation is organized in the area that lies in between these two pillars, 
mainly dealing with fragile countries and crisis situations. I will conclude each section 
with a brief zoom into the specificities of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region, in order to prepare the subsequent analysis and comparison of the case studies.   
3.1 Security: intergovernamental policy making and the UN 
The United Nations is at the core of the security policy of the EU. This is fully 
acknowledged in the EU treaties and other key policy statements.25 Article 21 of the 
TEU states that “(the Union) shall promote multilateral solutions to common 
problems, in particular in the framework of the UN”. Article 220 of the TFEU gives 
specific responsibility to the High Representative and the Commission to manage 
 
                                                
24 For legal reference I will use the European Union publication “Consolidated Treaties and 
Charter of Human Rights”, March 2010, Brussels. This contains the consolidated versions of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), together with the annexes and protocols, as they result from the amendments 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, which entered into force on 
1 December 2009. 
25 References to the United Nations and to the UN charter in the EU Treaties are multiple. 
Within the Lisbon treaty they include Article 3 “Common Provisions”, 21 “Principles”, 34 
“CFSP”, 42 “CSDP” of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Preamble, article 208 
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relations with International Organizations and especially the UN. In turn, the 
European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 and reviewed in 2008 puts the UNSC at 
the centre of any international intervention by the European Union (European Council 
2003, 9, 2008). Yet, this rhetorical commitment does not prevent the EU from acting 
unilaterally on occasion. Indeed, the vagueness of the concept of ‘effective 
multilateralism’ leaves ample room for interpretations by the different member states. 
3.1.1 Policy formulation and coordination: member states and institutions 
Given the predominance of member states in the policy processes of the security field, 
it is wise to elaborate a bit on their preferences towards working with the UN before 
moving on to the institutions. In line with liberal approaches to foreign policy analysis, 
the domestic arena is a key explanatory factor (Milner 1997; Putnam 1988; M. E. 
Smith 2004). Historically, the European public has been very favourable to the UN 
(Brantner and Gowan 2009; European Commission 2011b). Amid a general 
reluctance towards military interventions, a UN mandate is an important factor for 
domestic support to security operations. Thus, the UN is a source of legitimacy first 
and foremost towards the internal domestic constituencies.26 In this context, a few 
states have a particular position over cooperation with the United Nations that it is 
worth to look at in more detail: the permanent members, Germany and Italy and the 
so-called ‘UN-Lobby’ including mainly the Nordic countries and the neutrals such as 
Austria and Ireland (Brantner and Gowan 2009, 44).  
France and the UK: exploiting the privilege 
France and the UK’s policy towards working with the UN is based on maintaining 
and reinforcing their privileged position and status within the organization as a means 
                                                                                                                                       
“Development Cooperation”, 214 “Humanitarian Aid” and 220 “Relations with International 
Organisations” in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
26 “The main reason why we want to involve the UN is legitimacy” Conversation with 
member of the Libya team, in UK cabinet office, ECFR conference (Chatham house rule), 
London, 5 July 2011. The Eurobarometer polls recorded from 2003 to 2011 shows a general 
support and steady majority of people expressing trust in the United Nations as an institution 
in all EU member states except for Greece and Cyprus (European Commission 2011b)  
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also to accentuate their leadership role within the EU.27 This happens frequently on 
Middle East issues as shown by the contact group created for Nuclear proliferation in 
Iran or the 2011-2012 initiatives by France and the UK at the UN Security Council on 
Libya and Syria. Each time that the EU works with the UN, France and the UK are 
strengthened in their quality as permanent members. In addition, their higher 
responsibility in crisis management also guarantees a boosted presence within the UN 
secretariat (for instance in the Departments for Political Affairs-UNDPA or for 
Peacekeeping Operations –UNDPKO), which gives them firmer control on what the 
UN does and thinks. 
Germany and Italy: a beauty contests for status 
Germany has an important impact on EU cooperation with the UN. Its membership in 
the Organization in the 1973 has opened the way for the European Community to 
obtain observer status in 1974. Then, since reunification, Germany has been hesitant 
between the goal of promoting a stronger EU presence in the UN and the idea of 
pursuing its own national permanent presence within the UNSC (supported in this by 
France and the UK)(Roos, Franke, and Hellmann 2008). Due to its GDP, Germany is 
by far the biggest EU contributor to the UN general budget and has been very keen in 
promoting its own role within the organization, being elected 5 times as non-
permanent member.28 Its security role, however, is constrained by public opinion and 
the constitutional law. The Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s and the expansion of 
UNIFIL in Lebanon are the only occasions when German blue helmets have been 
above 1000.29  
 
                                                
27 This policy has been tenaciously pursued and has resulted in the wording of article 34 of the 
Lisbon treaty (ex 19 TEU), which in substance gives priority to the obligations as UN 
members over EU coordination and coherence (Biscop and Drieskens 2006; Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis 2011; Bourantonis and Tsakaloyannis 1997; Degrand-Guillaud 2009a; Marchesi 
2010) 
28 This included key phases in the recent politics of the MENA region such as the period 
between 2003-2004 with the Iraq war and 2011-2012 with the so-called Arab Spring.  
29 Own elaboration from data available on the UN website on peacekeeping statistics: 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ (accesses on 8 March 2012) 
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Italy, on the other hand, has resolutely promoted a common European presence in the 
United Nations and has firmly opposed Germany’s bid for a permanent seat, de facto 
preventing a common European position on UN reform.30 This was largely motivated 
by the fear for a loss of status within the EU and in New York and has had 
consistently the highest priority in Italian foreign policy (Drieskens, Marchesi, and 
Kerremans 2007; Fulci 1998; Marchesi 2010). Italy has itself sat 6 times in the 
Security Council as non-permanent member and, through its presence in UNIFIL, has 
been the biggest European troop contributor to UN peacekeeping between 2006 and 
2010.31 
The Nordic and neutrals: the UN lobby: 
The Nordic countries, together with the other neutrals (Austria and Ireland), have a 
more ideological approach to cooperation with the UN on security. The UN is a 
cornerstone of their national security identity and they have contributed vastly to the 
working of the organization.32 Of course, they also have prosaic reasons for favouring 
the United Nations. Through the UN these countries were able to punch above their 
weight in international affairs, holding key posts in the Secretariat and in 
peacekeeping and political mediation initiatives. Laatikainen has noted how the EU’s 
growing presence at the UN and the strong pressure for internal coordination has 
generated some frustration about reduced visibility (Katie Verlin Laatikainen 2006). 
The role of institutions 
EU member states have safeguarded the principle of unanimity for decision-making in 
security policy and limited the role of institutions. The Commission is associated to 
CFSP (and has some specific functions for example in funding and sanctions) but has 
 
                                                
30 Italy (supported by Spain) has been at a key sponsor of an extensive interpretation of article 
34 (ex 19) of the TEU and has promoted the first EU-UN joint declaration on crisis 
management during its EU presidency in 2003 (UN Secretary General and Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union 2003).  
31 Own elaboration from data available on the UN website on peacekeeping statistics: 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ (accesses on 8 March 2012) 
32 Eurobarometer polls show an higher than average support for the United Nations in all of 
these countries (European Commission 2011b). 
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refrained from claiming a stronger role in security, while being jealous about its 
prerogatives in broader external relations (Dijkstra 2009). When states decided to 
delegate powers to institutions to represent common positions or implement joint 
actions, they preferred doing this via a High Representative (and its administrative 
structure in the Council Secretariat), rather than giving more power to the distrusted 
European Commission. The creation of the External Action Service with the Lisbon 
Treaty has not changed this pattern. The first evidence from practice suggests a 
further side-lining of the Commission from policy making in CFSP, even though the 
High Representative (HR/VP) is now also Vice President of the Commission 
(Blockmans and Wessel 2009; Whitman and Juncos 2009).  
Channelling security policy at the UN through the emerging EU structures has been 
controversial (Fulci 2001; Marchesi 2010; Rasch 2008). States were very careful in 
maintaining specific procedures and firewalls (for example article 34 of the TEU) 
against excessive meddling by EU institutions on UN Security Council deliberations 
(Drieskens 2008; Marchesi 2010). Internal coordination on UNSC issues has been 
gradually reinforced, but ambiguously.33 Decisions on security positions are still 
largely taken in capitals and New York but a degree of ‘Brusselisation’ of the policy 
process has occurred, with efforts to synchronize the agendas. It is now common 
practice to discuss what is happening in the UNSC in the relevant Council Working 
Groups, the Political and Security Committee or in COREPER II. Information sharing 
from member states that are present in the UNSC has been formalised34 - something 
that would have been very difficult to imagine during the EPC years (Fulci 2001). 
Specific Council Working Groups, such as the CONUN or CODUN (disarmament) 
and COHOM (human rights), discuss issues concerning the UN in general (such as 
 
                                                
33 Some member states have seen in this coordination and information sharing on UNSC 
issues as a means to promote integration, while France and the UK, have approached it 
largely as an inter-relational instrument to diffuse pressure on them and dilute tensions with 
other EU member states.(Marchesi 2010) 
34 See for instance the internal document approved by the Council in 2002 (Council of 
Minister of the European Union 2002) 
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UN reform or human rights), but are not very operational (Kissack 2010, 15; 
Laatikainen and Degrand-Guillaud 2010).35  
Progressively, also forms of common EU representation at the UN on security have 
emerged, including in the UNSC. For example, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the 
obligation to invite a representative of the HR/VP to the UNSC, when a EU common 
position has been reached (article 34 TUE).36 An important output of this complex 
institutional machinery are the frequent references to the UN in CFSP positions (Klein, 
Kunstein, and Reiners 2010, 19). Referring to the UN process has become a default 
formula to reach some EU consensus on difficult issues.37  
3.1.2 EU-UN operational cooperation in security 
The UN is often a partner for specific CSDP operations or on CFSP political 
negotiations involving a mandate for the High Representative. Indeed, the United 
Nations, with its much superior structures and experience in peacekeeping, has been 
very important to the operational development of the European Security and Defence 
Policy.38 Most ESDP missions have been deployed in countries where the UN has a 
peacekeeping or peace-building mission (Gowan 2009a, 117) and the joint actions 
 
                                                
35 Interview n°1 (European Commission oficial DG Relex), Participant Observation CONUN 
meeting, Brussels, December 2007 
36 This was followed in 3 May 2011 by the adoption of an enhanced status for the EU in the 
General Assembly. UN General Assembly, Participation of the European Union in the Work 
of the United Nations, (A/RES/65/276), New York, 3 May 2011 
37 It has been argued that this behaviour is motivated by the logic of appropriatness rather than 
of consequences. It denotes a degree of entrapment of the member states in cooperating with 
the UN and in finding some kind of EU agreement at all costs(Lewis 2009). Yet, this can also 
be understood in rational terms as different member states use the “UN language” for 
different purposes: the UK and France take it as a blank check to then negotiate feely in the 
UNSC on behalf of the EU, other pro-Europe states, as a way to adopt at least a degree of 
collective action, all as a means to open news arenas for discussion (inter-relational) and 
perahps even with a genuine expectation that this can facilitate a solution. 
38 See for instance the statement by EU High Representative Solana on the occasion of the 
60th anniversary of UN peacekeeping: "The European Union has formed a partnership with 
the UN to work together in the area of crisis management. (…) The EU and the UN are 
working effectively together on the ground under some of the most difficult circumstances.", 
Brussels, 29 May 2008, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_7912_fr.htm 
(4/4/2012). 
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establishing the missions often refer to UNSC mandates and resolutions, with few 
exceptions. Table 8 lists all CSDP operations until 2010 showing which follow 
directly on a UN initiative.39 
Table 8. EU CSDP operations inter-organizational cooperation40 
NAME (Acronym) Start date Nature Status Initiative and organization 
CONCORDIA (FYROM) 2003 Mil Completed UN-NATO 
ARTEMIS (RDC) 2003 Mil Completed UN 
EUPM (Bosnia- Herzegovina) 2003 Civ On-going UN 
EUFOR ALTHEA (B-H) 2004 Mil On-going UN-NATO 
EUPOL PROXIMA (FYROM) 2004 Civ Completed UN-NATO 
EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia) 2004 Civ Completed EU 
EUBAM (Moldova and Ukraine) 2005 Civ On-going EU 
EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian 
Territories) 2005 Civ On-going EU 
EUJUST LEX (Iraq/Brussels) 2005 Civ On-going EU 
EUSEC RD Congo 2005 Civ On-going EU 
Support to AMIS II (Sudan/Darfur) 2005 Civ/Mil Completed EU-AU 
AMM Monitoring Mission 
(Aceh/Indonesia) 2005 Civ Completed EU 
EUPOL Kinshasa (RDC) 2005 Civ Completed UN 
EUPAT (FYROM) 2006 Civ Completed UN-NATO 
EUFOR RD Congo 2006 Mil Completed UN 
EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian 
Territories) 2006 Civ On-going EU 
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN 2007 Civ On-going UN-NATO 
EUPOL RD Congo 2007 Civ On-going EU 
EULEX KOSOVO 2008 Civ On-going UN 
EUMM GEORGIA 2008 Civ On-going EU 
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 2008 Mil Completed UN-AU 
EU SSR Guinea Bissau 2008 Civ Completed EU 
EUNAVFOR – Atalanta (Indian 
Ocean) 2008 Mil On-going UN 
EUTM SOMALIA 2010 Mil On-going UN-AU 
 
                                                
39 By mid 2012, 3 more operations were about to be launched by the Council in the Horn of 
Africa (EUCAP/NESTOR), in Niger (EUCAP/SAHEL) and in South Sudan (EUAVEC South 
Sudan) and planning was undergoing on a border security misión in Libya. See the Council 
conclusions on CSDP, 3183rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 23 July 2012 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131971.pdf   
(accessed in 30 July 2012) 
40 This table is elaborated and updated from the work of Fulvio Attinà (Attinà 2008, 6–7) 
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The evolution of CSDP-UN operational cooperation 
Since the launch of CSDP in 1999, cooperation with the UN secretariat has increased 
and has been institutionalised. The Joint Declaration on Crisis Management of 2003 
paved the way for regular follow up,41 generating a score of meetings, steering groups, 
trainings and information-sharing practices from the desks to the highest political 
level. From 2003, joint operations were launched in the field of security (civilian and 
military) in Africa and in the Balkans. UN officials are regularly invited to meetings 
of the EU Council, at all levels. Yet much of this is largely formalistic. It does not 
really go beyond information sharing and does not entail joint decision-making or 
pooling of resources between the two organizations.  
In his analysis Gowan distinguishes four main historical phases of CSDP-UN 
cooperation. He argues that from 1999 to 2002 the relationship was characterized by 
inaction, as the EU and the UN had still not identified the terms of a possible 
collaboration. Then, between 2002 there was a phase of experimentation, which led to 
the first ESDP deployments in the Balkans and in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and a degree of mentoring from the UN to the EU. This paved the way for 
institutional convergence from 2003-2006 with the many joint statements and 
common operations again in Africa and the Balkans. Finally, after 2006 the EU has 
taken a more selective, ad hoc approach, launching hybrid operations where 
cooperation mechanics with the UN were identified on a case-by-case basis (Gowan 
2009a, 118). In 2011, the Council adopted a paper prepared by the Crisis Management 
and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the EEAS that attempts to put some order in the 
panoply of options through which CSDP can support the UN(European External 
Actions Service (EEAS) 2011).  
This evolutionary scheme is coherent with my rational-choice argument that with the 
increase in ideational and material resources on the part of the EU, cooperation with 
 
                                                
41 See the following documents: UN Secretary General and Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union 2007; Council of Minister of the European Union 2008b; 2008a; European 
External Actions Service 2011 
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the United Nations tends to become less spontaneous. A general analysis of European 
security operations, confirms that decisions on whether to really invest in joint-
operations with the UN depend on rational considerations by the EU member states 
about the context of the operation, the previous experience and reputation of the UN 
and the relative weakness of the EU structures in that circumstance (Grevi et al. 2009).  
In addition to this, CSDP development seems to have had an impact on the EU states 
willingness to work through UN peacekeeping. I will analyse this aspect in the next 
section.  
The EU and UN peacekeeping 
The launch of CSDP in 1998-1999 occurred in a phase in which UN peacekeeping 
had reached an all time low. To some, it appeared that CSDP was bound to substitute 
UN peacekeeping, at least in Europe and its periphery (Attinà 2008). As shown by the 
graph below, the EU 27 member states’ relative weight in terms of troop contributions 
has steadily decreased from 54% in the 1990 to 6% in 2011, even though Europeans 
continue to shoulder up to 40% of the peacekeeping budget (UNRIC 2008). 
Figure 3. Peacekeeping contributions in terms of troops 
 
This pattern is partly explained by the negative experience with UN peacekeeping in 
the mid-nineties (particularly in Somalia and in the Balkans), which tainted UN 
reputation. The UN struggled to adapt to the new challenges of peace-building, which 
often implied interventions in internal conflicts and civil wars rather than cease-fire 
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monitoring between sovereign states (MacQueen 2011; Spillmann et al. 2001). Other 
organizations and arrangements came to the fore, particularly at the regional level, 
which it was not necessarily easy to subsume under the UN Charter and Chapter VIII 
(Graham and Felicio 2005). The EU itself gradually started to view itself as a suitable 
alternative to UN operations (Attinà 2008; Gowan 2009a; Ojanen 2011; Tardy 2009).   
In addition to this, maintaining soldiers in UN peacekeeping operations abroad is 
relatively expensive for the EU states’ shrinking defence budgets as compared with 
other developing countries, which receive a net benefit in contributing troops.42 As a 
consequence, Europeans have tended to engage in security operations where they can 
get control and visibility (Attinà 2008). In this sense NATO or CSDP are preferable to 
the UN. The European leadership in the expansion of UNIFIL in Lebanon is the only 
case where this trend was inverted and accounts for much of the bump in 
contributions in the years 2006-2010 (see Figure 4 below). Yet, while this was saluted 
as a return of the EU to UN blue helmet peacekeeping it is actually a good example of 
the European cautious approach (Mattelaer 2009). The EU acted as a ‘clearing-house’ 
for member states substantial contributions in troops, which, however, were 
conditioned on a stronger control on the operation via specific institutional 
arrangements in New York and in the field.43  
 
                                                
42 Benefits include higher salaries, social allowances and training.  
43 More detail in Chapter 5 below.  
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Figure 4. Selected EU member states’ contributions to UN peacekeeping (troops) 
 
3.1.3 Security and the MENA 
EU multilateralism in the security sector can be explained by the European public’s 
support for the UN and its general opposition to robust interventions unless they are 
visibly covered by the UNSC. This is consistent with liberal institutional approaches 
and is particularly relevant in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In general, 
member states find specific advantages in referring to the UN and working with it, as 
a central arena to showcase their contribution to international affairs. For France and 
the UK, in particular, the UN is a key anchor for their status as leading members of 
the international community and of the EU. 
Below the surface, however, there are many problems and constraints to EU-UN 
security cooperation. EU integration in security and defence through the development 
of CSDP has coincided with a decreased interest on the part of EU states in 
participating directly to blue helmet peacekeeping. In addition, EU-UN institutional 
cooperation has increased but remains rather formalistic. After an initial mentoring 
period, CSDP has partly emancipated itself from the UN and cooperation now varies 
considerably on a case-by-case basis. Since 2011-2012 there have been some attempts 
to cooperate institutionally on conflict prevention and mediation in particular (the UN 
has also established an DPA/DPKO/DFS integrated Liaison Office in Brussels), but 
this is still rather embryonic.  
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Looking specifically at Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Europeans seem 
reluctant to use CSDP for robust operations in this region. As can be seen from Table 
8 above, none of the three CSDP missions deployed between 2005 and 2006 in 
Palestine and Iraq is really military in nature. On the other hand, there is a long 
history of support to UN operations up until the European leadership role in Lebanon 
in 2006 and the strong backing to UN observation in Syria in 2012. According to my 
explanatory framework, Europeans have seen UN peace operations as opportunities to 
maintain a presence in regional security in a context characterized by lack of intra-EU 
cohesion and relative weakness. So far, intervening independently in the MENA and 
in the Arab world has been perceived as too risky for an organization that is still 
inexperienced in security and generally risk avert (Toje 2010).44  
I will now turn to the development field 
3.2 Development: high politics for EU-UN cooperation  
Development cooperation is a key component of the EU’s identity as an international 
actor (Bickerton 2011; Carbone 2007; Manners 2008) and a tool of its foreign 
policy.45 The EU, together with its member states, is a giant in this field, providing 
more than 50% of global Official Development Assistance (ODA). The European 
Commission, managing the Union budget (and European Development Fund) 
accounts for around 20% of the overall European effort. Germany, France and the UK 
are the other major donors in absolute terms with Nordic countries being the most 
generous in relative terms.46 The most important characteristic of this policy field for 
the EU is that competences are shared. The Union policies, managed via the 
 
                                                
44 In addition to this, the strong security role of the United States in the Middle East has 
crowded out the Europeans from the region at least since the 1956 Franco-British Suez war 
debacle (Daalder, Gnesotto, and Gordon 2006; MacQueen 2011).  
45 For a detailed discussion of European development policy see: Holland 2002; Bourdet et al. 
2007; Frisch 2008; Carbone 2007; 2009; 2011 
46 Statistics are available both on the OECD-DAC website (www.oecd.org) or via the 
European Union Donor Atlas (http://development.donoratlas.eu) 
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Community method and with a leading role for the European Commission, continue 
to coexist with member state policies under a relatively vague duty of coordination.47 
Also in this field, the official rhetoric can be misleading. The development sector is 
very competitive and even intra-EU cooperation is not easy. Notwithstanding the 
philanthropic pledges on global poverty, external assistance is also an instrument for 
geo-economic penetration and political influence (Mckinlay and Little 1978; 
Morgenthau 1962; Walt 1987) and the race for resources and visibility can be fierce. 
This is compounded by the fact that EU integration in security policy has left very 
few instruments to states for independent foreign policy other than external 
development assistance. As a result, Member states have allowed only limited 
European coordination and have resisted the efforts to have a single voice in 
multilateral financial institutions, development banks and programmes.48 
3.2.1 Agenda setting and policy coordination 
The United Nations has an important role in setting the global development agenda, 
particularly through the UNDP sponsored Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 
which have become a standard also for the European Union. 49 The major political 
guidelines of development policy are negotiated within acrimonious 
intergovernmental processes at the United Nations,50 while donor-led institutions such 
as the G8, the G7 or the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD-
 
                                                
47 See articles 209 and 210 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (TFEU). Similar 
procedures discipline ‘technical and financial cooperation’ and ‘Humanitarian aid’ which are 
regulated in the following articles.  
48 See, for example, point 7 on “Position on improving the voice of the EU27 within 
International Financial Institutions” for each member state in the “EU donor profiles” 
(European Commission 2010d) 
49  According to the Treaties, poverty reduction is the primary objective of European 
development policy in accordance with the UN sponsored MDG. However poverty reduction 
is not the priority for economic, financial and technical cooperation (Articles 212, 213 
TFEU). Therefore, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which descends from this 
separate strand of policy, is less constrained by ‘multilateral obligations’. See also article 8 of 
the TUE 
50 It is the UNGA that established the first ODA target to 0.7% of GDP in 1970. This 
processes was then sustained through many international summits and conferences often 
hosted by the UN (United Nations 2008, 147–163). 
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DAC) are used to sustain and control the commitments to the aid targets. The EU 
Treaties call the Union and its member states to respect the commitments to 
international objectives established in the framework of the UN and other 
international organizations (particularly the MDGs).51  
The UN has also an important role in coordination and oversight, supervising the 
work of the myriads of actors through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
the 5th Committee of the General Assembly and other coordination structures such as 
the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the UN System Chief Executives Board of 
Coordination (CEB). Common EU representation in these instances is very limited. 
As noted by the Commission already in 2001 there is more coordination on UN 
General Assembly political issues than there is in the 5th Committee or the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) (European Commission 2001a). On the contrary, EU 
common institutions are relatively well represented in donor groups such as the 
OECD-DAC. In this organization the EU has been traditionally quite active and is 
present both with the European Commission and fifteen EU member states.  
3.2.2 The role of the Commission in implemention mechanics 
In the day-to-day implementation of development policy, the Commission has a major 
role and important resources. 52 It has independent competence for the execution of the 
EU budget and is responsible of facilitating the coordination and ensuring 
complementarities with the member state policies. 53The technical nature of the policy 
area as well as the necessity for long-term predictable strategies further increases the 
power of the Commission over implementation. Once the main allocation of funds 
 
                                                
51 Article 208.2 TFEU. 
52 The responsibility for development assistance in the Commission is now firmly in the hands 
of the newly established DG for Development and cooperation –Europeaid (DEVCO) which 
has resulted from a merger of two Commission directorate generals in 2011. In 2011 this 
directorate general was the biggest one for human resources in the whole Commission (and 
much bigger than the EEAS), with staff in both Headquarters and delegations 
53 Article 210.2 TFEU. See also the principles of the European consensus for development 
(2005) and of the European Code of Conduct on division of labour as well as of the various 
international commitments to aid effectiveness (Accra Agenda for Action 2008; Paris 
Declaration 2005). 
  
59 
(programming) is done under the EEAS leadership and with bargaining by states and 
the Parliament, the bureaucracy can control key policy choices, design new projects, 
develop best practices and maintain relative independence from national pressures. As 
I will show in the next section, the Commission can also decide whether to channel 
funds through the UN or not. According to our analytical concept, we would argue 
that the ideational resources (legitimacy within the EU system) and material resources 
(capacities) of the Commission in this field are both generally high.  
Controlling operational cooperation with the UN  
Cooperation with international organizations is also a general objective of the EU 
policy. 54 According to the financial regulations and the legal bases for the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – as well as for the Instrument for Stability (IfS) 55- the 
decision on the implementation modality for each specific operation is taken by the 
Commission, which includes also the option of working through international 
organizations.  
Once this decision is taken, it will not be possible to change this approach, unless a 
modifying financing decision is adopted, with a similar, rather heavy, procedure.56 
This means that dialogue with the United Nations has to start very early in the process 
of preparation of each operation in the field or it will be very difficult to cooperate 
substantially afterwards. The proposal on the type of modality to be used is elaborated 
at the Delegation level, in coordination with the Headquarters of DG Europeaid. The 
more political services such as the EEAS (or before 2011 DG RELEX) are hardly 
involved in this decision. The Commission informs the member states at the relevant 
management committees or locally but, normally, the choice on the implementation 
 
                                                
54 Article 212.3 TFEU on technical cooperation. See also the many references in the main 
regulations on external assistance in the European Neighbourhood and in developing 
countries for the EU budget, as well as for the European Development Fund (EDF).  
55 See the latest version of the EU financial regulation and the 2006 regulations on the ENPI 
and IfS instruments (European Union 2006a, 2006b, 2010) 
56 European Union Financial Regulation, (European Union 2010) and ‘DEVCO Companion’ 
available at www.ec.europeaid.eu  
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modality is left entirely to “technical” considerations by the Commission. These are 
based on passed experience, effectiveness, costs and added value.57 As a consequence, 
the European Commission has an important leverage on the decision to channel aid to 
the United Nations.  
Ups and downs in the evolution of Commission-UN cooperation  
Ups: isomorphic and functionalist logics 
In this context, the European Commission has increased its cooperation with the UN 
secretariat importantly since 2001, when at the dawn of the ‘effective multilateralism’ 
turn it took a leadership role in promoting a functional partnership. This was done 
through a degree of isomorphic alignment between the two organizations, which 
harmonized their structures and procedures with the objective to facilitate the transfer 
of resources and knowledge.  
This began with a Joint Declaration on development and humanitarian aid signed in 
2001 and two key Commission’s communications on “building an effective 
partnership with the UN” and on “the choice of multilateralism” (European 
Commission 2001a, 2003a). The main obstacles to cooperation were identified, with 
the crucial limit being in a “piece-meal” approach to cooperation (European 
Commission 2001a, 5).  Part of the strategy to improve the situation was based on an 
agreement with the UN on a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement 
(FAFA), which was to facilitate joint operations by harmonizing the legal and 
administrative processes. In the following years (2004-2006) the European 
Commission also signed six partnership agreements with specialized agencies of the 
UN to enhance its cooperation with them (UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, 
 
                                                
57 Interview n°2 (EU Delegation official), 27 February 2012. See also the survey made by the 
European Court of Auditors on motivations to channel assistance through the UN, stating that 
the decisions are based on the “capacity to deliver, such as its experience, expertise, logistical 
capacity (including access to insecure zones) and past performance”(European Court of 
Auditors 2009, 15). Similar conclusions came from the own Commission evaluation, which 
adds to expertise also legitimacy and unique mandate, consistently with our analytical 
framework (ADE for the European Commission 2008, 22–25,28) 
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WFP) and elaborated specific guidelines on visibility and reporting.58 Biannual high-
level meetings in the development field take place with the UN to review cooperation. 
There are regular joint training sessions for officials, constant contacts at the desk and 
field level and even attempts towards joint programming and monitoring and 
communication.  
Progressively, EU funds channelled through the UN increased from € 250 million in 
1999 to 1.430 million in 2005, more than 15% of total financial assistance that year 
(European Commission, 2008). This situation has itself stimulated the appetite of the 
UN, which has gradually reinforced its representation in Brussels (24 specialised 
agencies) to tap the funding opportunities.  
Figure 5 below gives an illustration of these numbers, showing also the specific 
weight of the MENA. In 2005-2006, about 30% of this concerned the MENA region, 
particularly the West Bank and Gaza and Iraq. This percentage later went down 
considerably following a hasty wind down of operations in Iraq and the MENA region 
was accounting for about 8% of total aid delivered through the UN in 2010. 
 
                                                
58 For a summary on this see the website of the European Commission Europeaid Directorate 
(www.ec.europa.eu/europaid)  
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Figure 5 European Commission (DG Europeaid – EU Budget) Financial 
Contribution to the United Nations - 2000-201059 
 
 
Downs: Reining in cooperation 
This evolutionary process described above is consistent with neo-functional and inter-
organizational theory (Adler and Haas 1992), including the apparent isomorphic 
alignment among organizations, which I have described (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Yet, this period of ‘glorious’ intensification in cooperation was contemporary to the 
general overhaul of EU external assistance, which was launched in 2001 to increase 
the effectiveness and credibility of the Commission as a donor and improve the ratio 
of disbursement against commitments (Carbone 2011; OECD-DAC 2009, 131–134). 
The United Nations certainly benefitted from that momentum (which peaked in 2006) 
as channelling through UN programmes is a good way to bring up the ratio of 
disbursements.  
 
                                                
59  Data elaborated from the European Commission (Europeaid Directorate) website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/partners/international-organisations/index_en.htm, 
(accessed on 9 March 2012) 
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However, as shown by the graph above, after the peak in 2005-2006, EU channelling 
of development assistance through the UN has substantially decreased. This is 
consistent with my hypothesis 1, which argues that an increase in reputation 
(ideational resources) and capacities might lead to a decrease in cooperation. In fact, 
once it became more confident about its own donor effectiveness (second half 2000s), 
the Commission started building its own firewalls against an excessive cooperative 
zeal by the task managers - for whom handing money to the UN can often appear an 
easy and sensible solution.60 Following an internal evaluation and a report from the 
Court of Auditors (ADE for the European Commission 2008; European Court of 
Auditors 2009), the management of DG Europeaid developed an instruction note with 
a set of key questions that need to be answered by the task managers to justify 
cooperation with the United Nations (and other international cooperation). No more 
default channelling of aid, therefore, but careful and rational assessments on whether 
ad hoc cooperation can bring added value as compared to other alternatives (European 
Commission (DG Europeaid) 2009). The establishment of new partnerships was 
interrupted in favour of thematic cooperation61 and considerations about effectiveness 
now prime over the idea of having to cooperate with the United Nations at all cost.62 
Structural and bureaucratic constraints to cooperation 
There are both objective and subjective constraints to cooperation. Structurally, the 
Commission is not a member of the UN, does not have a seat on the board of key 
programmes, such as UNDP and cannot have direct access to its decision-making and 
control (or audit) mechanisms. In addition, in the development field the European 
Commission is itself a multilateral donor for EU member states funding. This is why 
 
                                                
60 Interview n°2 (EU Delegation official), 27 February 2012 
61 Interview n°3 (European Commission Official, DG Europeaid), 25 June 2010 
62 The 2001 Commission Communication on a partnership in development and humanitarian 
aid was already quite clear on the need to take an instrumental and rational approach based on 
comparative advantage, added value and relevance of the EU interests (European 
Commission 2001a, 7–9,11). The European Court of Auditors continues to monitor 
specifically channelling of aid through the UN as testified by also by the special 2011 report 
n°3, looking specifically at conflicts affected countries 
http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/7913076.PDF (5/4/2012) 
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the European Commission does not generally contribute to the core budget of the UN, 
with very few exceptions. In short, 70-80% of all assistance delivered multilaterally 
by the European Commission is earmarked to specific projects and programmes and is 
therefore not supporting structurally a particular organization(OECD-DAC 2009, 132). 
The Commission has to justify to the European Parliament and the member states 
where is the added value of “federating” EU funds in Brussels to then “park” them in 
the UN (which then itself often delegates to NGOs).63  
A second typology of constraints are linked to ‘subjective’ factors, based on 
bureaucratic rivalry. In the Commission, the overall perception of the UN has been 
rather poor. As a rule, working with the UN entails important administrative costs (a 
maximum rate of 7% on any operation for overheads to which other administrative 
costs are regularly added) and visibility costs, together with the loss of control linked 
with having to work with a big and often uncoordinated bureaucracy. The paradox, 
therefore, is that cooperation with the UN can end up increasing transaction costs, 
whereas channelling aid through multilateral institutions should actually lower them. 
3.2.3 Member states: the ‘bilateralization’ of multilateralism 
The approach of member states is not too different from that of the European 
Commission. Member states are adopting increasingly a rational (effectiveness based) 
approach to channelling their aid to the United Nations, assessing on a case-by-case 
basis whether an organization can provide the sufficient performance and visibility 
and deliver consistently on the donor’s objectives. 64 Notwithstanding the repeated 
calls from the United Nations to pledge un-earmarked funds to the core budget of its 
different programmes and agencies, many member states resist this and prefer 
 
                                                
63 Relations with the Parliament have been particularly tense over the Middle East and 
particularly on Iraq and the Palestinian territories, where the Commission supported large 
trust funds managed by the UN and World Bank. See chapters 5 and 6 below. Similar issues 
were also raised on the Balkans. See for instance Tom Vogel, “Frauds provoke backlash 
against EU funding for UN”, European Voice, 7 May 2009. 
64 See for instance the UK Department for International Development (DfID) which has 
developed a framework to evaluate the performance of multilateral organizations to channels 
its assistance accordingly. (OECD-DAC 2012a, 13). Similar approaches are taken by 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany and others.  
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committing to specific projects, sectors and countries on which they have an interest 
(often based on former colonial ties or specific political and economic 
links)(European Commission 2010d; OECD-DAC 2009, 113–209). This modality can 
ensure a wider impact and lower transaction costs without sacrificing the control over 
the operation (Milner and Tingley 2010). 
In addition, EU development policy is a disincentive for states to commit un-
earmarked funds to the UN. In fact, as the funds going to the EU budget are 
obligatory and not earmarked, member states (especially those with a small 
cooperation budget), want to keep at least some control and national visibility over 
their remaining funds. Over the years, EU institutions have been by far the largest 
channel of member states multilateral aid and their relative weight has grown at the 
expense of the UN and World Bank, which have to deal increasingly with non-core 
‘earmarked’ assistance. This process has been described as the “bilateralization of 
multilateral aid” (OECD-DAC 2012a, 5). The table below provides a view of the aid 
strategies of the OECD-DAC EU member states and the United States.  
Table 9. Chapter 3: Development assistance of EU member states in 2010 by aid 
channels (bilateral/multilateral) 
Composition of ODA Flows 201065 
 US$ million AT BE DK FI FR DE GR 
ODA 1 208 3 004 2 871 1 333 12 915 12 985 508 
% GNI 0,32 0,64 0,91 0,55 0,50 0,39 0,17 
BILATERAL 612 2 051 2 109 839 7 787 8 036 212 
MULTILATERAL 596 953 762 494 5 128 4 950 296 
1. UN 52 146 277 145 255 371 13 
2. EU 325 546 252 200 2 661 2 926 278 
3. WB 151 141 93 74 600 763 - 
4. Others 58 39 47 35 210 299 1 
% ODA TO MULTI. (core) 49% 32% 27% 37% 40% 38% 58% 
% ODA TO UN core) 4% 5% 10% 11% 2% 3% 3% 
Estimate % of total UN which is 
core66 - 30% 90% 58% 75% 95% 96% 
 
                                                
65 Elaborated from the OECD DAC website (www.oecd.org). The figures are relative to core 
funding to multilateral institutions. They therefore do not include project funding that is 
channelled via international organisations, as is the case for most of the Commission funding 
to the United Nations.  
66 The last row of the graph is an estimate elaborated from the analysis made by the OECD-
DAC report on multilateral aid 2008 (OECD-DAC 2009, 113–209). It shows how the UN 
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 US$ million IR IT LU NE PT ES SE UK US67 
ODA 895 2 996  403 6 357 649 5 949 4 533 13 053 30 353 
% GNI 0,52 0,15 1,05 0,81 0,29 0,43 0,97 0,57 0,21 
BILATERAL 585 759  262 4 644 396 3 999 2 915 8 017 26 587 
MULTILATERAL 310 2 237  141 1 713 253 1 951 1 618 5 036 3 766 
1. UN 87 170  61 672 14 287 666 573 947 
2. EU 164 1 557  36 610 185 1 012 394 2 009 - 
3. WB 24 386  18 74 21 269 299 1 420 1 263 
4. Others 12 6  6 92 28 165 25 324 380 
% ODA TO MULTI. (core) 35% 75% 35% 27% 39% 33% 36% 39% 12% 
% ODA TO UN core) 10% 6% 15% 11% 2% 5% 15% 4% 3% 
Estimate % of total UN which is 
core 
High 
93% 
all 
mult. 
 
32% 38% 
37% 
all 
mult. 
75% 64% all mult. 
73% 
all mult. 25% 
 
3.2.4 Development and the MENA 
The European Commission and the member states have an instrumental approach to 
multilateralism in the development field. The analysis of the policy area shows the 
degree of control that the Commission has over the decisions to channel EU aid 
towards the UN. I also looked at how EC-UN cooperation has increased in recent 
years following isomorphic and functionalist logics, peaking in 2005-2006. 
Notwithstanding the attempts to partner strategically with some UN programmes and 
agencies, the Commission has maintained a rather ad-hoc approach. Consistently with 
my explanatory framework, the key motivation behind the decision to channel 
assistance through the UN or the WB is the expertise, logistics and legitimacy that 
these organizations can provide in some specific cases.  
Member states in their bilateral aid policies behave in a similar way. Even though this 
can be damaging for the UN’s organizational and financial sustainability, EU states 
have tended to prefer earmarked financing to supporting the core budget of UN 
programmes and agencies. All EU donors prioritize organizational relevance, 
                                                                                                                                       
system is used extensively for non-core funding (which is normally counted under bilateral 
funding). Through this method states can tap the benefits of working with multilateral 
institutions while retaining the control and visibility. Most of Commission aid to international 
organizations, including the UN, takes this form (non-core), UNRWA being the main 
exception. 
67 The figures on the United States show that this still has a cautious approach on funding the 
core budget. However the United States does use earmarked (non-core) funding, particularly 
to organizations with specific mandates such as the World Food Programme and UNRWA 
(OECD-DAC 2009, 206). 
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efficiency and accountability in their decisions to channel funds to multilateral 
agencies, with the goal to maintain a tight oversight and control.68There is no blind 
commitment to supporting the UN in the development field, but rather a lucid policy 
to use it when and where it can bring some added value.  
This approach is compounded in the MENA region where the EU and some of its 
member states are leading players in economic and technical cooperation, trade, and 
foreign direct investment, while the UN is not very active outside conflict zones. The 
table below, provides a snap shot of the bilateral financial assistance flows from the 
15 member states that are also part of OECD-DAC and of the European Commission. 
The comparison also gives a hint of the general interest of different member states for 
the region.  
Table 10. European aid flows to the MENA region 
EU Aid flow to the MENA region 2008 (includes debt relief)69 
Mio US$ ODA to MENA 
% MENA of TOT 
ODA 
MENA countries in top ten 
recipients 
% Bilateral 
of total 
ODA70 
Germany  2893 28% Iraq, Egypt, Morocco 65 
European 
Commission 2033 16% WBG, Morocco, Egypt - 
France  1928 25% 
Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Lebanon 59 
Italy  907 50% Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, WBG 38 
Austria  634 
48% (mostly debt relief 
to Iraq released in 2008) Iraq, Egypt 72 
Spain  540 12% Morocco, WBG 70 
United 
Kingdom  486 6% Iraq 64 
Netherlands  157 3% 
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Denmark  128 7% Egypt 65 
Belgium  124 9% Iraq, WBG 58 
Sweden  121 4% WBG 66 
 
                                                
68 This was an EU priority during the negotiations for the 2012-2013 UN budget (Mayr 
Harting 2011) and is also coherent with the increasing demands coming from the European 
and national parliaments about transparency and efficiency public spending 
69  Figures elaborated from the European Commission, EU donors profiles (European 
Commission 2010d). Note that debt relief initiatives affected particularly Iraq. See in 
particular the distorted figures for Austria.  
70 Note that bilateral figures here include also money that is channelled through the UN 
system for specific projects (non-core funding).     
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Portugal  60 18% Morocco 60 
Greece  33 12% Egypt, WBG, Syria, Lebanon 44 
Finland  24 4% 
 
59 
Ireland  16 2% 
 
70 
Luxembourg  10 4% 
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The MENA is mostly composed of middle-income countries - MICs (with Palestinian 
territories as a notable exception). As a consequence, the United Nations is 
structurally under-funded as most of its core funding is focused on low-income 
countries (OECD-DAC 2009, p.48). UN system-wide coordination in the Arab world 
has also been limited, creating an image of relative inefficiency and lack of 
independence from the host country, which in MICs funds most of its activities.71  
EU institutions are well established in the development sector, playing a central role 
in the Barcelona process and the ENP and don’t need to cooperate with the UN. The 
EU’s approach in the Mediterranean is strongly geared towards “reform promotion” 
rather than pure poverty reduction, therefore transcending from the MDG agenda and 
other UN targets.72 This is clear in North Africa, while the situation is more nuanced 
in the Middle East, where there are more non-EU donors involved and instability and 
conflict increase the interest for multilateral intervention.  
In the next section, I will briefly focus on the policy area between security and 
development, where we expect cooperation with the UN to be more intense.  
  
 
                                                
71 The “One UN” framework has not been tested in the MENA and inter-agency coordination 
is left to the resistant coordinator (often from UNDP) who has however limited traction on the 
different UN offices, agencies and programmes. 
72 Even in the field of loans, where the World Bank could play a role as elsewhere, the EU has 
established and reinforced progressively the presence of the EIB, which, beyond the 
discussion among the organizations via the ‘Luxembourg process’ is a clear competitor of the 
World Bank. So the WB itself has been relegated to some key trust funds and otherwise to a 
role as a standard setter, for example on public finance management. 
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3.3 Grey areas: between security and development 
So far I have sketched a map of the policy processes and actors in security and 
development. Obviously though, these two fields are both part of what should be a 
coherent foreign policy and are deeply interrelated, especially in fragile countries. 
This interrelation is well established in academia and policy and has become explicit 
in useful concepts such as ‘human security’, ‘comprehensive approach to security’ 
(Kaldor 2007; Major and Mölling 2009; Youngs 2008) and in important UN reports 
on peacekeeping (Brahimi 2000; Butros Butros Ghali 1992) and reform (High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004; Secretary-General 2005). In this 
section I will briefly analyse some of the specificities of the elusive policy field 
between security and development, which is a fertile ground for EU-UN cooperation. 
First, let’s look at a practical definition. 
3.3.1 An elusive field: crisis response and peacebuilding 
Both the EU (and the European Commission in particular) and the UN have 
spearheaded the recognition of the security – development nexus (European 
Commission 2001b). A common definition, however, is still missing, as is a shared 
template on how this should be applied operationally on the ground. Disagreement 
lies also within the two organizations themselves and is the cause of important turf 
wars and policy debates. Gourlay has shown how different interpretation of policy 
priorities and sequencing of security and development exists among key departments 
within the UN such as UNDPKO, UNDPA and UNDP (Gourlay 2009, 14–28). 
Similarly, within the EU, the European Commission has promoted a structural 
approach to security, giving priority to long term stabilisation and prevention, 
whereby the Council Secretariat and the team of the High Representatives have taken 
narrower - crisis management- perspective on security (European Council 2003, 11).  
In both the UN and the EU, conflict about the interpretation of this problem is 
primarily based on bureaucratic rivalry among institutions, services and departments 
for influence, policy space and recognition. Therefore, to be pragmatic, I will avoid a 
general definition of this ‘grey area’ and will rather consider two main subfields of 
EU external relations. 
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- Development operations led by the European Commission, which have 
security implications as they effect conflict prevention or are related to post 
conflict stabilization, reconstruction and rehabilitation. These can be dealt 
with through specific short-term instruments like the ‘Instrument for Stability’ 
(which includes facilitated procedures to work with the UN) but also and 
perhaps more substantially, through ordinary development instruments (like 
the DCI or the ENPI) with work on governance, police and judiciary structures, 
electoral assistance and observation, etc. 73  
- CSDP operations led by the Council Secretariat institutions such as the CPCC 
(Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) and CMPD (Crisis Management 
and Planning Directorate), when they are mostly civilian in nature. Civilian 
crisis management has been an area of intense confrontation and 
bureaucratic/legal competition between the Commission and the Council 
structures, especially when operations are extended over time (Dijkstra 2009; 
Ioannides 2010; McCallum 2009). This competition has been integrated as 
such in 2011-2012, in the complex organigramme of the EEAS. 
These are the policy areas where substantive cooperation with the United Nations 
(joint decision making, pooling of resources) has been more extensive. Indeed, joint 
operations are typical in areas of fragility, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-
building (Gourlay 2009). For example, in 2006 (the peak year for EU-UN 
cooperation) more than half of total EU aid to the UN was going to five major areas 
of political crisis: Iraq, West Bank and Gaza (WBG), Afghanistan, Sudan and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (ADE for the European Commission 2008, 22).  
 
                                                
73 See the thematic Evaluation on European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peace Building, September 2010. Available at www.ec.europa.eu/europaid/evaluation . In 
2001 with the Communication on conflict prevention COM/2001/0211) the Commission put 
forward the concept of “integrated approach” to security, which is still used today(European 
Commission 2001b). Similarly, HR/VP Ashton has insisted a lot on the so called 
“Comprehensive approach” which should become paramount to EU foreign policy. See for 
instance the statement issues to the EU Heads of Delegation retreat in Brussels in September 
2012: http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2012/050912_eeas_hod_en.htm (3/9/2012). 
  
71 
3.3.2 Explaining cooperation: necessity and opportunism 
There are various factors that explain the higher than average level of cooperation 
between the EU and the UN in the policy areas between security and development. I 
identify three main ones. Firstly, interviewees have mentioned an announcement 
effect, which is sought in crisis situations and can be achieved by collaborating with 
multilateral organizations and particularly the UN.74 Meaningful responses to crisis 
take time to be formulated, discussed and implemented, but the logic of international 
media coverage and domestic politics creates the need for quick and decisive action. 
Supporting the United Nations, which can always absorb funds and resources within 
its on-going operations and standing structures, is often a useful first stage solution. 
The Libya refugee crisis in 2011 offers a recent example, but a similar reliance on the 
UN programmes and agencies is also typical during the periodic crisis in the West 
Bank and Gaza, or in times of food crisis, as in 2009.75 
Secondly, as argued in chapter 2, there is an element of institutional opportunism of 
the European Commission, the Council Secretariat or the EEAS, which is coherent 
with neo-functionalist explanations. 76 The Commission, for example, can increase its 
presence in CFSP and promote functional spill-over by working on the margins of its 
community competences with the UN. Financial assistance channelled through the 
UN system has given to the Commission a sit at the table on sensitive issues such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction, Sudan and Yemen electoral processes and the 
Middle East Peace Process. As an important donor, the Commission was also able to 
impose its presence in new UN body such as the Peace-Building Commission and 
maintain it after the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
                                                
74 Interview n°2 (EU Delegation official), 27 February 2012 
75Given this situation, the Commission, the UN and the World Bank have developed a 
common framework for dealing with post-conflict or post disaster needs assessement and 
planning missions (European Commision, United Nations Development Group and World 
Bank 2008) 
76 Of course also principal-agent theory, which stems from similar rationalist assumptions as 
functionalism arrives at the same conclusions(Pollack 2007) 
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Finally, and more importantly, the UN has vast capabilities, expertise and 
competences in crisis situations, which makes it the absolute reference for any 
operation. The EU has had a lot to learn from the UN on crisis response, conflict 
management and Peace-building and only in recent years has started to build up the 
confidence and capabilities necessary to deploy independently in these situations. In 
addition, acting in conflict and post conflict situation often entails obtaining access to 
politically difficult contexts where logistics, standing capacities and expertise are 
valued assets. Obviously the UN is also needed for its neutrality and impartiality. In 
short, in this grey area between security and development, the UN has often a 
relatively high level of material and ideational resources.  
3.4 Summing up 
This chapter analysed the key policy processes sustaining EU-UN cooperation in 
security and development: the main actors and their preferences, the legal 
commitments and institutional constraints as well as the main trends of cooperation. 
As expected in my analytical framework, it would seem that the policy sector has a 
considerable impact on the tendency of the different actors leading EU foreign policy 
to work with the United Nations. The pressure on the EU to coordinate both internally 
and externally with the UN in security and in crisis areas appears to be stronger than 
in the development sector, where a default reflex to turn to the UN is avoided. In 
general though, the approach to the UN can be described as rather instrumental across 
policy areas.  
In security, the EU strongly relies on the UN, particularly in the MENA region, where 
interventions need a solid platform of international legitimacy to be accepted. 
Although operational problems do exist, it would seem that here the gradual 
institutionalisation of EU-UN relations has brought many advantages in smoothing 
and facilitating coordination. In this field the EU can – at least on paper - either 
deploy operations side by side to the UN, provide a short-term bridge in view of UN 
deployment or, vice versa, take up on UN operations or deploy independently under 
UN mandate.  
In the development field, on the contrary, notwithstanding the very vast acquis of 
declarations and commitments to coordination and coherence, the context is not 
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always favourable to cooperation with the UN, particularly in the MENA. The EU 
and its Member States have a leadership role in this field and channelling of funds 
through the UN is used only if efficient and necessary.  
While in other regions, the EU might be tempted to follow the UN leadership on the 
ground, in the MENA this has been less the case, also due to the ‘reform oriented’ and 
Eurocentric nature of operations, in the framework of the ‘Southern neighbourhood. 
For the same reasons also the logic of donor coordination, coherence and division of 
labour is weaker in this region and there is a higher tendency towards competition 
between multilateral donors, including within the UN. However there are also 
important examples of cooperation in the region, particularly the crisis situations, 
where the UN can provide the required material and ideational resources for the EU 
and its actors.  
In conclusion, this chapter reinforces the framework that we have designed in the 
previous pages and strengthens our argument that EU cooperation with the UN can be 
understood using rational choice and liberal institutional approaches and taking a 
fundamentally instrumental perspective to it. In the next pages we will further test our 
hypotheses going more in detail into the case studies that we have selected 
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Chapter 4. The Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco and Western 
Sahara 
This chapter is centred on EU-UN cooperation in the Maghreb region. I will use my 
analytical framework and the two rational-choice hypotheses on resources and 
coherence as operationalized in chapter 2. The general objective is to assess 
empirically why and under what conditions does the EU cooperate with the UN in the 
Maghreb77. The focus on the Maghreb allows me to zoom in a subsection of the 
MENA region particularly close to the EU, highly economically dependent, with a 
supposedly high EU leverage.  
EU Foreign Policy in the Maghreb is deeply embedded within the institutionalized 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). Some member states and particularly France, Spain and Italy maintain 
strong bilateral links in this region while the rest of the EU membership is less active. 
There is, instead, an established role for supranational institutions, especially the 
European Commission, which has held a central role in the implementation of the 
European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process) and the ENP. The 
UN is present on the development front with numerous specialized agencies and 
programmes, as well as on security, on the Western Sahara conflict.  
In this context, our hypotheses would suggest that EU-UN cooperation is going to be 
limited. The relative strength of the EU in this region (particularly of the players that 
are leading its policy here) and its proximity entails a comparatively stronger 
tendency of the EU to adopt an instrumentalist ‘sphere of influence’ approach, rather 
than giving priority to working with multilateral institutions (Mckinlay and Little 
1978; Walt 1987). In the next section, I will set the policy context that creates the 
interaction opportunity. I will analyse two case studies: the first on development 
cooperation towards Algeria and Morocco from the 1990s, the second looking 
 
                                                
77 The Maghreb region normally includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, 
the five parties of the Arab Maghreb Union. However, since we are focussing particularly on 
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specifically at the security field and at Western Sahara. Both case studies are biased 
towards long-term policy making, whereas I will focus on short-term crisis 
management in the next chapters.  
4.1 The EU bilateral external cooperation portfolio for 
Morocco and Algeria (1995-2010) 
The first case study focuses on the development assistance of the EU to Algeria and 
Morocco from 1995 to 2010, the period since the launch of the Barcelona process. 
Algeria and Morocco are the largest countries in the Maghreb region, with similar 
populations of around 35 million and an important economic dependence on the EU in 
terms of trade, foreign direct investments (FDI) and remittances from the emigrant 
community. As these two countries are also the key stakeholders to the Western 
Sahara dispute, this case on development cooperation will also allow me to set the 
context for the following one, which focuses specifically on the security situation and 
the frozen conflict.  
4.1.1 EU development cooperation in the Maghreb: unilateralism at work 
Analysing development cooperation towards Morocco and Algeria entails allowing 
for an important amount of within case variation. While both are usually described as 
middle-income countries (MIC), Algeria has a much higher GDP level than Morocco 
(which is described by UNDP as a Lower Middle Income country) due to its 
hydrocarbon exports and is therefore also much less dependent on external aid. While 
in Morocco, poverty reduction is a key concern in much of the country, in Algeria the 
central issue is rather economic diversification and capacity development. Even in 
Algeria, though, the benefits of hydrocarbon exports struggle to trickled down and 
poverty continues to be an issue for large sections of the populations, particularly in 
the rural areas.  
                                                                                                                                       
the Mediterranean dimension of the policy, Mauritania will not be discussed. Policy on Libya 
will be analysed specifically in a chapter 6.  
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The EU policy 
The EU has established bilateral relations in both Morocco and Algeria. For the EU, 
the key objective of financial assistance is to strengthen political dialogue and provide 
access and support to reform strategies of these countries. In the view of the recipient 
countries, on the other hand, financial assistance is seen as a partial compensation for 
the politically costly reforms that they are asked to undertake. Poorer and more 
reform-oriented (or pro-western) Morocco benefits from an average of € 200 million a 
year in financial assistance from the EU budget, mainly through budget support 
programmes(European Commission 2010f).78 This has been consistently one of the 
biggest envelopes of EU financial assistance in the world. Since 2008 Morocco has 
also been granted an “Advanced Status” within the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
which provides further opportunities for market integration, political dialogue and 
access to EU programmes.79 While Morocco is an aid “darling” for the EU, Algeria 
currently receives the smallest per capita aid allocation in the MENA region 
(excluding Israel) averaging 54 million euros per year for the 2007-2010 
programme(European Commission 2006), with actual commitments at 46 million per 
year. Algeria is a difficult partner within the southern neighbourhood. It had 
traditionally maintained a nationalist foreign policy as a champion of third world non-
alignment and socialist economic policy. With the hydrocarbon-driven recovery from 
the crisis of the 1990s the Algerian authorities maintained an ambiguous position 
towards the EU, ratifying the Association Agreement only late in 2005 and choosing 
not to formally join the ENP through an action plan(Darbouche 2008). Aid levels 
have remained fairly constant since the late 1990s, focussing on technical assistance 
and support for economic transition.80 
In the Maghreb as a whole, national bilateral development activity is limited to a few 
member states, which, as discussed, have strong interests in the region, mainly France 
 
                                                
78 For a systematic study of factors behind aid allocation in the EU see Reynaert 2011. 
79 See European Commission, The European Union and Morocco strengthen their partnership, 
Press Release IP/08/1488, Brussels, 13 October 2008 
80 Only in 2010 was a sector budget support cautiously introduced(European Commission 
2010b). 
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and Spain. Other member states are less active, with a few specific projects carried 
out by Germany, Italy and Belgium (OECD-DAC 2012b). For all, the European 
Commission and the EU delegations are the main channels for development assistance 
and coordination. 
The EU strategy and priorities for these countries are identified in the Country 
Strategy Papers and in the various documents in which the policy is framed, including 
the Association Agreements, the European Neighbourhood Action Plan, agreed with 
Morocco in 2005 and the subsequent agreement on a Advanced Status and the less 
ambitious Road Map with Algeria, signed in 2008. In terms of financial assistances 
these documents are then further articulated in the National (multiannual) Indicative 
Programmes (NIP), which are normally structured over three year periods. The 
priorities within these programmes are rather wide ranging, notwithstanding the 
obligation coming from the European Consensus for Development to keep priorities 
to three. In Algeria priorities for the period 2007-2013, for example were the reform 
of the justice sector (governance), the support to economic transition and 
diversification and support to the delivery of basic services(European Commission 
2006, 2010a). In Morocco instead, the priorities are governance, environment and 
economic development(European Commission 2010f). Of course these priorities are 
very broad and undetermined but they are further specified in the actual programmes 
that are launched annually and are also indicatively programmed in the NIPs.81  
In short, the EU’s presence in these countries is strongly grounded in the 
neighbourhood paradigm of EU ‘acquis’ norm diffusion and partnership. The EU's 
overall ideational and material resources are quite high.  
The UN policy 
There is a strong and obvious alignment in these programmes with what is planned 
and done by the United Nations in both countries. An analysis of the UNDAF 
documents for Algeria and Morocco shows the frequent overlaps in the field of 
 
                                                
81  For the Commission’s Annual Action Programmes containing the specific financing 
decisions for each project see the European Commission, DG Europeaid website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/ap/aap  
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governance, environment and, again, economic reform.82 As mentioned above also the 
UN system in the Maghreb has a very large mandate and works through technical 
assistance on reform and modernization in various sectors. A degree of overlap is 
somehow inevitable given the fact that development assistance is to be based on the 
national and sector strategies of the partner countries. However, as explained in 
Chapter 3, the UN is more constrained by the middle-income development context 
whereby it has to constantly justify its added value and lobby for project funding.83 
Overall, the UN projects in the Maghreb have provided technical assistance in specific 
areas such industrial development, heritage, environment, but also governance. In 
Algeria, the United Nations had a lot of visibility between the end of the 1990s and 
the beginning of the 2000s, when the country was slowly coming out of the terrorism 
years and was then also hit by an earthquake in 2003, killing more than 2000 people. 
UN presence was then downgraded following terrorist attacks at the end of 2007, 
which targeted specifically the UN compound killing 23 people. In Morocco, instead, 
as the donor community is bigger, the UN plays an important coordinating role, while 
the World Bank is active with loans. 
Table 11. EU Budget Development Assistance channelled via the UN84 
 European Commission 
Financial Assistance 
Percentage channeled 
through the UN system 
Morocco (1995-2010) 3.2 billion euro 6.25% 
Algeria (1995-2010) 0.9 billion euro 0.00% 
Total 4.1 billion euro 5.00% 
 
 
                                                
82 The strategic documents for the United Nations activities in Morocco, including the United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) are available at 
http://www.un.org.ma/spip.php?rubrique28. For Algeria see the UN country website at 
http://www.dz.undp.org/ 
83 See, for example, the mid term review of the UNDAF 2007-2011 for Morocco. Available at 
http://www.un.org.ma/spip.php?rubrique28 (accessed on 28/3/2012). 
84 Elaborated from the figures of the National Indicative Programmes and the ‘CRIS’ 
Commission’s internal financial management database 
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When we go at the implementation, the table 11 above shows how there have been 
basically no funds channelled through the UN in these two countries by the European 
Commission (figures on member states' bilateral aid do not substantially change the 
picture). Specialised agencies on the ground are associated in donor coordination 
groups but are not used to deliver funding. My observation, interviews and analysis 
shows that in the Maghreb there is very little ‘substantial cooperation’ (joint decision 
making and pooling of resources) between the EU and the UN on the ground and the 
European Commission, as well as the member states, have chosen not to use the UN 
for their development activities in this region. Even information sharing and basic 
loose coordination is reduced to a minimum, to a point that redundancies are not 
uncommon in sectors where both organizations are working.85  
4.1.2 Assessing the hypotheses: we can do it ourselves! 
According to the thesis this weak cooperation outcome can be explained with rational 
arguments and calculation of EU actors in relations to their relative power (ideational 
and material capacities). According to our hypothesis 1, “the less the EU has 
expertise, access, resources or legitimacy towards a particular issue, the more it will 
seek cooperation with the United Nations”.  
Firstly, hypothesis 1 tentatively identified the need for access, resources or expertise 
as a motivation for cooperation with the United Nations. In chapter II, I have further 
specified these factors into (1) Access, (2) Capabilities – human and financial 
resources, (3) Policy and (4) Experience. I group these four factors in the concept of 
material resources, or capacities. As discussed in the previous pages the EU has a high 
level of ‘capacities’ in the development field in the Maghreb. This if we look at the 
member states and at the Commission, in particular. The Commission has a very good 
access to these partner countries thanks to an established presence through strong 
delegations on the field, and a central role in the subcommittee and committee 
dynamic in the context of the Association agreements. Funding and staff resources are 
 
                                                
85  Direct observation (Algeria 2008-2011), External Assistance Management Reports 
(EAMR) for Algeria and Morocco 2007-2010 (Internal Commission Documents – available 
upon request).  
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available and relatively abundant as compared to resources dedicated to the region by 
most member states and the United Nations. Finally, in the Maghreb in particular the 
high level of Europeanization of the EU policy reinforces the Commission’s power 
(Morisse-Schilbach 1999). It provides a high level of confidence to the European 
Commission on its position within the EU foreign policy system and limits the 
incentive on working with the United Nations.  
Secondly, the hypothesis mentions legitimacy, which was operationalized in the four 
factors of (1) Legal competence, (2) Political mandate, (3) Acceptance from the 
partner country, (4) Reputation. From the analysis of the previous pages, it appears 
that the Commission is relatively powerful (or resourceful) also on this dimension 
when working in the Maghreb. The EU member states have as a whole delegated to it 
the designing and devising of development cooperation in Algeria and Morocco 
which has reinforced the institution's authority both internally and vis-à-vis the 
partner countries. The table below provides the values for each of the 8 
variables/indicators. 
Table 12. Configuration of variables for Ideational and Material Resources 
(Resources) in Case Study 1 – Development Cooperation in the Maghreb - 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 1 Legal Competences 1 
Access 1 Political Support 1 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 1 
Policy 1 Reputation 1 
Total 4 (High) Total 4 (High) 
 
In the next sections I will analyse these two dimensions of capacity and legitimacy 
with some representative examples. The examples or ‘units of analysis’ are more than 
anecdotal: they have been selected by looking at a cross section of the instruments 
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that the EU uses in the Maghreb, in particular technical assistance and budget 
support.86  
Technical assistance - providing European capacities 
Technical assistance consists mainly in the recruitment and deployment of experts to 
assist the target institution in carrying out a particular policy or set of tasks. Technical 
assistance makes up about 20% of the cooperation portfolio for grants in Morocco and 
up to 100% in Algeria (excluding civil society support). In the Maghreb, technical 
assistance is strongly geared towards European expertise often specialized in the 
approximation to the EU acquis. Although the assistance is ‘un-tied’, the experts 
working are for a great part made up of Europeans sub-contracted by European 
consulting firms. This, not only suites EU member states (where these firms are 
established and pay taxes), but is often requested by the partner government itself, 
which in many cases prefers senior international experts to local ones. Technical 
assistance has also been gradually enhanced by the “twinning” instrument, which was 
used extensively in enlargement countries. This is public technical assistance, or 
technical assistance carried out by civil servants from EU member states. The 
objective of approximation to the EU acquis is one of the conditions for this type of 
aid, which is by definition carried out by European administrations.87 The UN is 
therefore completely excluded.  
 
                                                
86 In the past, the European Commission has also used macro-financial assistance (DG 
ECFIN), for instance towards Algeria in 1991-1994, that is, loans. However, today and for the 
past ten years, financial cooperation in the Maghreb has been associated to non-reinbursable 
grant money. Another key channel of assistance is civil society, which is mostly supported 
through small grants funded by instruments such as the European Instruments for Democracy 
and Human Rights or Non State Actors and Local Authorities. However in terms of funding, 
these operations are relatively marginal when compared to support to government institutions 
through technical assistance or budget support. Importantly, international organizations are 
often also eligible for funding through these “calls for proposals” mechanisms, but the 
European Commission has a preference for delivering directly to NGOs, which can be more 
easily controlled (Direct observation, Algeria, Libya, Brussels, 2008-2012).  
87For example, support to the Association Agreement Programmes (SAAPs) that constitute 
the framework for twinnings constitute 25% of the cooperation portfolio for Algeria for the 
2007-2013 period. They represent 70% of the technical assistance for Morocco in the same 
period.  
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As I have shown in Chapter 3, in formulating and implementing its projects the 
European Commission follows a set of rigid rules and programmes, which in general 
are quite impervious to external influence, including from the UN. Inclusion as an 
implementing partner in a project has to be triggered very early in the process, during 
the identification of the needs, and well before the financial decision is taken. As a 
consequence, there are regular complains about the lack of consultation in the areas 
where the UN is active and has a strong capacities and added value. A good example 
comes from the governance sector and justice in particular, which are key areas of UN 
expertise. The strengthening of the rule of law has been an important stated aim for 
the EU in both Morocco and Algeria, particularly from 1995, but even before (Roberts 
2003). Following an apparent opening to reform from key sections of the Algerian 
government in the early 2000s, the UNDP office in Algiers was requested to support 
the reform of the justice system, and in particular of the prison administration. Both 
these elements were ascribed in the governments reform plan. 88 UNDP therefore 
launched two operations in these areas in 2002 and 2003, including capacity building, 
provision of equipment and training (including training on human rights). These 
projects were small in scale but visible and lasted until 2006 and 2010.89 
Having itself identified the justice system as a priory area for support in both the 
2000-2006 strategy document and the 2007-2013 one, the European Commission 
prepared two much larger technical assistance projects of 15 million (2004) and 17 
million (2007) Euros in the justice and prison reform areas. Yet, even though the 
financing decisions pays lip service to the UNDP pre-existing programmes, there was 
no discussion according to my interviews on the possibility of using UNDP expertise 
for carrying out the EU projects, let alone to fund directly the on-going UN 
activities.90 Consultations were carried out for the formulation of the 2007 prison 
reform programme, but although UNDP expressed the interest in assisting in the 
 
                                                
88 Interview n°7 (Former UN official in Algeria), 17 August 2011 
89  For information on UNDP activities in the Justice sector see: 
http://www.dz.undp.org/Projets_Cooperation/Projets_cooperation.htm  (consulted on 
23/3/2012) 
90 Interview n°8 (Official from the EU Delegation to Algeria), 10 December 2010 
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implementation of the project,91 the possibility was dismissed by the Commission, for 
which the EU programme was going to be much more ambitious than previous 
experiences. This, even though, the level of EU acquis in the area of justice is 
relatively limited and therefore the need for exclusively European expertise was less 
imperative.92 In this specific case, the intervention of the European Commission had 
the effect to crowd out the UNDP from the justice sector, although from 2011 it has 
restarted its activities in the modernization of the justice sector, in a smaller scale.93 
Similar examples can be found in the area of investment promotion or health or even 
in post-crisis rehabilitation, where the UN had a strong expertise. The European 
Commission has consistently avoided the possibility of working through the United 
Nations. According to my observation, this approach is motivated by the 
unwillingness to lose autonomy, the concerns with the lack of visibility and the high 
costs linked to working with the UN. To this one can add the diffuse belief among the 
staff that the UN is relatively weak and inefficient in these countries.94  
  
 
                                                
91 Interview n°8 (Official of EU delegation to Algeria), 10 December 2010, Interviews n°9, 
10, 11 (UN officials working on the MENA region), 7 March 2011  
92See formulation reports for the EC programme Justice II, 2006 (EC Internal documents 
viewed by author). The 2007 EC-Algeria Financing Agreement for Justice II (reform of the 
penitentiary sector) mentions the following on contributions of other donors to the sector: 
point 1.4 Technical Administrative Provisions: “There is no donor coordination properly in 
Algeria. Among donors, coordination is limited to information exchange. Most of the 
programmes of support to the prison administration consist of partial bilateral actions with 
very weak financial allocation. They will be probably without notable incidence on the 
proposed projects. The Delegation of the European Commission organizes periodic meetings 
of coordination with the Member states during which it will expose the progress of the 
project”(EC Internal Document viewed by autor). 
93 All three UNDP projects in the justice sector (2 closed and one on-going in 2011) are 
around 1 million euros, with around 50% funding from the Algerian government. 
http://www.dz.undp.org/Projets_Cooperation/Projets_cooperation.htm (consulted on 
23/3/2012) 
94 Interview n°2 (Official of EU Delegation), 27 February 2012 and direct observation 
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Table 13. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Technical 
Assitance” 
Technical Assistance in the Maghreb 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 1 Legal Competences 1 
Access 1 Political Support 1 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 1 
Policy 1 Reputation 1 
Total 4 (High) Total 4 (High) 
 
Budget support – it's legit!  
The other main channel of EU aid in the Maghreb has been by far budget support. I 
will use the analysis of this instrument to test specifically the second part of the first 
hypothesis, on legitimacy and ideational resources. The more an organization disposes 
of ideational resources within the European foreign policy system, the less it will tend 
to work with the United Nations.  
For grant money, budget support has slowly developed as the prominent tool in the 
Maghreb, in particular in Morocco and Tunisia (in the MENA region it is also used in 
Jordan and Egypt). The tool, in constant development, evolved from the experience 
with the structural adjustment facilities (SAF), which were based on strong and fixed 
conditionality, grounded on International Financial Institutions’ standards (European 
Commission 2011a).  
The main orientation for sector budget support was given by the 2000 communication 
on Budget Support “Community support for economic reform programmes and 
structural adjustment: review and prospects” (European Commission 2000). 
Objectives vary, but over time in the neighbourhood the Commission used budget 
support mostly to promote sector reforms (rather than to support general national 
poverty reduction strategies as in the ACP area). These reforms in the neighbourhood, 
and in the Maghreb in particular are generally technocratic (they rarely had an impact 
on democratization) EU-oriented and linked to the association to the EU or to market 
integration. Budget support is also a response to the aid effectiveness agenda 
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developed after the 2005 “Paris declaration” on increasing ownership of recipient 
countries, alignment to the recipient country's strategies and use of the country system 
of public finance. However, for the Commission the instrument became a means to 
reinforce its role in leading the policy dialogue with the partner countries and raising 
it to an higher, more strategic level, as opposed to the more technical (project level) 
discussions typical of technical assistance. 95 
This instrument bypasses the United Nations specialized agencies active in the 
Maghreb, but it is very relevant to the work of the international financial institutions 
(IFIs), such as the World Bank and the IMF. Two of the three key eligibility criteria 
for the instrument are dependent on some kind of endorsement by international 
organizations.96Macroeconomic stability is normally established in consultation and 
coordination with the ‘Article 4’ annual consultations of the IMF, while the Public 
finance management assessment is carried out within the standards set largely by the 
World Bank.97  
In practice, the Commission uses the assessments coming from the World Bank or the 
IMF to reassure some member states, such as Germany, which have regularly 
expressed scepticism over the use of budget support (Schmidt 2006), particularly in 
middle income countries. This emerges from our analysis of the financing decisions 
documents for budget support programmes, both in Morocco and Algeria. The 
 
                                                
95 In Morocco, budget support increased from about 50% of the total aid delivered in the 
country in the period 2000-2006 to around 80% with the ENPI instrument from 2007. The 
instrument was introduced also in Algeria, with the 2010 annual action programme (available 
on DG Europeaid website).  
96 The three eligibility criteria for sector budget support are (1) macroeconomic stability, (2) 
reform of the public finance management system, (3) a credible sector strategy. “This 
instrument was gradually promoted by the European Commission and was included also in 
the ENPI regulation (Reg.1638/06), which is mainly geared to promoting reform, support 
policies and strengthen institutions (Art.2). The regulation foresees the provision of EU funds 
for sectoral or general budget support if the partners’ public finance management system is 
sufficiently transparent, reliable and effective, and where it has put in place properly 
formulated sectoral or macroeconomic policies approved by its principal donors, including, 
where relevant, the international financial institutions (Art.15)”(European Union 2006a) 
97 See for instance the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Framework, a 
reputed Public Finance Management Assessement methodology sponsored and hosted by the 
World Bank secretariat (www.pefa.org) 
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decision on whether the instrument can be used is taken on the basis of independent 
considerations of the Commission and of the experience with this instrument (which 
in North Africa, largely precedes the establishment of any specific international 
assessment framework). The endorsement from these organizations is used for its 
legitimizing effect and is mainly ceremonial, while the European Commission boasts 
both its expertise in formulating and implementing these programmes, and its specific 
approach to them particularly in the Maghreb(DG Europeaid, EC 2007; European 
Commission 2011a).  
Cooperation with IFIs is in general positive in the Maghreb (particularly in Morocco 
and Tunisia) and is being reinforced, for instance through the regular meetings with 
the IFIs under a ‘Commission-WB Memorandum of Understanding for a Strategic 
Partnership for the MENA’ and the so-called ‘Luxembourg Process’ (including the 
Commission, IMF, WB, and EIB).98 Good coordination is particularly important for 
the European Commission as an increase in the loan levels by IFIs, in particular in 
Morocco, can undermine the leverage of the grant money coming from the 
Commission.99 New grant/loan blending instruments such as the Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility (NIF) should be seen also in this light. This is not only effective 
means to increase the impact of projects by joining up with development banks, but 
also a way to maintain the leverage of the necessarily limited grant money, by having 
a central seat on the project’s management board.100 But in Morocco and Tunisia the 
 
                                                
98 Cooperation with the IFIs in the Maghreb is more developed than it is with the UN. There is 
regular exchange of information, stopovers of WB officials to Brussels before negotiating 
with partner countries and occasional visits of Brussels staff to Washington, Policy co-
ordination, i.e. structural adjustment, governance and Private sector development 
(workshops), co-financing of programme preparation and co-operation on specific operations 
in Algeria (in the past), Morocco and Tunisia including joint public expenditure reviews. See 
the World Bank website’s page on cooperation with the European Union in the MENA: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/WBEU/0,,co
ntentMDK:20421974~menuPK:581208~pagePK:64137114~piPK:64136911~theSitePK:3808
23,00.html (23/4/2012) 
99 This could be pictured as a decrease in the relative ‘capabilities’ volume. 
100 Direct observation and interview n°12 (EU Delegation official with extensive experience in 
the MENA) email interview, 14 September 2011. See also the DG Europeaid webpage for the 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility: 
 
 87 
 
EC and the World Bank have also worked on joint programmes, where the 
Commission provides money and the WB loans on the basis of the same project 
objectives.101 
In general, it would seem that through budget support, the European Commission has 
gradually reinforced its credibility in implementing EU development policy, with 
specific instruments and policies. The UN is generally excluded from budget support 
while other international organizations (IFIs) play a highly ceremonial role, helping 
maintain the support of member states for the Commission’s methodology.  
This example casts some light in the need for some legitimacy for the EU, particularly 
in using budget support in the Maghreb, with middle-income countries. The European 
Commission has the support of southern member states on its strategy, which 
increases the absorption capacity of aid in these countries. However, it needs the 
support of IFIs to maintain the support of northern member states, which have a more 
prudent position on the use of budget support, and a lower interest in maintaining a 
high level of development assistance in these countries.  
Table 14. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Budget 
Support” 
Budget Support in the Maghreb 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 1 Legal Competences 1 
Access 1 Political Support 0 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 1 
Policy 1 Reputation 0,5 
Total 4 (High) Total  2,5 (Medium  
                                                                                                                                       
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-
cooperation/irc/investment_en.htm 23/4/2012 
101 EAMR 2011 second semester Morocco – internal). See for instance the Programme 
supporting the reform of the public administration (PARAP). Joint operations with the UN are 
more rare, but in Morocco there is a case in the Health sector where MDGs targets are 
monitored jointly with UNFPA (PASS programme). Information available on the website of 
the EU delegation in Morocco.  
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/morocco/projects/list_of_projects/project_fr.htm 
(23/4/2012) 
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4.1.3 Explaining  
This case is based on the observation that EU development cooperation with the 
United Nations in the Maghreb region is very limited and reduced mainly to loose 
coordination and information sharing. There is basically no channelling of aid through 
the United Nations (nor through other international organizations like the World 
Bank). If anything, this trend has increased in the years from the 1990s, as the EU has 
progressively emancipated itself from the IMF and the WB by moving from structural 
adjustment to the instrument of sector budget support (Schmidt 2006). At the level of 
technical assistance the paradigm of EU approximation, EU integration and EU-
orientated reforms is dominant also in areas where the UN has a clear experience on 
the ground and globally, such as governance, rule of law and rehabilitation. As both in 
terms of capacities and legitimacy EU institutions don’t feel the need to work with the 
UN, the behavioural pattern is largely dismissive, with the notable exception coming 
from areas of specific expertise (such as migration and refugees), where international 
organizations can count on an exclusive mandate.102 
Our hypothesis 1, linking cooperation to lack of capacities (material resources) and 
legitimacy (ideational resources) is sufficient to explain this case. The European 
Union is powerful enough in the Maghreb region to do without the United Nations. 
The key member states which are leading the policy in the Maghreb, France, and to a 
lesser extent Italy and Spain, have Europeanized the Maghreb policy using Europe as 
a legitimizing tool and instrument, rather than the UN. Other EU members, lack the 
interest to actually oppose this pattern or block the policy, as this is still generally 
considered as the domaine reservé of Southern EU states (Gillespie 2009). Some 
might contest that the substance of the EU policy – especially in crisis phases103 - 
towards the Maghreb is decided in a few key national capitals (Roberts 2003). Yet, it 
 
                                                
102 But even here, the EU does not like to maintain dependence and has financed also 
alternative organizations, with exclusively European membership, such as the International 
Centre for Migration Management Policy Development (ICMPD) (www.icmpd.org). 
Similarly, in difficult situations in the MENA and Balkans, the European Commission often 
uses IMG (International Management Group), a newly established international organizations 
with expertise in providing technical assistance, as an alternative to UN agencies.  
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is a fact that the European Commission has been given an important and 
institutionalized role in carrying out long-term development cooperation in the 
framework of the MENA and then ENPI regulations on behalf of the EU member 
states.  
As this became clear with Barcelona in 1995, interaction with the United Nations has 
remained atrophic and the Commission (but the same can be expected from the 
EEAS) has been unwilling to give up its autonomy. The justification for sidelining the 
UN lays at two levels. On the one hand, the proximity and EU integration agenda of 
the neighbourhood (particularly in the Maghreb) has primed over the Millennium 
Development Goals and poverty reduction as policy objectives. On the other hand, the 
idea of adding a further multilateral step to implementation went against the need to 
speed up disbursements and increase absorption capacity, which became a crucial 
priority from the administrative reform of 2000 (Carbone 2007; Holland 2002; Mold 
2007).104  
As a result, going back to the analytical scheme elaborated in chapter 2 the behaviour 
of the EU toward the UN has ranged from being dismissive to ceremonial. It can be 
labelled dismissive with technical assistance, where EU institutions can count on a 
high level of material and ideational resources. While with Budget support interaction 
has been mostly ritualistic and ceremonial, as some lip service to IFI expertise is 
needed to fence the doubts regularly expressed by some northern member states.  
                                                                                                                                       
103 See the reaction to the 2011 “Arab Spring”.  
104 This partially explains also the acceleration on budget support, which has a higher 
absorption capacity than technical assistance.   
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Figure 6. Illustration of the configuration of variables (resources) in Case 1 
 
 
4.2 The EU foreign policy interaction with the UN on the 
Western Sahara conflict (1991-2010)  
The story changes considerably when looking at security, and specifically at the case 
of Western Sahara, which has been a constant disturbing factor in the security context 
of the region for almost 40 years. Here the UN has played a major role both as a 
political framework since 1970s when the conflict started, and as an operational actor 
from 1991 when the MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara) peace operation was launched. The UN has had an important role 
also in the political meditation effort, through the good offices of the UN Secretary 
General and its Special Representative (also head of MINURSO) and the Personal 
envoy. Specialized agencies have also been active on the conflict in Western Sahara, 
particularly the UNHCR, which has coordinated refugee relief and confidence 
building measures in the camps in Algeria and elsewhere. 
The conflict in the Western Sahara is one of the most prominent features of Algeria-
Morocco relations. In this case study I therefore turn to how the EU has been involved 
in this frozen conflict and to what extent it has cooperated with the United Nations in 
its management and resolution. Over the years there has been a strong, albeit passive, 
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EU cooperation within the UN and a complete reliance on the United Nations 
initiative to mediate a solution on Western Sahara (Gillespie 2009, 94). This is 
strikingly different from the picture of the development sector. 
For this case, therefore, I will test in particular my second hypothesis, which states 
that “the more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is 
institutionally integrated, the more it is likely to work with the United Nation”. 
Considering that the Western Sahara conflict obviously falls in the security domain, 
where member states maintain strong control of the policy outcome, this second 
hypothesis allows me to focus better on the impact of different state preferences.  
In the next sections I will look at the main determinants of the conflict and at the 
positions within the EU, to show how the EU is divided on this issue. I will then look 
at how cooperation with the UN is articulated.  
4.2.1 Main features of the conflict 
The Western Sahara conflict has languished in the European neighbourhood for more 
than thirty years, with considerable costs. Apart from the human suffering that it 
causes for the stranded and displaced populations affected, it is the most important 
irritant in the relations between Algeria and Morocco. This frozen conflict hampers all 
efforts for meaningful sub-regional integration in the Maghreb, for instance through 
the Arab Maghreb Union established in 1989, but damages also cooperation in the 
Sahel, a key region for Europe’s security. Morocco’s relative isolation in Africa and 
its exclusion from the African Union (of which the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic –SADR- is a full member) have also put an important obstacle to the 
development of this organisation as the overarching collective security mechanism in 
the continent. As a whole, the lack of a solution to this problem (whatever this might 
be) is an open wound to the EU’s strategic objective of promoting a ring of friends in 
its neighbourhood. 
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Historical accounts of the conflict 105  often start from the period of Spanish 
colonization, as sanctioned by the 1884 Berlin conference and at the subsequent 
formation of a Western Saharan national identity, distinguished from Morocco, which, 
among other things, was under French rule. In 1975 Spain relinquished the territory 
abruptly to Morocco and Mauritania with a tripartite agreement. Faced with the 
Polisario Front106’s fighting, Mauritania soon gave up any claim to the territory but 
Morocco in 1976 decided to occupy it. A conflict between Morocco and the Polisario 
front, supported by Algeria, ensued and is still going on today, albeit since 1991 a UN 
administered cease-fire is in force.  
While being a bilateral decolonization problem between Morocco and the Polisario 
Front representing the SADR, the issue was multilateralized from the inception with a 
strong role for the United Nations system, through the General Assembly, the 
International Count of Justice, the Security Council and the Secretary General and its 
envoys. In fact, this is a good case for assessing the effect of United Nations 
involvement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping (Gillespie 2009; Goulding 2003, 
199–214; Jensen 2005, 116). After 1991, it was targeted by renewed international 
activism starting with the Settlement Plan proposed by the Secretary General, on the 
wave of the positive momentum in multilateral affairs following the international 
intervention in Iraq. As a consequence the UNSC decided to deploy the MINURSO 
mission with the purpose of organizing and implementing the referendum of self-
determination. The referendum, though, was hijacked by the problem of the 
identification of voters, which was never clarified.  Notwithstanding the fact that the 
MINURSO mission is now primarily a peacekeeping operation, the UN involvement 
has always been under Chapter VI of the Charter on Dispute Settlement, with the 
 
                                                
105 For an historical analysis of the conflict see Hodges 1983; Bontems 1984; Zoubir & 
Volman 1993; Barbier 2000; Jensen 2005; Zunes & Mundy 2010. 
106 The Polisario Front represents the Sahrawi national liberation movement. Polisario is a 
Spanish abbreviation of Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro 
("Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro").  
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Fourth Commission on Decolonization treating the subject on the General Assembly 
side (Jensen 2005; MacQueen 2011)107.  
Although it is impossible to discern right from wrong in this conflict most observers 
and historians agree on number of points.  
a. This conflict is nested within the broader rivalry between Algeria and 
Morocco for regional hegemony. During the Cold War these two countries 
represented two opposing ideologies and were already at odds over their 
common borders since the “Sand Wars” of 1963. Both sides, have used the 
Western Sahara conflict has a means to reinforce nationalism and as an excuse 
to stall their relationship, which has led, among other things to the closure of 
the land borders in 1994. 
b. External powers have had a key role in supporting either self-determination or 
integration in Morocco. France and the United States are at the forefront of 
those sustaining Morocco. France took this position following its cultural 
economic and historical ties with Morocco, while the US did it to maintain 
stability in an important area at the entry of the Mediterranean and to prop-up 
Morocco as a traditionally pro-western and moderate Arab-country. Algeria, 
on the other hand, has always upheld the right of the Saharawi for self-
determination, supporting politically, diplomatically and economically (and 
also militarily) the Polisario front, whose main de facto headquarters are in the 
Tindouf refugee camps in South-western Algeria. 
c. Given a clear difference of perspective amongst the parties and their 
unwillingness to compromise, it became rapidly clear that a solution was 
going to be difficult to get to through UN mediation. Morocco, as the de facto 
administrator of the territory, has an interest in maintaining the status quo. Yet, 
no external power with the potential to influence Morocco for a solution has 
ever found the interest to do so and the UN good offices were not sufficient so 
far (Jensen 2005, 48,56).  
 
                                                
107 Interview n°13 (Former UN official), 25 March 2012. 
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The building up of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy has coincided with 
the multilateralization of the conflict in Western Sahara and the setting up of the 
MINURSO operation in 1991. There was therefore considerable opportunity for 
interaction between the EU and the UN on this issue. Let’s now turn to see how this 
interaction has actually taken place in practice. Doing that, however, means analysing 
a conflict within the conflict: the conflict within the EU itself.  
The EU: between division and lack of interest 
The role of the EU in the conflict has been very modest (Benabdallah 2009; 
Darbouche and Colombo 2010; Gillespie 2009), notwithstanding the potential 
influence that it could have in its solution. The EU maintained a “policy of 
disengagement” (Darbouche and Colombo 2010), due to different preferences among 
the member states or simply lack of interest. As a consequence, no European state has 
actually recognized the SADR (although a few have diplomatic relations with the 
Polisario) and there has been a general lack of willingness to take sides and to bear the 
consequent costs. France provides a strong cover for Morocco (supported in this by 
the US) and is probably the only member state with enough influence by itself to put 
pressure on Morocco for a solution. Yet it decided not to do that, and has insisted on 
leaving the issue to the UN. This allows Paris to control the situation while keeping a 
low profile, which partly shields it from criticism coming from the supporters of the 
SADR. France has effectively prevented the EU from having a strong position on this 
issue and taking initiative. Any innovative declaration on the Western Sahara will be 
blocked already at the level of the Maghreb/Mashrek Council Working Group 
(MAMA), or earlier and will rarely reach the PSC.108 
Spain has maintained an approach of “active neutrality” on the Western Sahara 
conflict, which has often put it at odds with France and Morocco (Nunez Villaverde 
2005, 107). First, it felt a “moral” obligation to ensure that any solution guarantees 
some kind of self-determination for the people of the territory for which it is still the 
de jure administrator. In Spain there is the vastest portion of European public 
 
                                                
108 Senior German diplomat (Chatham House), IAI Conference, “The Reform of the UN 
Security Council, What role for the EU”, 14 May 2010 
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interested in the topic and promoting the rights of the Saharawi people. So there is a 
domestic concern, particularly in the left of the Spanish political spectrum.109 Finally, 
Spain is also interested in maintaining good relations with Algeria, as this is a critical 
energy provider for its domestic market (Gillespie 2009, 94). Yet, this position has 
been rather ambiguous. Spain has been increasing ties with Morocco, with which it 
has an interest in maintaining good relations due to proximity and the enclaves in 
Ceuta and Melilla. To a certain extent Spain (and other member states, such as 
Portugal and the UK) also benefits from the status quo, which has allowed it to exploit 
the resources available in Western Sahara in terms of fisheries and phosphate and 
explore the territorial waters for oil and gas. These factors have in time created a 
wavering positioning of Spain, depending also on the political party in power.  
Most other member states simply lack the political interest to get involved into this 
conundrum, knowing the position of France and Morocco. The UK has been rather 
close to the United States, promoting stability but also leaving this area to the French 
influence. The only voices consistently concerned over respect of human rights in the 
Western Sahara territories have been the Scandinavian states (Scholdtz and Wrange 
2006). Overall, though, no European state is too keen at having a possibly weak state 
in that area of the world, which is important for EU security. It is assumed in several 
quarters in Brussels that Western Sahara would be better managed and controlled if 
administered by Morocco (albeit, with a important status of autonomy) than by 
SADR.110  
The EU is therefore divided on this issue. As a consequence, Western Sahara is a “no 
man’s land for CFSP” (Gillespie 2009, 93), from which the High Representative was 
excluded and on which the EU was never willing to nominate a special envoy, as in 
the case of the Middle East and of other conflicts.111  
 
                                                
109For instance, a great part of the NGOs working on Western Sahara are Spanish 
110 Interviews n°4 and 6 (European officials), April-November 2011 
111 This has perhaps partly changed with the creation in July 2011 of the post of EU special 
representative for the Southern Mediterranean. However, even here, the official will be 
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The European Commission, which as seen in the previous section, has an important 
role in the Maghreb, was forced to maintain a very low profile on the Western Sahara 
file, not having the mandate to act. Political dialogue with Morocco (as with Algeria), 
which was led by the Commission before the Lisbon Treaty, has rarely touched upon 
the painful issue of Western Sahara.112 As a whole, the Commission has an interest in 
reinforcing the relations with Morocco, which has traditionally been one of the keener 
reformer and an “easy to work with” partner within the ENP. Advances on trade, 
fisheries and transport have all opened a window to international cooperation for 
various technical services in the Commission, which not surprisingly focus on 
technocratic implementation. This consideration towards Morocco has not changed 
fundamentally with the EEAS.113 
This, however, has gone hand in hand with a degree of frustration over the lack of 
progress, which prevents deeper regional integration in the area, and over the lack of 
voice for the Commission, notwithstanding its strong position within Maghreb policy. 
ENP strategic documents, for instance, regularly mention the importance for the EU 
to “enhance its involvement in solving protracted conflicts”, citing also Western 
Sahara (High Representative and European Commission 2011). Yet these references 
are notable for not providing any specific proposal on this issue. The Commission has 
had to avoid this issue, beyond Humanitarian aid, declining to fund even the small 
confidence building measures managed by UNHCR.114 
The only EU institution that has generally maintained some interest for the conflict 
and an active role, has been the European Parliament. It has adopted several 
resolutions favouring the self-determination of the Saharawi people and the respect of 
                                                                                                                                       
responsible for the whole MENA region, against the backdrop of the “Arab spring”. The 
Western Sahara is hardly going to be the priority.  
112 See for an example the EU-Morocco political dialogue subcommittee of December 2010. 
Report available on: Joint Staff Working Paper, Mise en oeuvre de la politique européenne de 
voisinage en 2010, Rapport pays: Maroc.  
113 Interviews with EU officials, October-November 2011. The “Governance Facility” under 
the ENPI was attributed twice to Morocco in 2007 and 2009 notwithstanding proven 
violations of human rights in the Western Sahara confirmed by NGOs(Human Rights Watch 
2008). See also the 2011 World Report of HRW:http://www.hrw.org/fr/world-report-
2011/maroc-et-sahara-occidental (23/4/2012) 
114 Direct observation 2007-2011. 
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their rights by Morocco (Gillespie 2009, 95). In 1992 it has halted the signature of the 
fourth financial agreement with Morocco over human rights concerns and in 2012 it 
has temporarily blocked the extension of the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement.115 
However, the attention on this conflict has been rather sporadic and linked to phases 
of renewed visibility for the issue such as with the 2005 so-called “Independence 
Intifada”, the regular resurgence of violence around the camps, or the periodic 
adoption of a fishery agreement. In addition, the Parliament has somehow imported 
the divisions within the member states on the conflict (including domestic divisions 
among political parties, as in the case of Spain).  
4.2.2 Assessing the hypotheses: dissimulating and empowering 
In this difficult context, EU cooperation with the UN, both as a political framework 
and as an operational actor has been quite substantial. The core argument of 
hypothesis 2 is that the lack of EU unity and internal fragmentation are themselves 
important factors behind the EU alignment with and within the UN. Following the 
analysis that I have done so far, I can fill in a table of values for each variable ‘unity’ 
and ‘integration’ as follows.  
Table 15. Configuration of variables (cohesion) in Case Study 2 
- Security Cooperation in the Western Sahara -  
Unity  Integration  
Positional 0 Decision Making Procedure 0 
Operational 0 Institutional Coherence 1 
Total 0 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
The next sections will focus on this aspect more in detail looking at the examples of 
political mediation and peacekeeping, and at humanitarian aid. 
 
                                                
115 Morocco Fish’s fight: High Stake over Western Sahara, BBC News, 15 December 2011 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16101666  
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The UN and political mediation - the illusion of coherence 
Although Europe would have the leverage necessary to play a direct role in conflict 
resolution it has renounced to do so, due to its differences. Instead, the EU strongly 
supports the UN mediation effort led by the UN Personal Envoy and the UN/DPA 
staff. Notwithstanding the differences that I have underlined, EU coherence within the 
fourth committee of the UNGA has been solid and in the plenary as well, at least since 
the UN took full charge of the situation in 1991. 116  The EU presidency has 
increasingly been tasked with voicing the precooked position of the EU at the UN, as 
well as in negotiations with Morocco. For years now this common position has been 
to “support efforts to find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, 
which will allow for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, as 
envisaged by the Security Council” (British EU Presidency 2005).  
France favours the constant referral of this issue to the UNSC, which reinforces its 
status as a permanent member. Its recognized role as a privileged interlocutor of 
Morocco and as an influential player within the conflict increases its legitimacy 
within the international system, as well as within the EU. Although it is not a UNSC 
permanent member, Spain has a similar view and has used the United Nations to 
assert its status as an independent and influential player in the Maghreb. It has, for 
instance, insisted on its inclusion in the “Friends of Western Sahara” contact group, 
meeting regularly in the margins of the negotiations by the parties under the auspices 
of the UNSG Personal Envoy. Other member states, less implicated are all happy to 
use the UN channel to maintain a degree of activeness and information and “reinforce 
multilateralism”, while reducing to the bone their involvement in this thorny issues. 
This picture is consistent with the analytical framework of this thesis that has 
described the UN as a vehicle for inter-relational and identity objectives for the EU 
member states.  
 
                                                
116 All main UN documents, including reports, resolutions and main position papers are 
available in the webpage dedicated to the conflict: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2400739/k.5A47/Publications_
on_Western_Sahara.htm (accessed on 3/9/2011). See also elaboration on UNGA votes by 
(Rasch 2008). 
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Table 16. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for unit of analysis “support to 
political mediation” 
Support to Political Mediation on Western Sahara 
Unity  Integration  
Positional 0 Decision Making Procedure 0 
Operational 1 Institutional Coherence 1 
Total 1 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
The more fragmented is the EU foreign policy system, the more each player seems to 
have a interest in working together within the UN. A similar mechanisms works also 
at the operational level.  
The UN as a military actor - the choice of weakness 
At the operational level, the EU is also obviously hampered by its division. As a 
consequence, the EU regularly encourages “the parties to work towards (…) a 
solution, within the framework of the United Nations” and to work with the UNSG 
Personal Envoy to the conflict and of the Special Representative to MINURSO 
(British EU Presidency 2005).117 In the security field, therefore, the EU’s support for 
the UN has materialised in the contributions to the MINURSO operation itself, which 
have been constant over the years, even if this has become itself an element of inertia. 
Taking 2010 as an example, seven EU member states were participating to the 
mission with 32 military observers out of a total of 233 uniformed personnel.118  
Obviously, participation on the part of Europeans serves also the purpose of 
reinforcing the control on the mission, which immediately from its deployment 
became entangled in the issue of voter identification and registration and had to be 
prolonged annually now for twenty years, notwithstanding its initial limited mandate. 
 
                                                
117Reflecting for instance, the key 2005 UNSC resolution S/RES/1598. 
118 Statistics avaiable on the UNDPKO website:  
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics (accesses on 8 March 2012) 
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France carefully prevents any modification or expansion of the mandate.  In 2010-
2011, for instance, the UNSC discussed the possibility of including human rights 
violations monitoring in the mandate of MINURSO. This followed complains from 
pro-Saharawi activists and Polisario that this is the only UN peacekeeping operation 
not to have any human rights competence (principally because it was not initially 
designed to be a peacekeeping operation). UNSC resolution 1979 of 27 April 2011 
mentioned the importance of human rights and welcomed some steps taken by 
Morocco to reassure about its commitment to protect human rights, but did not give 
any new mandate to MINURSO due to France opposition.119 
Table 17. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for unit of analysis “Support to 
Minurso” 
Support to MINURSO Peacekeeping 
Unity  Integration  
Positional 1 Decision Making Procedure 0 
Operational 0 Institutional Coherence 1 
Total 1 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
The humanitarian angle - the will of power 
What about other actors within the EU foreign policy system? We have already 
mentioned the role of the European Parliament as a human rights watchdog. The High 
Representative, the EEAS and the Commission instead have been prevented from 
intervening directly by the division among member states. But while this was 
acceptable for the High Representative, which had an otherwise marginal role in the 
Maghreb, it has been frustrating for the Commission, which as an established 
presence in this region. As a consequence, through cooperation with the UN, the 
Commission carved a role for itself on the margins of conflict management, in the 
 
                                                
119 (UN/DPI 2011b). See for instance the article by Philippe Bolopion appeared on Le Monde 
in December 2010(Bolopion 2010). Available also on 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/22/western-sahara-france-against-human-rights 
(23/4/2012) 
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humanitarian support of the Saharawi refugee camps in South-western Algeria.120As 
explained in Chapter 2, if the EU member states are not capable of reaching a 
substantive agreement on an issue, EU institutions are often required to cooperate 
with the UN on accessory foreign policy domains.  
Indeed, since 1993, through its office for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHO) the 
Commission has provided an average of € 10 million per year to support the 
humanitarian needs of the population in the camps for a total of over 150 million euro 
effectively becoming the largest donor to the population in the refugee camps (DARA 
2009). Since 2005, Spain has also stepped up its cooperation to 20 million a year, but 
the Commission has maintained a steady flow of aid and a very visible role in the 
camps.121  
To access, the remote territory and deal with the Sahrawi authorities, which are thirsty 
for recognition, the Commission channels an important part of its funds through the 
UN agencies on the ground, mainly UNHCR and WFP. This cooperation with the UN 
has actually increased since 2003, reaching more than 50% of the total EU 
commitments to this area, mainly at the expenses of international NGOs also active in 
Tindouf (European Commission evaluation 2010). UNHCR is now also granted a 
general coordination role on aid to the camps and relations with the authorities.  
The reason for this shift away from NGOs is linked to transparency and operational 
problems, but is also largely motivated by the interest for the Commission to maintain 
this operation absolutely neutral, apolitical.122 The Office of ECHO in Algeria for 
 
                                                
120Olli Rehn, Acting Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid said in 2009 on 
committing a further 5.5 million euro to the crisis: "These refugees are trapped in one of the 
world's oldest "frozen" and forgotten conflicts. As long as this conflict remains in a political 
and diplomatic deadlock, the refugees remain almost totally dependent on international aid for 
their survival. The Commission is committed to assisting these vulnerable people until a 
political solution can be found for their plight." European Commission, Press release, 
IP/09/871, 4/6/2009. 
121 Interview n°16 (European Commission official, DG ECHO), 22 September 2011. See also 
DG ECHO website on Western Sahara 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/north_africa_mid_east/algeria_en.htm (23/4/2012). 
122 Interview n°16 (European Commission official, DG ECHO), 22 September 2011. 
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instance is kept separated from the Delegation that manages development operation 
(the European Commission cannot fund the camps with bilateral development aid, as 
this would be interpreted as a formal recognition), and has regular coordination 
meetings with UN agencies in Algiers and in the field. Coordination, coherence and 
visibility problems with the UN are recurrent, but overall the relationship is 
satisfactory for the Commission.123 And while it is certainly true, as noted by Gillespie 
that the humanitarian operations are a sort of “guilty acknowledgement” from member 
states on their inability to settle the conflict (Gillespie 2009, 92), they also offer a way 
for the European Commission to play a role on this problem from which it would be 
otherwise excluded.  
To play this role, the Commission needs the United Nations, which over the years has 
offered the mandate (ideational resources) and the access (material resources). The 
table below shows the values for the European Commission on the ‘Resources’ 
variable under Hypothesis 1. 
Table 18. Configuration on variables (resources) for unit of analysis 
“humanitarian support to Saharawi refugees” 
Humanitarian aid to the Saharawi refugees (Commission) 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0 Political Support 0.5 
Capabilities 0 Acceptance 0.5 
Policy 0.5 Reputation 0.5 
Total 1 (Low) Total 2.5 (Medium) 
 
Although the situation is very difficult on the ground, through the UN, the European 
Commission is able to have access to this problem and is, therefore, regularly 
consulted by the member states on the situation. Similarly, the European Parliament 
 
                                                
123  For the evaluations (2003 and 2009) see DG ECHO website : 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/evaluation/countries_en.htm (23/4/2012). 
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regularly poses questions on the operations, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the 
Commission in the EU foreign policy system. 
4.2.3 Explaining 
When looking at the EU’s role in the Western Sahara, one needs to explain why 
Europe channels so much of its policy though the United Nations, both as a political 
framework, in New York and in the negotiations amongst the parties, and as an 
operational actor in peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs. The previous sections 
suggest an explanation, which stems mainly from our second hypothesis on lack of 
internal cohesion. The United Nations is used to dissimulate the incapacity of the EU 
to act as a whole, due to division among key member states. The EU has chosen to be 
powerless on Western Sahara, and is therefore highly dependent on the multilateral 
system to dilute its divisions, while at the same time, maintaining a role (particularly 
for individual member states).  
Figure 7. Illustration of configuration for variables (cohesion) in Case Study 2 
 
On the other hand, the first hypothesis on ‘Resources’ is also useful in explaining the 
situation. Having estimated the value of the variables for each of the examples/units 
of analysis that I have analysed we can obtain an interesting picture of the situation. 
The EU would be ‘ceremonial’ on Political Mediation, where its reliance on the UN is 
relatively formalistic. On the other hand, it would be dependent in the military domain 
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in its support to MINURSO, where both ideational and material resources are 
relatively low. Finally, the impact of the lack of ideational and material resources on 
cooperation with the UN, offers a rational explanation of the specific Commission’s 
approach to this issue. Given that the Commission has a relatively high level of 
legitimacy in humanitarian affairs, but is missing specific material resources, its 
approach to cooperation with the UN could be defined as ‘Predatory’. As in the 
refugee camps the Commission has limited access, relying on the UN brings in not 
only ideational resources, but also material resources in terms logistical support 
(access and capability). It thus provides a link to a solid structure and a long-term 
approach, which the Commission cannot display on this issue without running the risk 
of giving recognition to the SADR and upsetting the member states.  
Figure 8. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) in Case study 2 
 
 
4.3 Summing up 
The objective of this chapter was to explore the cooperation of the EU with the UN in 
the Maghreb region, looking at both the development and security field. I have first 
presented briefly the context of the region. This is characterized by proximity to the 
EU, which is here capable of exerting a considerable leverage through a variety of 
tools both at the bilateral and union level. Relations with the Maghreb countries are 
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structured within a rather institutionalized framework, in particular the Barcelona 
Process since 1995 and the European Neighbourhood Policy since 2003. For all these 
reasons, it could be expected that in this region, the “sphere of influence” approach in 
terms of policies, particularly amongst the leading member states, would predominate 
over the objective to strengthen effective multilateralism.  
In effect, in the period between 1991 and 2010 the EU member states closer to this 
region have substantially Europeanised and institutionalized their policy towards the 
Maghreb while maintaining also their independent bilateral ties (Fernández and 
Youngs 2005; Morisse-Schilbach 1999). In this context the EU has been the preferred 
channel for foreign policy (beyond bilateralism) and the United Nations has not been 
particularly called for. Among other things this is proven by the meagre amount of aid 
channelled through the United Nations, which has remained generally low, even in 
areas where the United Nations has presence and expertise, as on governance and post 
crisis rehabilitation in Algeria. Yet, the first case study also shows how the 
multilateral rubber stamp is looked for on policies were EU institutions face some 
degree of opposition, or reluctance from member states. The European Commission 
carefully refers to its consultations with IFIs to justify its decision to use the budget 
support approach.  
The second case study, on the conflict of Western Sahara allowed us to test, in 
particular, the second hypothesis namely on the impact of integration and institutional 
coherence on the EU’s tendency to work with the United Nations. The second case 
also casts light on an area, the security sector, where the member states have been 
very reluctant to transfer competences to supranational institutions and the EU as a 
whole is short on resources. The EU has been always divided on the issue of Western 
Sahara and unwilling to find a consensus. As a consequence it has reverted to the 
United Nations as a framework for its policy and has consistently supported the 
mediation efforts by the UN envoy and MINURSO.  
In this context, a relatively weak European Commission, deprived of a clear mandate 
to work on this conflict, was able to assume a role by funding with humanitarian 
assistance the refugee camps in Algeria. To do this the Commission has used the UN 
structures such as UNHCR to provide expertise and legitimize its action. Once again, 
this seems to confirm our hypotheses that the Commission cooperates substantially 
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the United Nations for opportunistic reasons. It does it to gain legitimacy internally 
within the EU and reinforce its position within the European Foreign policy system or 
on specific issues at the cross roads between development and security. 
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Chapter 5. The Levant - West Bank and Gaza, and the 
Middle East Peace Process 
This chapter will analyse EU-UN cooperation in the Levant region, looking in 
particular at the Palestinian territories and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). In 
the next sections I will focus first on development cooperation in the West Bank and 
Gaza (WBG),124 to then touch on the key instances of security cooperation. Of course, 
though, any distinction between these two policy fields in the Middle East is rather 
theoretical, as in practice the on-going Israeli-Arab conflict situation makes all actions 
strongly interrelated in a supposedly integrated approach to peace building. 
5.1 Development assistance to the Palestinians (2000-2010) 
Description and analysis of the EU’s role and action in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
is not lacking.125 Most authors acknowledge the activeness of the EU as a donor in the 
West Bank and Gaza over the years but question its impact in political terms. A 
common criticism is that the EU has overall supported the status quo, rather than 
contributing to a substantial solution (Le More 2005, 2008; Tocci 2005, 2009). In this 
view, by providing consistently high levels of funding to the Palestinians the EU has 
sought to gain access to a political negotiation that was led by the United States by 
virtue of its privileged relationship with Israel. However, so far it has not managed to 
use these assets strategically (including the strong trade and economic links with 
Israel) and to leverage them to promote a solution. On the contrary, it has partly 
relieved Israel from its responsibilities towards the Palestinian population and has 
 
                                                
124 In the text I will use alternatively the expression West Bank and Gaza (which is typically 
used by international donors) and Palestinian territories.  
125 The key sources for this chapter are the rich secondary literature on EU foreign policy in 
the Middle East, focusing on early days of European Political cooperation (Allen and Pijpers 
1984) to the most recent developments (Asseburg 2009b; Bulut 2010; Dosenrode-Lynge 
2002; Müller 2011; Musu 2010; Roberson 1998; Tocci 2005; Youngs 2006). I also use 
internal documents – which are all available upon request - and statistics as well as expert 
interviews, carried out between 2008 and 2012. 
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supported (at least until the early 2000s) an unaccountable and often corrupted 
Palestinian authority.  
Here, I shall focus on the role of the United Nations in this situation, focussing on 
when and why does the EU work with the UN in delivering its assistance to the 
Palestinians. In this respect, Le More has used the effective expression that “the US 
decides, the EU pays and the UN feeds” (Le More 2008). At first sight, in fact, it is 
obvious that in supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) the EU cooperates 
extensively with the UN and well above the regional and global averages. Looking at 
the European Commission, for example, 40% of assistance to the Palestinians, 
refugees or not, went through international organizations in 2010.126  
5.1.1 EU players 
In development cooperation, the Commission is a reference player. Its personnel make 
up the bulk of the technical cooperation office in East Jerusalem (since 2010 EU 
Representation) and there is also Commission’s project staff at the EU Delegation in 
Tel Aviv. Managing a programme averaging €500 million in new commitments a year 
in the period 2007-2010, the Commission is responsible for the biggest share of total 
EU assistance towards the Palestinian territories and has increasingly sought to 
coordinate the development efforts of the member states. The table below shows the 
European Commission assistance between 2000 and 2010.  
  
 
                                                
126 EU Office in Jerusalem, External Assistance Management Report, Second Semester 2010, 
January 2011 – Internal Document – Available upon request. Funding through I.O.s was for 
around 280 million out of ongoing commitments for around 700 million euro.  
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Table 19. EU aid flows to the Palestinian People 
EU Financial Commitments to the Palestinian People (Commitments in € million) 
Estimated 
breakdown by 
programme 
sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2000-
2010 
Direct and 
Indirect 
Financial 
Support 90 40 140 102 90,25 76 141,75 370 258 219,1 199,9 1,727,00 
Institutional 
Building 1,8 2,71 27,75 10 8 8,4 12 5,67 14 12 31 133,33 
Infrastructure 
Development 7,7 0 1,93 0 0 40,55 0 0 37 19,5 21 127,68 
Direct 
Support to the 
Private Sector 3 0 15,4 15 0 0 0 0 0 22 11 66,4 
UNRWA 83,76 90,07 71,43 91,85 103,27 97,26 111,81 100,55 120 171,59 108,4 1,150,00 
Humanitarian 
Aid, Food Aid 
(excluding 
UNRWA) 4,68 9,13 52,81 34,94 36,98 36,78 69,6 59,21 43,76 57,15 45,51 450,55 
East 
Jerusalem 
initiatives 0 0,14 5 0,75 0 1,8 0 2 2 4,5 6 22,19 
Support to 
civil society 28,07 2,62 6,58 16,36 15,78 16,28 8,43 11,35 8,3 3,3 13,3 130,37 
CFSP, RRM, 
IFS 
(excluding 
UNRWA) 6,19 3,81 5 0 0,95 3,8 6,4 14,5 14,7 9,27 0 64,62 
TOTAL 225,2 148,5 325,9 270,9 255,23 280,9 349,99 563,28 497,76 518,41 436,1 3,872,14 
 
Yet, as compared with the Maghreb, in the Near East the Commission is not alone. As 
can be seen from Table 20, member states have very solid cooperation programmes 
and the two CFSP missions and the EUSR are also active in development and 
capacity building.  
Table 20. Financial commitments to Palestine by EU member states127 
Financial commitments to the Palestinian territories - 1992-2006 
France 236,697,438 US$ 
Germany 537,292,012 US$ 
United Kingdom 348,160,940 US$ 
 
                                                
127 Table extrapolated from Muller: Müller 2011, p.87,107,127. 
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Donor coordination has improved quite importantly over the years, including at the 
global political level, as donor coordination has become more structured progressively 
since the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) was established to support the Oslo 
agenda.128. The EU Delegation has taken the lead role with member states, both at the 
Heads of Missions and Heads of Cooperation levels. In the absence of a Country 
Strategy Paper (CSP), the Delegation, with the Member States, has established a 
diagnosis of the situation and listed the EU focal sectors creating a non-biding 
reference framework where all member states and the European Commission have 
different responsibilities.129 
In addition to this, the European Parliament is also a vocal player. In particular, since 
a Country Strategy Paper and multiannual programme for the Palestinian Territories 
was never adopted due to the constant crisis, a large amount of funds is appropriated 
annually for emergency situations from the EU budget on top of what is planned in 
the Multiannual financial framework. In this process, the European parliament is a 
key ally for the European Commission on budget increases and has been particularly 
sensitive to the requests coming from UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East). There is therefore competition not 
only among member states, but also among EU institutions.  
Within such a massive cooperation portfolio, the EU can count on important 
capabilities and a solid expertise. Yet the situation is more complex as compared with 
the Maghreb with more difficulties in terms of access and a weaker general legitimacy. 
The table below provides the general picture of the variables under the first hypothesis.  
 
                                                
128 At local level, coordination mechanisms are quite complex but the EU plays a central role. 
Four Strategy Groups have been established under the umbrella of the Local Development 
Forum, which meets regularly under joint chair of Norway, the World Bank (WB), UNSCO 
and the Palestinian Authority, and where all donors are present. The four Strategy Groups 
(SG) are: 1. The Governance SG co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning and the Commission 
(the Head of Delegation); 2. The Economy SG (co-chairs: Ministry of Finance and WB); 3. 
The Infrastructure SG (co-chairs: Ministry of Public Works and USAID); and 4. The Social 
Development SG (co-chairs: MoSA and UNSCO). Under each of the four Strategy Groups, 
several sector working groups have been created. The EU Delegation chairs or is active in 
most of these groups. 
129 Interview n°17 (EC Official, MENA coordination unit, DG Europeaid), 15 May 2011 
 111 
 
Table 21. Configuration of variables (resources) for Case Study 3  
– Development Cooperation in the Levant/Near East - 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0 Political Support 1 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 0.5 
Policy 0.5 Reputation 0.5 
Total 2 (Medium) Total 3 (High) 
 
5.1.2 Assessing the hypotheses  
I will focus here on three key areas of work, which are emblematic of the work of the 
EU towards the West Bank and Gaza (WBG). Support to UNRWA, direct financial 
support to the Palestinian authority and capacity building through technical assistance.  
UNRWA - the trusted partner and the access door 
The Commission cooperates very closely with the UN when it lacks access or 
expertise in a particular area or issue. This is the case with Palestinian refugees who 
are under the mandate of UNRWA. This Commission has a longstanding relationship 
with this agency, since the 1971. This is the only UN body, which the Commission is 
funding substantially in its core budget (27% of the total operating budget in 2008), 
with an important and steady contribution of more than €100 million per year in 
average over the 2000-2010 period, accounting for slightly more than 28% of total 
Commission spending in the occupied Palestinian Territories (UNRWA 2009, 7).130  
 
 
                                                
130 In a EU-UNRWA joint declaration of September 2011, the EU has pledged 80 million euro 
per year for the period from 2011 to 2013 – EU HR/VP Press Release, 3 March 2012. 
Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/199 
(23/4/2012) 
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Table 22. European Commission support to UNRWA 
EC Financial Commitments to UNRWA 2000-2010 (rounded in Million EUR)131 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2000-
2010 
Contribution 
to the general 
fund 40 57 55 57 60 63 65 66 67 67 66 663 
Humanitarian 
assistance 29 33 16 27 22 23 36 17 39 26 12 280 
Crisis 
Response               7   24 5 36 
Ad Hoc 
Support 
Projects 15     8 21 11 11 11 14 55 25 171 
Total 
Annual 84 90 71 92 103 97 112 101 120 172 108 1150 
 
This cooperation is justified principally by the unique mandate that UNRWA has to 
work with Palestinian refugees in the all region, its experience and competence. The 
Commission of course depends on UNRWA for its specific mandate on working with 
the refugees. UNRWA provides an unmatched access to the Palestinian refugees, 
particularly in Gaza, where since 2006 the EU does not have official contacts with the 
Hamas authorities.  
Table 23. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Support to 
Palestinian Refugees” 
Support to Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 0 
Access 0 Political Support 0,5 
Capabilities 0 Acceptance 0 
Policy 0,5 Reputation 0,5 
Total 1 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
 
                                                
131 Figures elaborated from internal Commission information system (CRIS).  
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Yet, to avoid losing too control on implementation, the EU has built a close 
relationship with UNRWA, where it plays a leading role in management and 
structural reform. The Commission has progressively increased its role in the 
Advisory Committee of UNRWA, where it is observer and especially in the 
Subcommittee for programming, which it has chaired for three years in 2007-2010. 
Similarly, visibility has been put on the EC-UNRWA partnership itself, rather than on 
individual projects.132 
UNRWA has also an important information gathering function on the ground, feeling 
the temperature among the Palestinian public opinion.133 For instance, UNRWA 
played a particularly important role following the “Cast Lead” intervention by Israel 
in Gaza (in winter 2008), as the international community had important problems in 
accessing the area, even for humanitarian assistance. At that time, the Commission’s 
strong relationships with UNRWA allowed it to have a facilitated access, information 
and understanding of the situation on the ground. This was followed by an 
unprecedented increase in the funding by the EU for the years 2007 and 2008. Indeed, 
in Humanitarian affairs cooperation with the UN is very pronounced. The EU and the 
UN used extensively the “Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery 
Planning” which had been signed on 25 September 2008, just before the Gaza crisis. 
(EC, UNDG, WB 2008). Joint missions were rapidly dispatched for damage 
assessment and the Commission134 used the UN (OCHA) Flash Appeal to plan and 
deliver its immediate response. UNRWA and other organizations (including UNDP 
and OCHA) channelled most of the EU recovery and food security effort.135 On 
longer-term reconstruction needs, where political sensitivities are higher, the situation 
was slightly different. After the Gaza crisis the Commission insisted in having its own 
 
                                                
132  See EU-UNRWA factsheet available on the EU website: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2012_unrwa_eu_unrwa_partnership.pdf (23/4/2012  
133 Interview n°18 (EEAS Official) 4 February 2011 
134 DG ECHO, in particular, has developed strong relationships both with UNRWA and with 
OCHA and regularly co-chairs the donors coordination group, but also the FAO and the WFP. 
135 See spike of humanitarian assistance in 2008 and 2009 in Table 22, above. 
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separate damage assessment report, although this was done in close cooperation with 
the UN, which admittedly has much more experience and capacities in this field.136  
Direct budgetary support and the WB - from mentor to competitor 
While cooperation with UNRWA is somewhat inevitable for the European Union and 
testifies more to the EU’s commitment to Palestinian refugees than to the UN itself, 
cooperation with the World Bank on Palestinian affairs is more illustrative of the 
dynamics that underlie the EU’s approach to cooperation with international 
organizations. While throughout the 1970s and 1980s aid to the Palestinian people 
was channelled mainly through UNRWA and NGOs, following the Oslo accords, the 
European Union has delivered an important part of its assistance as ‘direct budgetary 
support,137 to the constituting Palestinian authority. This increased particularly since 
1997 as a result of the decision of Israel to freeze the monthly transfers of tax 
revenues to the Palestinian authorities). What was initially just a ‘Special Cash 
Facility’ (to bridge the financing gap of the PA) became non-reimbursable direct 
budgetary assistance with the second intifada.138  
As pointed out by Le More this was a way for the EU to show its commitment to state 
building but also to respond concretely to what was termed the “Aid for peace” 
agenda. In the 1990s Europe, being excluded from the forefront of the political 
negotiations, effectively took up the role of “payer”, particularly in terms of 
humanitarian support (Le More 2008). With the second intifada, and the Camp David 
agreements, the international approach changed and more focus was put on state 
building and on consolidating the finances of the Palestinian authority. The World 
 
                                                
136 Interview n°18 (EU official), 4 February 2011. See also the Damage assessment report by 
the European Commission, March 2009. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-
cooperation/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/documents/final_report_version6_t1.pdf 
(23/4/2012)  
137 This instrument is completely different from budget support as analysed for the Maghreb. 
Here are not done against the achievement of agreed reform results but to meet specific needs 
such as the payment of pensions, fuel or social allowances.  
138 The Second ‘Al Aqsa’ Intifada started in September 2000, leading to a recrudescence of 
violence, which further complicated the work of donors on the ground and particularly the 
delivery of ‘project’ technical assistance. 
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Bank spearheaded this approach. For the European Union, which lacked expertise in 
this instrument, direct financial support allowed not only to reinforce the structure of 
the nascent authorities but also to disburse increasing amounts of moneys as 
compared with project support.  
So, to do this, the European Commission aligned with the strategy of the World Bank 
and in the years between 2000 and 2005 channel an important part of its aid towards 
the World Bank139. My archive research showed that this was motivated by a need to 
coordinate better the aid with other key donors. The World Bank, in particular had 
strong advantages, having been requested by the Palestinian authority to coordinate 
state building funding and having also an important backing from the United States. 
As a world body, the Bank could also attract assistance from non-EU donors. In 
addition to this, by channelling through the WB, the EU responded to calls from both 
the European Parliament and its anti-fraud office OLAF to seek more coordination 
with other donors and partners in its activities in the Palestinian territories.140 
The World Bank served well this purpose and the European Commission and member 
states worked extensively through the so called ‘PFRP-Trust Fund’ which focussed 
specifically on the public finance management reform in the run up to the Palestinian 
elections of 2005, contributing 65 million euro in 2004 and 70 million euro in 2005. 
This was considered efficient, notwithstanding the loss in visibility and also allowed 
the EU to increase its understanding of the finances of the Palestinian Authorities and 
its expertise of direct financing.141 In turn, it paved the way for the EU taking a 
 
                                                
139 The last such commitment to the WB Trust Fund (TF) was done in 2005 for 70 million 
euro. As argued by Le More 2008, since 2005 with the refurbishment of the donor 
coordination mechanism and the establishment of the AHLC, the EU and the EC where given 
a much greater role in coordination, in recognition of their funding (Le More 2008, 92–95). 
This might suggest that the pressure for the EU to use the WB to channel its funding has 
decreased since.  
140 EC Internal briefing on WB Trust funds in Iraq and Palestine: available upon request. See 
Parliament Hearing by Benita Ferrero-Waldner. 
141 The European Commission continued to channel aid also independently, particularly in the 
utilities (.e.g. fuel). 
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stronger role in 2006, when the victory of Hamas in the elections led to the decision 
by the Quartet to channel funds through the Palestinian authority President’s office.  
The Commission, then, took the lead in setting up the TIM, which built up on pre-
existing mechanisms of the European Commission and of the World Bank. The 
instrument was launched and managed by the Commission in cooperation with the 
World Bank that was responsible directly for one of the three financial windows. The 
operation could obviously count on the support of the UN within the Quartet (see next 
section). On the other hand, convincing the US took more time and the involvement - 
quite reluctant initially - of the World Bank, which was then led by Paul Wolfowitz 
(close to US President George W. Bush), was instrumental to getting the green 
light. 142  The European Commission considers the operation, which was set up 
relatively quickly, a success. Initially designed for three months it was prolonged and 
lasted 21 months disbursing a total of 650 million euros, of which 188 million came 
from EU member states.  
Following this successful experience the European Commission gained even more 
confidence and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner took up to propose another instrument, 
aligned to the Palestinian authority’s 2008-2010 reform programme in the follow up 
to the Annapolis summit. The Commission services then proposed a second 
instrument, which was called PEGASE (Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et 
d'Aide Socio-Economique) and was launched at the Paris Donor Conference in 
December 2007 where the EU as a whole pledged more than 3.6 billion to the PA 
over three years. From 2008 to 2010 almost one billion euro were channelled through 
PEGASE and the mechanism is well placed to continue working in over the next 
period, as the Palestinian authority approved the 2011-2013 reform plan.  
 
                                                
142 Interview n°19 (European Commission official), 10 September 2011. The TIM was a 
mechanism that had to be endorsed by the Quartet and therefore by definition by the United 
Nations and the wider international community. Yet the World Bank was rather reluctant to 
support it, notwithstanding the fact that the European Commission has called strongly for its 
participation and its cooperation. Actually the initial concept paper was drafted with the help 
of the WB which then, however started taking time (perhaps due to higher-level doubts from 
WB President Paul Wolfowitz, who was close to US President G.W.Bush). Finally an 
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Although the Commission is very clear in saying that the PEGASE mechanism is not 
competing with the World Bank, which is actually involved in supporting the reform 
process of the PA together with the IMF, there are some key elements that show how 
the Commission has sought to emancipate itself completely from Bank mentoring. 
Firstly, a key condition for Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s team was that the 
mechanism had a strong European identity. The name and the brand indeed, both 
made clear that Europe, the EU and the Commission were in charge. The managing 
mechanism is fully Commission based (since 2008 managed within the EU 
Representation in East Jerusalem), with the Netherlands supporting the management 
of funds coming from member states. Importantly, the mechanism had to be open to 
all donors and in fact, non-EU donors were targeted for funding (Switzerland used the 
mechanism and from 2011 also from Japan). Finally, the WB also launched in 2008 
its own trust fund to support the Palestinian Reform Plan (PRDP), but this suffered 
from under commitments, particularly in 2009, although non-EU donors still prefer 
this mechanism for their contribution.  
So, going back to our argument, we could say that, having gradually increased its 
reputation and experience, the EU approach has moved from being predatory (initial 
lack of expertise and access, but strong political support on the need for action), to 
being dismissive versus the WB by 2008. (See table below). 
Table 24. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Direct 
Budgetary Assistance to the Palestinian Authority” 
Direct Budgetary Assistance in Palestine (Since 2008) 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 1 
Access 1 Political Support 1 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 1 
Policy 1 Reputation 1 
Total 3.5 (High) Total 4 (High) 
 
                                                                                                                                       
agreement was struck by which the WB would be managing one of the three windows 
contained in the programme. 
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The Commission, with a strong mandate from the member states and, very 
importantly on Palestine, from the European Parliament, has increasingly sought to 
have a coordinating role for member states’ assistance programmes and a presence in 
the political process, including via the Quartet. To do this, the Commission has then 
first built up a strong relationship with the World Bank and reinforced its capacities to 
increase its credibility and be able to act independently. The opportunity came in 2006 
when the Quartet was seeking for a new financing option to keep the Palestinian 
territories afloat while bypassing Hamas. Through these instruments the Commission 
has gradually strengthened its direct access to the PA, avoiding the mediation of 
international organizations and also achieving important savings in terms of 
administration costs.  
Technical assistance in the security and justice sectors - the UN as a bridge 
A third important aid delivery method is technical assistance. Since Oslo one of the 
key objectives of the EU was to strengthen institutional capacities of the Palestinian 
National Authority to allow for a negotiated and sustainable two-state solution of the 
conflict as spelled out since the Berlin European Council of 1999. This area of 
cooperation is small in relative terms, within the financial portfolio since technical 
assistance does not necessarily require important funds, but is demanding in terms of 
time and human resources. The fact that it was not possible for the EU nor the 
Commission to adopt a country strategy paper for Palestine, considering the 
continuous state of crisis, led to a rather disorganized approach towards sector support 
with technical assistance, with ad-hoc projects funded in many sectors and several 
overlaps among donors. Also from the beneficiary side, the Palestinian Authority 
being constantly absorbed by emergency and struggling financially and economically 
by the occupation, usually favoured direct budgetary support.143  
This being said, following the launch of the Road Map and the revamping of donor 
coordination in 2005, working on capacity building in a variety of sector became 
more feasible. Most EU projects are managed through European consultants, as 
 
                                                
143 Interview n°19 (European Commission official), 10 September 2011 
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happens in the Maghreb, but some operations are contracted with the United Nations, 
including the WHO (mental health and psychosocial services), UNESCO (Nablus), 
UNCTAD (Customs) and UNDP (Governance), which is recognized for its specific 
expertise in areas of fragility. As in the case of Maghreb, governance is a sector that is 
particularly interesting for EU-UN cooperation because it is an area where various EU 
institutions can engage. In the justice sector, for example, Member states and the 
European Commission have worked quite extensively, through technical assistance 
and equipment. This has been done mostly independently but cooperation with the 
United Nations (and particularly UNDP) has somewhat increased since the EU has 
deployed the CSDP mission EUPOL COPPS in January 2006 and its mandate was 
latter extended to the justice sector in 2008 (Asseburg 2009a, 92). The Commission 
has reinforced its cooperation with the UN at the margins of the operation also to 
ensure that it was not left out from this important sector. I will focus on these issues 
particularly in the specific section on CSDP instruments. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, following the new guidelines of the European Commission, 
the decisions on joint operations have to be justified in terms of their added value. In 
general, the more the operations can link up to broader EU approaches with the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the MEDA,144 the more the Commission tends to 
work independently and dismiss cooperation with the UN as costly and not fully 
satisfactory in terms of visibility and reporting. Interview and reports show that much 
depends on the local capacity of the specific organization, as this can vary very much 
within the UN System.145  
 
                                                
144 For instance see the EU-PA Joint Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Available on the EEAS website: 
 http://eeas.europa.eu/occupied_palestinian_territory/index_en.htm 23/4/2012 
145 The UN itself has sometimes expressed some frustration about this ‘selective’ approach of 
the EU, and has recently opened its own UNDG trust fund for supporting the Palestinian 
reform plan. Interviews n°9,10,11 (UN officials working on the MENA region), 7 March 
2011.  
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5.1.3 Explaining 
In the development field the EU is one of the key players in the West Bank and Gaza. 
It certainly is the first donor. It has been criticized vehemently for not being able to 
translate this asset into actual influence on the settling of the conflict (Asseburg 2009a, 
75), playing a subordinate role to the United States. Yet, in the years it has increased 
its activity also in areas that are sensitive such as the justice and civil security sectors 
and it has shown leadership in designing and devising instruments that could respond 
to the emergency needs of the Palestinian people.  
Throughout the analysis above I have identified a series of key factors that have 
conditioned the assistance towards the Palestinian people and cooperation with the 
United Nations. Firstly, in the Palestinian territories there is a strong mandate and 
presence of the United Nations. While some institutions such as the UN Special 
Coordinator Office for the Middle East (UNSCO), struggle to coordinate the array of 
agencies and programmes that have very different capacities, other organizations, 
such as UNRWA, have an absolutely irreplaceable role in the territories and a capital 
of experience and presence which makes them essential. In addition to this the weak 
institutional capacities or various boycotts of the Palestinian authority have reinforced 
the need to work through different implementation partners that could claim sufficient 
neutrality and impartiality.  
Secondly, the development field in the Levant is very complex and congested. Aid per 
capita in the Palestinian territories has consistently been among the highest in the 
world and a large amount of donors (not only European), international organizations 
and NGOs are active in the field. This increases the need for coordination and division 
of labour and the UN’s status as a universal organization makes it a safe haven for all. 
However, complexity also means that there is a lot of competition for influence and 
visibility and a constant need for improvement, efficiency and innovative solution. In 
such a competitive environment, cooperation with the United Nations, when it is not 
obligatory, must be justified by added value on a case-by-case basis.  
Thirdly, there is a constant meddling of security concerns in a fragile and conflict 
prone environment. On the one hand, the crisis situation has has prevented the EU and 
the Commission from adopting a long-term strategy and programme and making full 
use of the MEDA and ENP methodologies. On the other hand, this has increased the 
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inter-institutional strife within the EU over competencies, mandates and leadership, 
among member states but also between the Commission and Council structures (the 
Parliament has also been a quite vocal actor). In this context, according to our 
argument, cooperation with the United Nations is used as a lever to gain more 
credibility, access and influence. Counting on strong operational relations with 
respected organizations such as UNRWA and the WB, the Commission was able to 
maintain a leading role in the field.   
Fourthly, in supporting the Government of Israel, the US has maintained a suspicious 
approach towards multilateral organizations and the UN in particular. As a 
consequence the EU as a whole has tended to differentiate itself by favouring 
multilateral solutions and has been relatively open to cooperation with the United 
Nations.  
This backdrop largely explains the fact that the EU (and the European Commission as 
the lead donor) has used the UN structures extensively in the West Bank and Gaza. As 
mentioned, assistance channelled through the UN accounted for 40% of total but goes 
up to more than 80% of what is not channelled directly to the government system as 
direct budgetary support.  
However, over the years, European ideational and material resources in the 
Palestinian territories increased. The EU established a key presence in the Donor 
coordination mechanisms from which it had been initially marginalized in the Oslo 
process. It increased its direct access and leverage with the Palestinian authorities, 
particularly with Prime Minister Fayyad. It improved its experience and 
understanding of the budgetary and economic dynamics in the Palestinian Authority. 
Its capabilities also increased both in terms of staffing and instruments used 
(including ESDP since 2005). All this, had an impact also on ideational resources, 
with legitimacy of the common EU institutions increasing gradually over independent 
member states approaches (Müller 2011). Albeit key member states kept on carrying 
out their independent political approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
leadership of the Commission in the development field, particularly over the 2006-
2007 period was reinforced and became more recognized.  
As a result, the EU has progressively sought to emancipate itself from the United 
Nations and other international organizations and has changed its approach to 
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cooperation. The dependency on the United Nations gradually transformed into a 
more confident ‘selective’ approach ranging from what we have described as 
predatory, to ceremonial or formalistic. This physiological tendency, was also 
reinforced by the broader realization by Headquarters, particularly in DG DEVCO, 
between 2007 and 2008, that the Commission was now channelling too much of its 
funds through the United Nations and was therefore losing out in visibility, 
accountability and leverage. 
The EU has also become more demanding. In the case of UNRWA, where Europeans 
have no choice but to work with the UN (dependent), they have gradually sought to 
use their position as main donor to the general budget to influence the running of the 
organization. The Commission has enhanced its participation in the advisory 
committee while remaining an observer to the board, and has become the chair to the 
subcommittee on programming, which has spearheaded the organization’s internal 
reform programme. The whole EU is on the driving seat of the organization 
functioning by virtue of its role as lead donor. As for direct financial support to the 
Palestinian authorities, the EU has built up its own visibility gradually and shrewdly, 
from a situation in which the main players were clearly the World Bank and the IMF. 
After some years of learning, it has led the effort to design new instruments such as 
the TIM and PEGASE in particular with the latter it actually started competing with 
the WB and the UNDP trust fund in channelling aid from EU and non-EU donors. 
The WB and IMF continue to supervise the results of the reform and state building 
effort of the Palestinian authority, but have progressively lost some of their 
operational capacities in terms of actual funding.  
Finally, on technical assistance, the EU has used its own instruments and expertise 
coming from the ENP and MEDA process. In this area cooperation with the United 
Nations is decided on a case-by-case basis depending on actual convenience and 
added value. Not surprisingly, cooperation concentrates in the governance, police and 
justice sectors, where the UN is stronger, but also where there is more competition 
from CSDP mechanisms and member states structures and projects.  
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Figure 9. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) in Case Study 3 
 
In the following pages I will focus specifically on the politico-military component of 
the EU’s activity in Middle East and CSDP instruments, to show what are the main 
characteristic of EU-UN interaction in high politics matters.  
 5.2 EU-UN security cooperation in the Levant 
The EU’s political and security engagement in the Levant is more articulated than in 
the Maghreb. All policies in the region are strongly affected by the Israeli-Arab 
conflict, which has been a strategic priority for the Europeans since the beginning of 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Allen and Pijpers 1984). The poor European 
reaction to the 1967 six days war and the following turmoil leading up to Yom Kippur 
1973 and the Arab oil embargo were among the key factors behind the decision to 
experiment with political cooperation (Müller 2011, 29; Musu 2010, 40 and ff.). In 
time, the Europeans have built up a presence, somewhere at the crossroads between 
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involvement in the Middle East crisis from a security point of view.146 This wealth of 
literature generally concords in pointing to a series of key milestones following the 
building up of EPC in the 1970s, and the role of France, the UK and Germany in 
brokering the consensus for a negotiated two-state solution, which was eventually 
accepted formally by all parties of the conflict (Müller 2011; Musu 2010). This 
European common Middle East policy has been complemented since 1995 by the 
long-term institutionalized frameworks of the EMP and ENP. In 2000, the EU also 
experimented with a Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region, which however 
has been left dormant.147 Other strategic papers have been advanced including an 
Action Strategy in 2008, aiming to support the Annapolis process.148  
However, below the declaratory surface of what seems a relatively coherent, 
comprehensive (and even progressive) policy, the EU member states are deeply 
divided over the fundamentals of the conflict, including the degree of support to 
Israeli policy versus Arab positions and the role of the United States.149 This division 
lingers throughout but emerges with particular pain in short-term crisis management, 
when member states have to adapt to new events and provide quick answers. Member 
states have sought to maintain a tight control on the formulation and implementation 
of foreign policy and have delegated tasks not the Commission but to Council led 
institutions, including a EU special representative since 1996 and the High 
Representative for CFSP. In this sense, the institutional legacy of the EPC structure 
and methods has remained very strong in the Middle East.  
 
                                                
146 This chapter is based mainly on the historical work of Allen & Pijpers 1984, Musu 2010, 
Bulut 2010, Asseburg 2009a, 2009b and Tocci 2011. 
147 Common Strategy 2000/458/CFSP of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the 
Mediterranean region. Musu attributes this to the collapse of the Camp David talks Musu 
2010, p.65 
148 All the main documents and positions of European foreign policy on the MEPP are 
available on the EEAS website: http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/eu-positions/eu_positions_en.htm 
(23/4/2012) 
149 An important obstacle to a more proactive role of the EU has traditionally come from the 
United States, which has been very jealous of its leadership role as a mediator in the Israeli-
Arab conflict. 
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In the United Nations, the EU member states have steadily increased their alignment 
on Middle East issues since the 1980s to reach averages of 95% voting coherence 
from 1994 on (Luif 2003; Rasch 2008). In this sense, the institutional developments 
from EPC to CFSP and CSDP have had limited impact, as the fundamental 
agreements on the key political positions were taken very early on. This was due to a 
structural alignment in policy preferences after the Cold War and to a call for a 
coherent voice coming from external actors, including the Palestinians.150  
With the launch of ESDP/CSDP, the EU has put two security operations on the 
ground in the region, both civilian in nature: EUBAM Rafah (2005), which was 
supposed to facilitate the Egypt-Gaza border crossing and EUPOL COPPS (2006), 
training Palestinian Authority’s police. In 2006, EU Member States have also 
accepted to deploy large amounts of troops within a UN peace operation in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), in exchange for stronger control on the strategic management of the 
operation in New York and on the field. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this was a major 
return to UN peacekeeping following the negative experiences of the 1990s in the 
Balkans, where the EU has acted as a clearing-house to coordinate and catalyse EU 
commitments. 
As for the United Nations, it has been one of the key actors in the conflict, since the 
first resolutions proposing a settlement plan and then establishing the state of Israel in 
1949. During the Cold war, the UN peacekeeping concept developed mostly in the 
Middle East, with the first ever truce observation operation, UNTSO, in 1949 to the 
first peacekeeping operation with UNEF between Israel and Egypt in 1956.151 The UN 
now constitutes a key framework for the negotiations but is also an important actor 
operationally, with a special coordinator under UN/DPA, UNSCO since 1994152 and 
three peacekeeping mission in the region: UNTSO (1949), UNDOF in the Golan 
 
                                                
150 Interview n°21 (Official of the EU Delegation in New York), March 2011, see also 
Birnberg 2009.  
151  For a good overview of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War see MacQueen 
2011(MacQueen 2011).  
152 See the website of UNSCO: http://www.unsco.org/about.asp . For an overview of the 
complex UN set up in the West Bank and Gaza see Le More 2008, p. 98 and ff.  
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Heights (1973) and UNIFIL (1978 and expanded in 2006) in Lebanon.153 Since 2002, 
the United Nations is also a member of the Quartet.  
5.2.1 Assessing the hypotheses 
The opportunity for interaction between the EU and the UN in this field is extensive. 
Using the existing literature, internal EU documents and my interviews in the region, I 
will now try to show what are the actual conditions that move the EU to cooperate in 
the security field with the United Nations in this difficult context. To do this I will 
work around some key examples of EU’s engagement since the establishment of 
CFSP in 1992: the establishment and running of the Quartet; the two CSDP missions 
established in 2005-2006 and the involvement in UNIFIL in 2006. The main driver 
for the EU to actually use UN structures in the security field is the need for ideational 
and material resources (hypothesis 1). However, in this case the lack of cohesiveness 
of its member states and structures also contributes to the explanation (hypothesis 2). 
As I have done in the previous pages, after each example I will provide a small table 
with the configuration of the key explanatory variables in that particular circumstance. 
The table below provide an estimate of the variables for the case study as a whole. 
  
 
                                                
153 On 21 April 2012 with Resolution 2043 (2012) the UNSC authorized another peace 
mission in Syria (UNSMIS), to monitor the cessation of violence and the implementation of 
the plan of Special Envoy’s Kofi Annan. See 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/sc10618.doc.htm (23/4/2012) 
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Table 25. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for Case Study 4 
– Security and the Middle East Peace Process -  
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0 Political Support 0.5 
Capabilities 0,5 Acceptance 0 
Policy 0.5 Reputation 0 
Total 1,5 (Medium) Total 1.5 (Medium) 
Integration  Unity  
Decision Making Procedure 0 Positional 1 
Institutional Coherence 1 Operational 1 
Total 1 (Low) Total 2 (Medium) 
 
The Quartet and international legitimacy 
The Middle East Quartet (EU, US, Russia and the UN) is certainly an illustrious 
example of interaction and cooperation between the EU and the UN. In 2002, it was 
saluted as an experiment of multilateral diplomacy that could tame the unilateral 
approach of the United States to the broader Middle East, which was brewing under 
the neo-conservative administration of G.W. Bush and its “War on Terror” (Tocci 
2011).154 It was established around the time when the EU was also working on the 
concept of “Effective multilateralism”, and can therefore be interpreted as an outcome 
of this approach, although it actually anticipated by several months the European 
Security Strategy (Tocci 2011, 3). According to Tocci it is a form of “Crystallized 
Multilateralism”, in the sense that it has remained flexible and informal even though 
its membership is fixed, meetings and outputs are regular and it was endorsed by the 
 
                                                
154 As noted by Musu the Quartet was established almost by accident in April 2002, when 
Secretary of State Colin Powell met in Madrid with HR Solana and the Spanish Foreign 
Minister and rotating president of the EU council Ana Palacio, the UN Secretary General 
Annan and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (Musu 2010, 64). 
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UNSC.155 Yet, the European interest for the Quartet stems mainly from its lack of 
leverage on the MEPP and from the substantial policy disagreements between 
member states, which the Quartet partly dissimulates.  
Thanks to the Quartet, the EU and the UN have increased their role (at least formally) 
in the politics of the MEPP, from which they have been excluded by the US and Israel 
(Le More 2008). Israel traditionally “abhors” multilateralism (Tocci 2011, 25) and the 
UN - where it is constantly isolated - and has been very suspicious of Europe’s 
alleged pendant for it.156 The period preceding the establishment of the Quartet was 
marked by various illustrations of this lack access to conflict resolution efforts. High 
Representative Solana and the Spanish Presidency were freshly coming from an 
unsuccessful mission to the Palestinian territories, where they had been prevented by 
Israel to meet with President Arafat in Ramallah (Musu 2010, 66): rather humiliating 
for the biggest donor to the Palestinian Authority. In addition, the UK and France 
were disagreeing on whether to continue following the US peace initiative. This 
awkward situation had shattered the ambition of the EU to put forward an autonomous 
mediation effort, in a phase of relative benign disengagement of the US. In this sense, 
in Europe the Quartet was interpreted as an instrument to tame the unilateralist “Axis 
of Evil” policy, which the US was developing 2002, or at least give this impression.  
As a matter of fact, the most important attribute of the Quartet was that, thanks to the 
UN, it ‘looked multilateral’ (Tocci 2011, 24). The UN provided legitimacy 
particularly towards the Arab world, which had been excluded. It also provided fresh 
 
                                                
155 UNSC resolution 1435, 14 September 2002. Some argued that the Quartet signalled the 
official ‘multilateralization’ of the conflict (Müller 2011, 53; Musu 2010, 70). The EU had 
lobbied for a long time for this approach, calling, for instance, for a comprehensive regional 
peace from all parties involved in the conflict as opposed to the bilateral/unilateral approach 
envisaged by Israel and the US, which had always prevailed in the past leading to separate 
peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. 
156 According to Ginsberg, one of the reasons for the Israeli insistence in 1991 that the EC be 
only an observer to the Madrid peace conference instead than a full party, was that in the past 
it had “insisted on the United Nations as the appropriate forum for negotiations towards a 
comprehensive peace settlement, knowing that this was totally unacceptable to Israel” 
(Ginsberg 2001, 107; Musu 2010, 49). 
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information from the Palestinian territories, through its presence on the ground. 157 
This became particularly important after the 2005 Palestinian elections, when both the 
US and the EU decided to boycott the Hamas government and soon lost all direct 
access to the Gaza strip. Europe’s presence was welcomed by the Palestinians and 
was eventually accepted by Israel, which felt reassured by the leading role of the 
US.158 And in fact, the leading role of the US and its unfaltering support of the Israeli 
policy remained unchanged. This became clear since the endorsement of Israel’s 
unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip in 2004 in violation of the Road 
Map. Tellingly, the UN participation to the forum soon started to be criticized, 
including from the inside, as it rapidly appeared that the process was not very 
neutral.159 
Still, for the EU the Quartet marked a milestone in its involvement in the Middle East, 
giving it “an higher political relevance and resonance” (Musu 2010, 67). After its 
establishment, through a series of proposals from German FM Fischer and then the 
Danish EU Presidency, the EU was able to influence the final draft of the “Road Map 
for Peace” (initially outlined by US President George W. Bush). This was a period 
when the EU was otherwise strongly fractious over the need to intervene in Iraq so the 
Quartet also allowed diffusing tensions among member states.  
Overall, though, Europe continued to play a subsidiary role in the MEPP, its 
comparative advantage remaining markedly linked to the financial support to the 
Palestinian Authorities. The Commission was given representation together with the 
High Representative and the Presidency, and left its mark by designing the Temporary 
International Mechanism (TIM) and financing substantially the Office of the Quartet 
representative (through UNDP), when this was established in 2007.160 Obviously, this 
 
                                                
157 Interview n°18 (EEAS official), 4 February 2011  
158 Russia had a largely residual role at this stage following past sponsorship of the Madrid 
peace summit. 
159 Interviews n°10,11 (UN officials working on the MENA region) 7 March 2011. See De 
Soto 2007 cited also in Tocci 2011, p.18.  
160 Considering the complicated legal status of the office, the Commission had to channel the 
funding through UNDP, which itself offers staff and offices for the team of Mr Tony Blair, 
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lack of institutional coherence facilitated the usual turf wars and quarrels about 
competencies and protocol and visibility which were resolved partly only with the 
Lisbon Treaty, limiting representation to the HR/VP.  
Table 26. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of 
analysis “Middle East Peace Process Quartet”  
The EU and the MEPP Quartet 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0.5 Political Support 0.5 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 0 
Policy 0.5 Reputation 0 
Total 2.5 (Medium) Total 1.5 (Low) 
Integration  Unity  
Decision Making Procedure 0 Positional 1 
Institutional Coherence 0 Operational 1 
Total 0 (Low) Total 2 (Medium) 
 
Cooperation with the United Nations in CSDP operations 
In its constant quest for “a seat at the table” the EU eventually was able also to put 
forward two CSDP missions. The opportunity came in the context of the unilateral 
withdrawal of Israel from Gaza announced by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 
December 2003, which was packaged by the US and the EU as consistent with the 
Roadmap (Müller 2011, 55). This led to the brokering of an agreement on Movement 
and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which also called for a 
“Third Party” to play a monitoring role. The EU offered to take up this role and with 
the previously “unthinkable” consent of Israel and the Americans deployed the 
EUBAM Rafah mission on the Border between Gaza and Egypt in November 2005 
(Musu 2010, 74). The operation was relatively small but it was the first time that EU 
                                                                                                                                       
the Quartet’s representative. Overall the EU has been funding more than 50% of the 
administrative costs for running the little team, in Palestine and London. (EC Internal 
Documents viewed by the author, Interview n°17 (EC official, DG Europeaid), 15 May 2011. 
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military personnel were deployed in the Middle East.161 A few weeks later, in January 
2006 a second ESDP mission was launched to assist the Palestinian Civil Police 
Development Programme (PCPDP), again in support to the peace process and with 
the blessing of the Quartet (Asseburg 2009a; Bulut 2009; Müller 2011). EUPOL 
COPPS in particular, was set up in close cooperation with the United States, which 
focussed on the training of the National Security Forces and Presidential guard, while 
the EU took charge of training the general civilian security (Police and Justice).162 
Muller argues that France, Germany and the UK saw at the time the opportunity for 
the EU to step forward and contribute visibly to security sector reform, just as the 
United States was distracted by the collapse of Iraq and by Afghanistan.  
The membership of the Quartet was certainly not the only condition that allowed for 
this autonomous EU mission in West Bank and Gaza: by 2005 the EU could already 
count on some successful experiences with ESDP in the civilian field in Africa, the 
Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. A civilian mission in the Justice sector 
had also been launched in Iraq (EUJUST LEX) in summer 2005.163 Although there 
were no major references to the UN in the mandates of the missions, on the ground, 
coordination and information sharing with the United Nations agencies, programmes 
and offices went relatively smoothly. On the other hand, as the EUPOL COPPS 
mission expanded its mandate to the justice sector in 2008, some problems of 
coordination emerged with UNDP for instance, as sector area is much more congested 
by donors (Bouris 2011)164.  
 
                                                
161 Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a European 
Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah). Note that a 
part from the Quartet, there is no reference to the UN in the joint action. 
162 Interview n°18 (EEAS Official), 4 February 2011, and Bulut 2009 
163 See CSDP website : http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations 
(23/4/2012) 
164 In fact, as in 2008 the Palestinian internal struggle stabilized around a division between the 
West Bank and Gaza, Europe followed the US in the “West Bank first” approach and 
reinforced its support to security sector reform. On 24 June 2008, Germany also organized an 
international conference specifically on civil security and the rule of law in Berlin, where 
further funds were raised and EUPOL COPPS was eventually strengthened (EC internal note 
to file, 2008, Available upon request) and its mandate expanded to the Justice sector. 
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Of course the victory by Hamas immediately complicated things and EUBAM 
RAFAH was substantially downgraded in capacities and became dormant when Israel 
decided to impose a blockade on Hamas. Similarly, EUPOL COPPS could start real 
work only with the Transition government in mid 2007 and had to limit its operations 
to the West Bank (Asseburg 2009a).  
Notwithstanding this, EUPOL COPPS has been relatively functional. Of course, the 
presence of a CSDP civilian mission, managed by the Council secretariat structures, 
not to say the expansion of its tasks, immediately opened the issue of coordination 
with the ‘Community’ instruments, managed by the European Commission (Dijkstra 
2009, 447).165 The Commission reinforced its programme in the Justice sector. In 
attempting to build bridges to the CSDP mission, the United Nations became again 
very useful for the European Commission. As it became clear that the Palestinian 
police was severely under resourced, together with other donors the Commission 
stepped forward to provide the equipment needed particularly through the Instrument 
for Stability.166 The implementing partner identified was UNOPS, which was already 
at the forefront of the PCPDP structure and has a solid track record for procurement, 
project management, infrastructure and training support. As a result the UN 
maintained and reinforced its role in the police reform programme and the 
Commission gained access and credibility in an area at the crossroads between 
development and security, where it does not have expertise of its own, but fears 
competition from other EU institutions.167 
 
                                                
165 See discussion on ‘Gray Areas’ in Chapter 3. 
166 See contribution agreement Addendum n°3 to Contribution Agreement IFS-
RRM/2008/160-898 (internal, available upon request). The Instrument for stability (IFS) uses 
the United Nations extensively as an implementing partner, having to deal mostly with crisis 
and emergency situation where Commission’s access is very limited (about 20 % of all IFS 
funds are channelled through the UN system- but in Palestine the figure is much higher 
including projects with UNDP, with UNRWA and with UNMAS on demining following the 
Gaza ‘Cast Lead’ operation in 2008-2009) 
167 similar collateral actions have been launched by the Commission around the EUBAM-
RAFAH operation, both through the IFS and with AENEAS (dealing with migration and 
border management). 
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Table 27. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of 
analysis “CSDP operations in the Middle East” 
CSDP operations in the Middle East 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0 Political Support 1 
Capabilities 0.5 Acceptance 0.5 
Policy 0.5 Reputation 0 
Total 1.5 (Low) Total 2.5 (Medium) 
Integration  Unity  
Decision Making Procedure 0 Positional 1 
Institutional Coherence 0 Operational 2 
Total 0 (Low) Total 3 (High) 
 
UNIFIL - peacekeeping through the United Nations  
To complete this overview of the EU-UN security interaction in the Middle East, we 
have to briefly look at the on-going UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, which 
was reinforced in the summer 2006 following the Israeli campaign against Lebanon 
and the Hezbollah militias (Asseburg 2009a; Gross 2009; Makdisi et al. 2009; 
Mattelaer 2009; Müller 2011, 58–59). 
The EU struggled to reach a consensus against the backdrop of the tenacious US 
defence of Israel and its insistence that a ceasefire should be called by the UN only 
after the Israeli operations were concluded and its security ensured. Given the US 
unmovable position even a cohesive front from Europe would have been useless and 
that offered the justification to EU member states to issue independent statements and 
positions on the crisis. This continued until the UNSC finally unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006, 33 days after the beginning of the war (Müller 
2011, 59).  
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Resolution 1701 called for the reinforcement of the UNIFIL mission,168 which had 
been present on the ground since 1978, and gave it a more robust mandate. This was 
not a multinational mission,169 nor a CSDP mission, but it became by all means a 
European-led UN operation (Makdisi et al. 2009). EU member states formed the core 
of the forces Italy, Spain and with initial reluctance France,170 offering the bulk of the 
troops and capacities both for the ground and maritime operation. This was the first 
time since the disappointments of Africa and the Balkans that such a substantial 
number of EU troops formed part of a UN operation. In 2009, a Euromesco report on 
UNIFIL noted that since 2006, 80% of all UN military personnel in the Middle East 
are from Europe (Makdisi et al. 2009, 11).  
Before 2006, UNIFIL had been criticised extensively for not being effective and for 
perpetuating the situation on the ground without really doing much to solve it. 
UNIFIL had to focus on humanitarian work mostly and on observing the (numerous) 
violations of the ceasefire. In addition to this UN credibility was at an all time low in 
the region because of the incapacity to interrupt the hostilities (Makdisi et al. 2009, 1). 
Yet, with UNIFIL the EU took up the burden and the leadership of the operation and 
refurbished it substantially in an initiative that was broadly welcomed and considered 
as a major show of responsibility for the EU and of its renewed willingness to take on 
hard power (ibid, p.11). The UNSG, in particular, insisted on a contribution by 
Europeans and was famously invited to participate at the Extraordinary General 
Affairs and External Relations Council of 25 August 2006 when pledges were made. 
Commentators have generally recognized EU institutions, such as the PSC and the 
European Council played a central stage (Gross 2009, 165; Müller 2011, 59), although 
 
                                                
168 UN Security Council, 5511th Meeting, “Security Council calls for end to hostilities 
between Hizbullah and Israel, unanimously adopting resolution 1701 (2006),” SC/8808 (11 
August 2006). 
169 For a famous precedent of peacekeeping efforts outside the UN in Lebanon see the 
multinational force (MNF) established in 1982 during the civil war with US, French, British 
and Italian troops.  
170 EU members troops came from Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Ireland, Germany, 
Poland, adding up to more than 7600 troops or more than 50% of the overall UNIFIL troops 
(Mattelaer 2009, 12–13). See figures 3 and 4 on Peacekeeping contributions in Chapter 3. 
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special summits as well as the UNSC itself were also used extensively to showcase 
national positions and leadership (Gross 2009, 166).  
The price of the EU’s commitment, though, was a substantial amendment of the 
military and oversight structure of the operation with the inclusion of a Special 
Military Cell in New York staffed with European senior military staff in parallel to 
the normal UN/DPKO structure (Mattelaer 2009, 11–12). As Gowan notes “European 
units wore blue helmets but circumvented cumbersome UN logistics and 
administration to get troops on the ground” (Gowan 2009b, 59). Germany also 
participated to the operation through the Maritime Task Force (MTF, a first for the 
United Nations), which further lowered the risk of direct confrontation with Israeli 
forces (Mattelaer 2009, 14). 
This was not the first European contribution to security in Lebanon. European troops 
were already contributing with minor contingents to UNIFIL and France, Britain and 
Italy had famously contributed to the Multinational Force during the 1982 Israeli 
invasion. Yet, in this occasion Europeans accepted to put their troops under the UN 
flag. Using the United Nations was necessary do to the lack of both ideational and 
material resources by the EU at that stage. The UNIFIL mission, however 
unsuccessful, had a long experience of the terrain, while Europeans lacked credibility 
towards the Lebanese that partly blamed them for the delays in calling a ceasefire. 
The EU was also perceived as lacking sufficient impartiality in that context, namely 
by Syria and Hezbollah (Makdisi et al. 2009). As noted by Gross, the idea of 
deploying the troops under an ESDP label (as had already happened in the DRC) was 
briefly ventilated in the discussions171 but remained a “no go area” due to the complex 
military dimension, the size of the mission, the impervious regional context and the 
opposition of the UK (Gross 2009, 52). 
Initially, even the more “robust” UN operation was not very well received by the 
some sectors of the Lebanese population and there were episodes of stone throwing 
 
                                                
171 Makdisi et Al also mention the idea of deploying through the “Battlegroup” concept, which 
was designed explicitely to support UN peacekeeping operations (Makdisi et al. 2009, 12) 
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and other forms of protest (including a terrorist attack on the Spanish contingent), 
until the second half of 2007 when the situation stabilized (Makdisi et al. 2009, 25). 
Lack of acceptance on the ground, therefore but also a weak legitimacy following the 
hesitations during the war. Of course the EU offered most of the capabilities, 
particularly through NATO countries and procedures (Mattelaer 2009, 15). However 
the UN provided a first bridge to the ground and the experience that was needed to be 
successful. The UN also ensured visibility for key EU members such as France, while 
Italy was going to enter the UNSC as a non-permanent member in January 2007 and 
the centre-left government was keen in displaying an even handed approach to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict(Menotti 2007).  
Table 28. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of 
analysis “Lebanon crisis and peacekeeping” 
Crisis Management on the Lebanon Crisis and UNIFIL II 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0.5 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0 Political Support 0 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 0 
Policy 0 Reputation 0 
Total 1.5 (Medium) Total 1 (Low) 
Integration  Unity  
Decision Making Procedure 0 Positional 0 
Institutional Coherence 1 Operational 1 
Total 1 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
After a substantial paralysis during the war, all member states agreed that the EU 
should play an active role on the ceasefire and reconstruction, although there was 
considerable competition for leadership between France, Italy and Spain. The UN 
therefore provided the perfect venue to increase European presence in Middle East 
security, while maintaining impartiality and legitimacy. Needless to say, although 
CSDP tools were not deployed, broader EU tools were substantially activated from 
damage assessment and humanitarian aid and demining to the long term development 
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and reform support and support to Palestinian refugees via UNRWA in a similar 
pattern as in the West Bank and Gaza.172  
5.2.2 Explaining  
The three examples that I have examined for this case study give a clear picture of the 
articulation and dynamics of EU-UN security cooperation in the Middle East. I have 
selected them because they provide a relatively comprehensive picture of the areas of 
cooperation in the field of security, ranging from the political framework, managed 
via the Quartet since 2002 to the civilian law enforcement operations via CSDP to full 
scale military peace-keeping on the Southern border of Lebanon.  
We have hypothesized that EU’s weakness is the overarching determinant of the EU’s 
decision to rely on the United Nations for its foreign policy, in security as in 
development. More than an ideological or normative adherence to the concept of 
multilateralism, the tendency to the EU to cooperate quite assiduously with the United 
Nations in the Middle East can be understood in general as a rational calculation, 
based on its position of relative political, institutional and diplomatic weakness in this 
region. Indeed, the case of Palestine and the Middle East peace process is particularly 
compelling. In the security field the EU has been historically excluded from playing a 
leading role at least since the 1956 Suez war, which effectively put an end to the 
France and British security influence in most of the area where they used to exercise a 
UN mandate. Since then, Europe has been trying to regain access to this region, which 
is crucial to its security, but had to play a subsidiary role to the United States which 
guarded jealously its privileged role and its special relationship with Israel.  
The UN on the other hand, had played an important role at the beginning of the 
conflict when it developed considerable experience in mediation, interposition and 
observation through pioneering peace operations. Yet, it also became increasingly 
subordinated to superpower interests in the period of the détente, when UNDOF, 
UNEF II and UNIFIL were launched as buffers between Israel and the Arabs 
 
                                                
172  For the key projects see the website of the EU delegation in Lebanon 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/projects/case_studies/index_en.htm  
 138 
 
(MacQueen 2011, 77). Then, when the détente finished from 1979, the leadership of 
the United States and Israel’s suspicion of its involvement in the peace process 
marginalized the UN from the political game (MacQueen 2011, 86–88).  
European member states, and particularly France, used both Europe (the European 
Community first and then the EU) as well as the UN, to regain clout within the region 
(Müller 2011). As a matter of fact, the EU tried to bring the MEPP back into the 
United Nations framework since its Venice declaration of 1980. Over the years, 
Europeans have continued to cherish their cooperation with the UN and within the UN. 
This partly explains the great attention that was put from the beginning of EPC in 
coordinating and aligning on Middle East issues in the UNGA (Luif 2003). When the 
opportunity for increasing its security role emerged from the Oslo process, and 
particularly after the failure of Camp David in 2000, at the end of the Clinton 
Administration, the EU used times and again the multilateral card.  
The Quartet was eventually the occasion to enter the peace mediation effort in a 
formal way, and the EU facilitated the inclusion of the United Nations in the team, to 
ensure international legitimacy, to counterbalance the US influence and to insure 
information from the ground. When the Quartet was established in 2002, the EU was 
coming from two years of divisions and disappointments over a possible ‘European 
initiative’ and the political forum gave the opportunity to regroup under the 
multilateral and UN flag. This was a time when the winds of war over Iraq and the 
impending European divisions over the US push towards an intervention for regime 
change were already looming.  
The role of the UN in the Quartet, though, has remained ceremonial in nature. It 
provided legitimacy to what continued to be US driven agenda (Tocci 2011), to which 
European resources were abundantly committed. Once it had gained that access and 
recognition, the EU started seeking more visibility and responsibility also 
independently from the UN. For example, the two ESDP operations EUPOL COPPS 
and EUBAM RAFAH were endorsed by the Quartet but independent from UN 
operations on the ground (TIM and PEGASE are similar examples on the 
development field). They were proudly identified as EU operations with EU 
capacities. Civilian capacity building operations though fall squarely into that cross 
pillar policy field where institutional competition is strong. Breaking up the EU 
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foreign policy system, the involvement of Council structures through CSDP pushed 
the European Commission to step up its operations in the area in the governance, 
police and justice sectors. In these areas, the Commission cooperates substantially 
with the UN, which provides it with useful expertise and access, as well as acceptance 
from the various parties and donors involved.  
But the deployment of independent CSDP operations in the Middle East has remained 
confined to civilian peace building. After the Lebanon war in 2006 the EU decided to 
use the UN structures by beefing up with EU troops the existing UNIFIL operation. 
This decision can certainly not be attributed exclusively to the EU. It depended also 
on the specific will of the Lebanese government, which certainly has the experience 
of other types of international forces. Yet, although it wanted to play a role, the EU as 
such was clearly in deficit of legitimacy following the division and impotence 
demonstrated during the crisis and was anyway not confident about deploying a major 
military operation through its own CSDP structures in a volatile area such as Lebanon. 
It lacked both capacities and cohesion on this term. The UN was therefore the perfect 
solution at that time and place.  
Figure 10. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) in Case Study 4 
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5.3 Summing up 
In this chapter I have focused on the Middle East region, and presented two separate 
cases of EU-UN cooperation in the development field and of EU-UN interaction in 
the security field. The Middle East is a sort of unreachable dream for Europe. It has 
constantly been a key priority and even a raison d’être for the common European 
foreign policy but Europeans have not managed so far to fully emancipate themselves 
from the role of sparring partners of the United States. So, while Europe is closely and 
directly affected by the politics of the Middle East, its leverage in the events of this 
region, and most importantly in brokering a peace settlement between Israel the 
Palestinians is very low. The first reason for this is certainly the deep-seated divisions 
among member states, as expected under Hypothesis 2. In this context, the EU has 
been broadly UN friendly. The UN itself has a very strong mandate in the region, and 
a lot of experience and capacities both in the development and security field.  
Distinguishing between development and security in Palestine is partly fictional as 
these two issues are always linked in a territory that has been so continuously 
characterized by crisis, conflict and fragility. Also, as pointed out by many 
commentators (Bouris 2010; Le More 2005; Tocci 2009) in the Middle East 
development policy has been to a great extent the only policy of the EU, in absence of 
more influential role in the political process, and lack of progress in general. In 
general, though, all cases show that the EU’s approach to the UN can be explained 
with the evolution of its resources and influence in the region, as well as with its 
internal cohesiveness. Cohesiveness has been always particularly elusive for two 
reasons. The first reason is that each Member States has a different position on this 
issue. The second reason is that the Middle East has been characterized by a high 
degree of competition and numerous turf wars between intergovernamental and 
community based institutions. In line with our initial hypotheses, all this has 
eventually created incentives for cooperation with the UN.  
In the development field, cooperation is intensive particularly over Palestinian 
refugees, where the UN has a unique mandate, through UNRWA. The EU has funded 
extensively this organization and has progressively increased its leverage over the 
management and reform of the organization itself. But the EU has also been at the 
forefront of direct funding to the Palestinian authority since Oslo. On this field it has 
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built on its legitimacy and strong political support at the domestic level, also 
confirmed by the European parliament to maintain an independent and autonomous 
role, putting forward innovative mechanisms with which it has competed with and 
predated the capacities of other donors and international organizations such as the 
World Bank. On the other hand, in the sensitive areas, across pillars, where Council 
structures where also increasingly active be it though the EUSR, the High 
Representative or the CSDP missions, the European Commission has in general 
maintained a strong cooperation with the United Nations. Of course, this depends also 
on the expertise of the UN in these areas. Working with it in these areas has been 
useful for the Commission notwithstanding the costs.  
In the security field, the situation is similar but here the reliance on the United Nations 
is even stronger as the EU’s security role in the Middle East has generally been 
limited by the US and Israel. The EU is also more fractious and divided in the Middle 
East. In this difficult context, the UN has allowed the EU to differentiate itself from 
the US and provided it with a degree of international legitimacy and recognition. It 
has also been used, as is often the case, as a common denominator under which to 
dissimulate divisions and differences. Finally, it has helped some leading member 
states - and particularly France, given the UK’s stronger alignment with the US - to 
maintain a visible profile on this global problem. Once the Quartet forum was set up, 
the EU has been reassured by the presence of the United Nations within an American-
led political framework but has sought, perhaps vainly, to build up its own security 
identity, including through CSDP. Overall, though, the Lebanon crisis in 2006 
showed that the EU is not ready yet to launch large-scale “robust” military operations 
in the area through its own CSDP structures. Therefore, on an ad hoc basis, the UN 
can still provide a very useful channel for putting troops on the ground.  
In the next chapter I will look at two cases that are outside of the EU institutional 
framework of the EMP/ENP, to see what is really the impact of this on the work of 
the EU and on its tendency to work with the United Nations.  
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Chapter 6. Outside of the European Mediterranean Policy 
The objective of this chapter is to control the impact of the institutionalization of 
foreign policy over EU-UN cooperation. To do this I will analyse security and 
development policy towards two countries, Iraq and Libya, which have been at the 
margin of the broader European institutionalized policy frameworks of the Barcelona 
process and the Neighbourhood policy. 
As has been discussed in the previous pages, institutionalization and Europeanization 
often imply a more assertive role of supranational agents, which can count on the 
ideational resources that are assured to them by a strong political mandate and legal 
competence. This results in a relatively stronger position within the EU foreign policy 
system and, according to my rational-choice institutional hypothesis 1, to a weaker 
tendency to seek cooperation with international organizations and the UN in particular. 
In reverse, where the general EU policy is less institutionally dense, and member 
states assertively maintain their own independent national agendas and structures, 
institutions can be expected to look instrumentally for the ideational and material 
support of international organizations.  
According to this view, Iraq and Libya can be singled out as countries where the 
common institutional framework have been weaker and the EU has maintained a 
looser foreign policy machinery in the face of very critical challenges. Both countries 
have been significantly isolated within the international community since the 1980s 
and have been targeted by stringent international and UN sanctions, increasing that 
isolation. There are obviously also important differences between them. While Libya 
has a strong geographic proximity with Europe, an observer status within the 
European Mediterranean Partnership and has been considered relatively unimportant 
for the global balance of power, up until the 2011 crisis. Iraq, on the other hand has 
been a central focus point for international diplomacy and for the United States, 
particularly since the end of the Cold War. 
The UN played also a different role in the framework of the international intervention. 
In the 2003 Iraq crisis, the UN was chiefly a stumbling stone for the US-led coalition 
that sought to topple the Saddam Hussein regime. In Libya, on the other hand, the UN 
was used extensively as a vehicle to legitimize an intervention in the 2011 civil war. 
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The UN also played an important role in the post-conflict reconstruction phase, 
according to a scheme, which, as we will see, has gradually improved in the years 
from Iraq 2003 and Libya 2011. The UN had a heterogeneous presence on the ground 
and experience before the crises. In Iraq its presence was very strong due to the 
previous UN mandated intervention in 1991 with the subsequent sanction regime and 
peacekeeping operation on the Kuwait border (UNIKOM)173, in addition to the IAEA 
led process of WMD inspections. In Libya, on the other hand, before 2011 UN 
presence was limited to the activities of a few programmes and agencies in the context 
of what was considered a relatively wealthy and stable country. Also the EU was 
weak, as it was trying to establish itself and had very limited presence and experience, 
outside of a few interested member states.  
Within this context, we would expect the EU to rely on the United Nations and 
channel its policy through it for two main reasons: firstly, because of the general lack 
of access to these two countries and secondly, because of the strong fragmentation 
and competition among EU foreign policy actors for resources and influence. Indeed, 
a key constant in Libya and Iraq has been the prominent role that the United Nations 
played in both crises and therefore the many opportunities for interaction, cooperation 
and conflict with the EU.  
The next section will address in more detail the case of European foreign policy in 
Iraq between 2003 and 2011, and at cooperation with the United Nations. I will tackle 
this case by focussing first on crisis management in 2003 and at the EU’s behaviour 
against the backdrop of the US-led military intervention, and then at post-conflict 
peacebuilding. In section 2, I will look at EU-UN development and security 
cooperation in Libya, particularly during and after the 2011 crisis. This is the last case 
study that I will analyse in my thesis. I will focus first on how the UN has been used 
as a political framework to ground the decision to intervene and then I will analyse 
the challenges of reconstruction. As already shown in previous chapters, post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconstruction is at the crossroads of development and security and 
 
                                                
173  United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. Closed in October 2003. See 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unikom/ (13/3/2012) 
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is a particularly fertile ground for cooperation with the United Nations in general and 
by EU institutional actors in particular. I will then conclude by providing some 
explanations and by summing up on the impact of the institutional framework of the 
Barcelona process on EU-UN cooperation.  
6.1 The case of Iraq: emerging from dependency 
The European painful navigation of the 2003 Iraq war has been extensively analyzed 
by international relations and European foreign policy scholarship. 174  It is an 
established fact that Europeans divided themselves over the US intention to topple 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in the aftermath to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Between 2002 and 2003, the United States, together with the UK, attempted to build-
up a multinational coalition around this goal and were faced by the opposition of an 
important part of the international community, with a leading role of France and 
Germany.  As a consequence of this opposition, the UNSC was branded as 
irrelevant175 and eventually bypassed by the US, which launched an massive operation 
in Iraq resulting in the fall Saddam Hussein and in a long, bloody and expensive 
occupation by coalition forces (mainly US) lasting until the end of 2011.  
Europe’s presence in Iraq was characterized by very little institutionalization. Iraq has 
always been detached from the European Mediterranean policy and the ENP and the 
European Commission did not have a strong role. The policy towards Iraq was 
fragmented and competitive with very little actual discussion at the EU level(Crowe 
2003). After the first Gulf War, the UK and France were particularly active within the 
United Nations. The UK developed a strong partnership with the United States in the 
management of the UN mandated No-flight-Zone in the South of Iraq. While France, 
played an important role in the Oil for Food programme and in the Iraqi oil sector in 
general.  
 
                                                
174 This section is based mainly on the work of (Crowe 2003; Gordon 2004; Lewis 2009, 
2009; Malone 2006; Menon 2004; Youngs 2006). 
175 Bush challenges U.N. to ‘show some backbone’, CNN, 14 September 2002, available at : 
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-14/us/iraq.bush.berlusconi_1_bush-challenges-gulf-war-
weapons-inspectors?_s=PM:US (13/3/2012) 
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6.1.1 Assessing the hypotheses 
There is not much that can be added to the understanding of the events that led to the 
European division in 2003, yet this case is crucial to our study of EU-UN cooperation. 
I will focus the next pages on the particular aspect of EU-UN interaction in the crisis 
phase and then on the post-conflict reconstruction.  
The crisis - breaking up within a political framework 
In the run up to the invasion Iraq was the center of the focus of the international 
community. In Europe, it was framed as a crucial challenge for multilateralism and 
for the EU’s credibility as a foreign policy actor. In that context, Iraq was “simply too 
tough a test” for CFSP (Crowe 2003, 535). Information sharing and coordination was 
attempted both in New York, via the “Article 19” framework and in Brussels until it 
became clear that the positions of the UK and Spain on the one hand and France and 
Germany on the other were simply irreconcilable. As mentioned by Crowe, given this 
division, by summer 2002 the discussions were held primarily in New York and the 
EU apparatus (including the Article 19 machinery) was completely bypassed (Crowe 
2003, 534).   
Table 29. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for the unit of analysis “Irak 
crisis management” 
Case 5: Iraq crisis management 2002-2003 
Unity  Integration  
Positional 0 Decision Making Procedure 0 
Operational 0 Institutional Coherence 1 
Total 0 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
By the summer of 2002 there was not much that could be done and a wedge had 
opened within CFSP. This was, to some extent, against the initial desire of the UK, 
which under the Blair government had tried to build a bridge between the US and the 
EU and to play a leadership role in the building up of a European security identity 
(Howorth 2003a). As described by Menon this crisis of CFSP actually led the EU to 
speed up developments on various fronts. By the end of 2003 the EU had adopted its 
first Security Strategy and launched the first ESDP missions in the Balkans and Africa, 
notably in strong cooperation with the United Nations (Menon 2004).  
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Authors argue that the division among member states on Iraq was linked primarily to 
the position vis-à-vis the United States and about the use of force (Howorth 2003b; 
Menon 2004). The strong ideological stance of the G.W. Bush Presidency, against the 
backdrop of the post 9/11 “War on Terror” created a divisive climate, which led the 
EU to break up explicitly. As noted by Lewis, for example, in the height of the crisis, 
Germany declared that it would have been against the intervention with or without the 
United Nations legitimation. Whatever the interpretation, this case could be seen as an 
exception to our complementary hypothesis that EU division normally leads to 
alignment under the United Nations.176 
However, there are signs also in this case that the hypothesis is correct. The Council 
of Ministers and European Council continued to meet on the Iraq question in 
November 2002 and then in 2003 until April and fell constantly on the United Nations 
and on the UN process as the lowest common denominator solution, on which all 
could agree to dissimulate their divergence. For example, a divisive European Council 
was held in Brussels on the 20th and 21st of March 2003, right at the start of the US 
operations. Interestingly the Presidency declaration states at paragraph 67. “We 
believe that the UN must continue to play a central role during and after the current 
crisis. The UN system has a unique capacity and practical experience in coordinating 
Assistance in post-conflict States. The Security Council should give the United 
Nations a strong mandate for this mission.” (Council of the European Union 2003a).  
Similarly, all European countries referred to multilateralism and legality as the basis 
for their position and action in Iraq. Even if the United States openly identified in the 
unwillingness of the UNSC to back its policy on Iraq a failure of multilateralism that 
justified unilateral action - as was already alleged in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy (US President G.W. Bush 2002), the UK and Spain, were much more 
 
                                                
176 Yet this ‘error’ effect can be explained by the centrality of the United Nations to the 
specific case of the US intervention. The UN was indirectly involved in the debate between 
“Old Europe” and “New Europe” because the United States G.W. Bush administration had 
explicitly challenged the UNSC relevance at the center of the international system and had 
made Iraq the crucial test of this. As pointed out by Malone, the UN was not functional to US 
interests in Iraq but it also did not bend to US interest (Malone 2006). 
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nuanced (Youngs 2006). The UK, for example, attempted to ground its intervention 
on UN legitimacy, which rested in previous UNSC resolutions violated by Iraq and 
notably on Resolution 1441 of November 2002. This was done mainly for domestic 
reasons, as Tony Blair struggled to rally his own party behind the military 
intervention in Iraq.177 Similarly, other countries that latter joined the coalition in 
supporting security and reconstruction in Iraq, such as Italy, insisted on the United 
Nations legitimacy that justified their presence in Iraq and support for the intervention, 
notwithstanding the strong domestic opposition to the war.  
During the military campaign, since the European Union was divided it used the UN 
venue to disburse humanitarian aid, through the remnants of the “Oil for Food” 
Programme, which had been running during the sanctions years. Also the European 
Commission activated its humanitarian structures and worked mainly through the UN 
and the Red Cross organizations on the ground (Prolog Consult 2010). Yet, the actual 
war lasted only a few days and by 9 April 2003 the immediate problem became the 
organization of post-conflict reconstruction, institution building and democratic 
transition. As we have seen, Europeans had insisted on a strong political backing from 
the United Nations. However, while the EU was able to regroup around the idea of 
giving a leading role to the UN, it continued to be strongly divided on the substance 
post-conflict Iraq and on the role of the US in European foreign policy (Menon 2004).  
Post-conflict - making up within an operational partnership 
UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003) adopted on 22 May 2003, recognized the role of 
occupying powers to ‘Coalition’ states and gave an important position to the United 
Nations in coordinating the reconstruction. This allowed Europe to join the effort for 
reconstruction and development assistance. At this operational level the United 
Nations played an absolutely crucial role, mainly through the ad hoc Trust Fund 
mechanism that was established by the UNDP and the WB (International 
 
                                                
177  For instance, the UK Attorney General Lord Goldsmith issued an advice that the 
intervention could be considered legal shortly before the war was started(BBC News 2010) 
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Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq - IRFFI)178 . Here again, we witness the 
dynamics of interrelation that are typical of crisis situations, when the European 
Union is relatively weak, divided and lacks access and resources.  
As the military operations ended, the European Council in Thessaloniki welcomed the 
central role given to the UN in the post-invasion phase and tasked the European 
Commission and the High Representative to present a proposal to channel assistance 
to Iraq (Council of the European Union 2003b). In response, the European 
commission with no direct presence in Iraq and under pressure to deliver quickly 
presented a proposal for the Madrid Summit of October 2003 whereby its Iraq 
reconstruction assistance for 2004 (200 million euro) would be completely channeled 
via the United Nations Trust Fund and invited member states to do the same 
(European Commission 2003b).179  
As explained above, the EU lacked both experience and access in Iraq following the 
toppling of the Saddam regime. The Commission had been cut out by the autonomous 
policies of member states and the sanctions against the regime. When interviewed EU 
officials justify in this way the channeling of EU funds through the UN. “There was 
no security on the ground and years of sanctions had cut off the EU from Iraq 
whereas the UN was very experienced.”180 Other states, which had opposed the war, 
such as France and Germany, could work in Iraq only indirectly, through the United 
 
                                                
178 For extensive information on this mechanism, history and sources of funding see the Multi-
partner Trust Fund Office gateway of UNDP : http://mptf.undp.org/ (accessed on 27 May 
2012).  
179 However impressive in absolute terms (almost 1 billion euro committed at the Donor 
conference in Madrid on 24 October 2003), one should not overestimate the material 
resources committed by Europe at this stage. In relative terms the commitment was very low, 
a small percentage of what was invested by the United States through its separate tool (Iraq 
Relief and Reconstruction Fund). 
180 Interview n°19 (European Commission official) 10 September 2011. Evaluation of the 
European Commision (ADE for the European Commission 2008). Note also that the needs 
assessment phase for Iraq post-conflict reconstruction had been carried out under the 
leadership of the UN with the participation also of European Commission staff. 
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Nations (Youngs 2006). As a consequence, at least in the initial phase of post-conflict 
reconstruction the EU was consistently in support to the United Nations.181  
Yet, in the case of Iraq, this rational-choice motivation can perhaps also be 
complemented with a contingent strong normative attraction towards the principle of 
multilateralism. That is, the clear ideological division over Iraq, which in Europe also 
led to the definition of the ‘effective multilateralism’ dogma in the ESS, created a 
strong momentum in the EU to pair up with the UN as a point of distinction from the 
US. In short, there was also a clear identity objective behind the decision to support 
the United Nations in Iraq because of the particular context of division and strife on 
this issue that had damaged the image and functioning of the EU(Lewis 2009).  
Opportunity and dependency in post conflict peace-building  
Cooperation with the United Nations continued through the post-conflict and 
stabilization phase. Iraq is actually a school case of cooperation as between 2003 and 
2007 almost all of the EU development assistance to Iraq was channeled via the IRFFI 
mechanism coordinated by the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the WB. Most 
of the funds actually went to UNDG and UNDP as the WB was criticized for not 
having sufficient capacity on the ground, particularly as the European Commission 
opened its own delegation in Baghdad in 2007.  
Most analysts note that the division among member states remained quite strong, yet 
the United Nations ensured a common umbrella for European presence in an 
important theatre, which was dominated by the United States (John Peterson 2004; 
Schwartz 2008; Youngs 2006). For illustration, the table of variables below reflects 
the situation of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building immediately following 
the 2003 both in terms of capacities (hyp. 1) and cohesion (hyp.2).  
 
                                                
181 Among its operations, for example, the EU financed a part of the establishment and 
running costs of the UNAMI mission, which coordinated the UN presence in IRAQ and was 
established by UNSC resolution 1546 (2004). 
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Table 30. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of 
analysis “Iraq post-conflict peacebuilding” 
Case 5: Iraq post-conflict peacebuilding 2003-2009 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0 Political Support 0.5 
Capabilities 0.5 Acceptance 0 
Policy 0.5 Reputation 0 
Total 1 (Low) Total 1.5 (Medium) 
Integration  Unity  
Decision Making Procedure 1 Positional 1 
Institutional Coherence 0 Operational 1 
Total 1 (Low) Total 2 (Medium) 
 
Gradually, though as the deep wounds left by the 2003 division started healing and 
the EU continued increasing its ambition as a foreign policy actor, a gradual 
dispassion from the United Nations started to take place. This detachment rested on 
various elements that are related to our hypotheses on resources and cohesion.   
First, Europeans decided in 2005 to increase its support to governance and institution 
building in Iraq. On the one hand they assisted the organization of elections, mainly 
via UNDP, which led to the first democratic elections in Iraq in 2005. On the other 
hand they increased the focus on security sector reform (SSR) and launched a specific 
ESDP civilian integrated mission in the field of justice reform to train judges and 
police. EUJUST Lex was deployed in mid 2005, before other similar operations in the 
Middle East and was stationed initially in Brussels and then in Bagdad, 
notwithstanding the still strong divisions amongst member states (Korski 2009, p.232; 
Banks 2010). Cooperation with the United Nations at this level was good but 
Europeans were beginning to restore their unity of purpose and importantly an 
independent and collective presence in Iraq.  
Secondly, with the channeling of large sums or more than 200 million euro per year 
through the IRFFI mechanism, the EU became progressively more demanding on 
results and visibility. Whereas initially it was accepted that reaching the Iraqi people 
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in such a difficult and unsecure environment meant also abiding with suboptimal 
results and sacrificing on donor visibility - which was also considered a risk for the 
recipient in the phase of the anti-Western insurgency - in the medium term this 
situation became less satisfactory. Various donors launched routine evaluations, 
which found that some aspects of the management of the funds needed improvement 
(UNDG and World Bank 2009). Reporting by the UN and the WB was initially 
reputed slow, unclear, uneven or even sloppy. 182 This was not a general trend, but 
concerned a few cases, which however were enough to reinforce the stereotypes and 
frustration. In addition to this, despite the efforts of the UN, the perceived ownership 
of the operations by the Iraqis was low (Youngs 2006). In parallel, the European 
Parliament started to take interest in the case. In 2007 and 2008 various parliamentary 
questions were made to the Commission on why and how funds were managed via the 
UN in Iraq. The Parliament asked to vision the audits and at the end of 2007 and again 
in 2008 the Parliamentary committee on budgetary control (COCOBU) even 
threatened to suspend the approval of the external relations budget pending clearer 
information on this by the European Commission.183 Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
had to appear more than once in front of the committee to explain the situation and 
reassure the European Parliament. Still, this led to further strife between the 
Commission and the UN and WB headquarters as these were asked to provide audits 
of their operations through IRFFI and were visited by verification and other missions 
in Washington, New York and Iraq.184 It looked as though the phase of expansion of 
EU aid through the United Nations, which had characterized the period between 2003 
 
                                                
182 Interview n°22 (European Commission official, DG Europeaid, 20 March 2011). 
183 See the COCOBU meeting of 8 September 2008. In particular point 5 : Use of Trust Funds 
financed by multiple donors. COCOBU info note number 8/2008, European Parliament. 
Available at : 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200809/20080901ATT35803/20080
901ATT35803EN.pdf). Minutes of the meeting are also available online. 
184 See for instance the report on the “Field trip of the International Reconstruction Fund 
Facility for Iraq Donors Committee” in May 2008, by MEP Paulo Casaca, one of the most 
vocal critics of the European Commission in Committee on Budget Control (COCOBU). 
Available at www.europarl.europa.eu (13/4/2012).  
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and 2007, mainly due to the operations in Iraq and the Palestinian territories was 
coming to an end.   
Third, by 2008/2009, the US surge in Iraq was giving the first positive signs in terms 
of security on the ground and more political space and independence to the 
democratically elected authorities of Iraq. This was also compounded by a resurgence 
of revenues from oil production and exports. In this context, the EU had more access 
and was able to set up independent operations in Iraq and increased its appetite 
towards the development of independent bilateral relations with Baghdad.  
Within the Commission services, with the acceptance of the member states, there was 
a push to downsize the overall allocations to Iraq, and to normalize the bilateral 
cooperation by shoring up the IRFFI mechanism and building up, instead, a stronger 
EU presence in Baghdad, with the capacity of managing projects independently. In 
this context, while the EUJUST LEX continued to be reinforced and prolonged, the 
first bilateral contracts with the Iraqi authorities were signed by the European 
Commission in 2009, with an overall reduced portfolio, which quickly went from 200 
million per year in 2004-2005 to about a tenth of the size in 2010. A country strategy 
paper was adopted in 2010 and a first multiannual indicative programme for 2011-
2013 was adopted (EC, Italy and Sweden 2010).185 In this new situation the UN 
continues to be a key partner, but it is now in competition with government agencies 
and NGOs.  
6.1.2 Explaining 
As with previous cases I have tried to provide a rationalist account of EU-UN 
cooperation on Iraq, looking at the United Nations as a political framework and as an 
operational partner. The table below provides the values that were estimated for each 
variable for this case study seen globally, including both crisis and post conflict.  
 
                                                
185 See in particular pages 17-21. Interestingly, the Iraq national indicative programme is also 
one of the few examples of joint programming, as the document integrates European 
Commission, Italian and Swedish programmes. 
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Table 31. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for Case Study 5 
– Iraq 2003-2011 - 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0 Legal Competences 1 
Access 0 Political Support 0 
Capabilities 0 Acceptance 0 
Policy 0 Reputation 0 
Total 0 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
Integration  Unity  
Decision Making Procedure 0 Positional 0 
Institutional Coherence 1 Operational 0 
Total 1 (Low) Total 0 (Low) 
 
Iraq has had a key role in the definition of the role of United Nations in the post cold 
war security environment from the first gulf war in 1991 to the US led intervention of 
2003 and the subsequent peace-building effort (Malone 2006; Pickering 2008). It has 
also contributed immensely to the definition of the doctrine of multilateralism of the 
EU and of both the theory and practice of cooperation with the UN (Biscop 2005; Hill, 
Peterson, and Wessels 2011).  
I have shown briefly how cooperation with the United Nations on Iraq and the EU’s 
commitment to it, at least formally, has been quite impressive, both politically and 
operationally. This, of course, if one excludes the actual war between March and May 
2003, when the coalition forces led by the US and the UK occupied Iraq after failing 
to obtain an explicit UNSC mandate. I have already noted how this division within the 
EU and the sidelining of the UN was due more to the position towards the US, than to 
the UN itself. In fact, as is to be expected according to our hypothesis 2, the EU 
remained broadly committed to the UN in the face of its division, both before, and 
particularly after the invasion.  
After the invasion, the peace-building operations have been strongly coordinated with 
and by the UN. Europeans have continuously promoted a strong role for the United 
Nations, including the UK, which as the junior partner in the coalition administrating 
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Iraq has been by far keener to include the UN as compared with the US (Youngs 
2006).  
Some have argued that this regrouping around the United Nations can be understood 
via normative institutional arguments or entrapment and cooperative bargaining. 
Lewis, for example claims that the EU moved from the paralysis until 20 March 2003, 
when it was blocked on a lowest common denominator solution of “let the UN do it” 
via the Oil for Food Programme, to a more progressive and leading role regrouping 
around a mandate to the European Commission to assist Iraq over the summer 2003. 
In this view the change would have been motivated by the need to get on with 
business and to play a role in post war Iraq, but also to recompose around a EU 
presence in this country, in the face of the long efforts made in building up CFSP and 
ESDP (Lewis 2009).  
I would rather put the accent on the rational motivations by the various actors of the 
European foreign policy system, mainly based on their relative weakness in terms of 
material and ideational resources. First of all, there was no real alternative to working 
through the “Oil for food” programme in delivering humanitarian aid to Iraq in March 
2003, as the military operation were starting. The only thing that Europeans could do 
was to channel their aid via the existing structures of the UN, to which some member 
states (and particularly France) had been chief contributors, and with which they were, 
therefore, rather familiar.  
Once the operations were over and a UNSC resolution was passed to base the 
reconstruction effort and that would de facto legitimize the occupation 
(Res.1483/2003), the EU had no choice, once again, but to work with the UN. Beyond 
some member states that participated directly to the operations (UK, Spain) or 
decided to contribute to the reconstruction efforts made by the coalition (Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland and others), all the other EU members did not have the access 
nor the legitimacy to channel aid towards Iraq. The UN and the WB via the IRFFI 
provided a good means to do that from 2004.  
The European Commission, was charged to find a solution together with the High 
Representative as most member states wanted to maintain a distance from the 
intervention while, at the same time, they build up some level of European presence. 
This was an important incentive for the Commission to increase its role in this country, 
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from which it had been excluded by the previous lack of Europeanization of the 
policy and by the general isolation of Iraq. The European Commission lacked any 
substantial means to channel this aid and therefore the IRFFI trust fund designed 
together with UNDP and WB was the only way to play.186 As predicted by my 
hypothesis 1 and by the general analytical concept, the European Commission used 
the United Nations to increase its access, legitimacy and credibility within the 
European foreign policy system, in an area, peace-building, which is at the cross roads 
between development competences and security competences (Dijkstra 2009).  
The security context, which deteriorated after the first months of occupation made it 
even more difficult to carry out independent operation in Iraq. The European Union 
had to work with the UN. According to our graph, it was in a situation of strong 
dependency.  
Figure 11. Illustration of configuration of variables for Case Study 5 
 
This situation of dependency and forceful cooperation did not last forever. As I 
explain in my hypothesis, the EU tends to avoid it. It generates a degree of frustration 
over visibility, reporting, results and was also targeted by the European Parliament, 
which further increased the pressure on the European Commission, in particular to 
 
                                                
186 Interview n°22 (European Commission Official, DG Europeaid), 20 March 2011 
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identify alternatives to channeling its development cooperation exclusively via the 
UN. Gradually, the EU built up its own legitimacy and credibility in Iraq, in particular 
by reinforcing its relationship with the newly elected authorities. This led to the 
establishment of an independent CSDP mission in the Justice sector in 2005. In the 
meantime the EU also increased its trade with Iraq and its political relations. The 
increasing relationship with the authorities and the acceptance of the EU presence on 
the ground further offset the need for the UN to provide ideational resources. Indeed, 
one of the criticisms on the IRFFI by the Iraqis (to a large extent unfair) referred the 
lack of ownership in the mechanism. Eventually, being in a stronger position, the EU 
started designing its more typical bilateral instruments of cooperation and the IRFFI 
mechanism (which was financed prominently by Europeans and the Commission) was 
closed in 2008-2009. The EU continues to work with the UN on the ground but now 
cooperation is more ad hoc (more “predatory”) and based on specific assessments on 
the convenience and added value of specific operations as elsewhere in the region.  
We moved therefore from a strong division of member states, and weakness of 
institutions to a more solid presence of the EU on the ground, a stronger legitimacy 
and more access to the country, which gradually brought to emancipation from the 
United Nations and the development of a more autonomous foreign policy.  
6.2 The case of Libya: coordination and competition 
Libya is particularly interesting to our understanding of EU-UN cooperation. This 
case shows how the cooperative behavior varies depending on the specific situation of 
relative power of the EU: what we have described as its material and ideational 
resources. Libya has been an unexplored territory for the EU for many years (not so 
for the UN), and Europe was only starting to position itself in the country as the 2011 
Revolution started. As we will see in the next pages, the post-conflict situation after 
the revolution as certainly increased the opportunities of cooperation with the UN, but 
has not changed the underlying trend, which sees the EU establishing its presence in 
the country and slowly emancipating itself from the United Nations.  
6.2.1 Assessing the hypotheses 
After a brief overview of the situation before the 2011 revolution, I will look at EU-
UN cooperation during the crisis and then in the immediate post-conflict phase.  
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EU-Libya relations before 2011 - opening shop  
For forty-two years, under the regime of Colonel Khadafy, Libya maintained a rather 
intractable foreign policy. In the 1980s a policy of support to international terrorism 
around the world led Libya to a direct confrontation with the United States. In 1986 
the US, under the Reagan Administration, carried out an air strike over the Khadafy 
compound of Al Azizia in Tripoli with the objective of punishing Khadafy for its 
policy and possibly to eliminate him. Colonel Khadafy survived the raid and in the 
subsequent years remained even more estranged from the international community. 
This was further compounded as a result of the bombing of the Pan American flight 
over the skies of Lockerbie in Scotland, which killed more than 200 passengers 
mostly Americans in December 1988 (Pinta 2006, 273–276).  
As a consequence of this, the Libyan regime also remained at the margins of the 
European initiatives in the Mediterranean in the post-Oslo phase. It was never a full 
member of the Barcelona process.187 Libya was the only country on the Mediterranean 
with which the European Union did not have any official legal agreement. Some 
member states, and particularly Italy, maintained an interest-based relationship with 
this country, focused on the energy supply, economic investments and migration but 
the European Union as such, was completely absent from the scene.  
The situation started changing at the turn of the century, when Colonel Khadafy 
announced a series of diplomatic moves meant to break the international isolation and 
turn Libya more towards Europe. In 1999, the UNSC sanction regime was suspended 
following collaboration by Libya on terrorism. This paved the way for the gradual 
‘normalisation’ of Libyan foreign policy with the total lifting of sanctions in 2004 
(Youngs 2006, 136–139) and a “policy of engagement” from Europe. This new 
approach was driven mainly by member states’ strong commercial interests to gain 
access to Libya’s rich and largely untapped resources and market. The EU institutions 
took a supporting role already with Commission President Prodi. A key step in this 
sense, was taken by External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero Waldner, who 
 
                                                
187 Libya acquired observer status to the EMP in 2002 
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played an important role in the liberation of a group Bulgarian medical personnel 
accused of infecting children with HIV in Benghazi (Pierini 2008).188 This case, which 
was finally closed in 2007, was considered the last impediment to absorbing Libya 
within the Euro-Mediterranean policy. Indeed, immediately following this diplomatic 
success, the GAERC of 15 October 2007 called for the Commission to prepare the 
negotiation mandate for a Framework agreement with Libya of a roughly analogous 
nature to the Association Agreements with the other countries of the region (Council 
of the European Union 2007). Negotiations were effectively opened in November 
2008 under the leadership of the European Commission. 189  
In parallel with the negotiations of the Framework Agreement, the European 
Commission adopted the first Country Strategy Paper for Libya and the related 
Multiannual Indicative programme, which allocated cooperation funds for 60 million 
euros over the 2011-2013. The documents were adopted in 2010 and planned projects 
in the field of migration, trade integration and SMEs, technical assistance and the 
health sector (European Commission 2010e).  
EU Cooperation on migration and border management however, had already started 
since 2005-2006 under strong pressure from Italy and was slightly more conspicuous 
than in other sectors. Various small projects had been launched from 2005-2006 but 
these were implemented through international organizations, such as the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR and UNODC.190 The main reason 
behind the cooperation with these organizations, notwithstanding the regular 
complaints over the lack of visibility, was the expertise and - in the case of the 
 
                                                
188  See also the document “Memorandum sur le rélations entre la Libye et l’Union 
européenne” signed between Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and Segretary of State El-
Obeidi on 23 July 2007. 
189 See Commission’s Press Release “Libya: Commission proposes negotiating mandate for a 
Framework Agreement” IP/08/308, 27 February 2008, and Press release: “EU-Libya: 
negotiations on future Framework Agreement start” 
IP/08/1687,12 November 2008 
190 Projects at this stage were financed through the programme AENEAS that in 2007 became 
the programme on Migration and Asylum. See the website : 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/migration-asylum/index_en.htm (19/3/2012) 
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UNHCR - the exclusive mandate. Yet, cooperation was also spurred by the lack of 
presence of the European Commission in Libya, given the fact that there was no 
permanent Delegation there, nor any substantial experience of cooperation with the 
authorities.191 An additional problem was linked to the lack of independent civil 
society organizations through which to channel aid. Finally the Libyan regime itself 
had an ambiguous approach towards cooperation in this area and the European public 
opinion and European Parliament were very suspicious of the human rights standards 
for migration management in Libya (Colombo and Abdelkhaliq 2012; Hamood 2008; 
Joffé 2011). It was therefore essential to work through credible and respected 
organizations such as UNHCR and IOM.192  
Table 32. Configuration of variables (resources) for the unit of analysis “EU 
cooperation policy in Libya before the crisis” 
EU cooperation policy in Libya before 2011 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0 Legal Competences 0.5 
Access 0 Political Support 0.5 
Capabilities 0.5 Acceptance 0 
Policy 0.5 Reputation 0 
Total 1 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
In short, given the scarcity of material and ideational resources before the revolution, 
the European Commission was constrained to work with international organizations in 
Libya. Contrary to the EU, the UN had both presence and experience in Libya. UNDP, 
in particular, led the coordination of official and private donors in Libya through a 
Donor Coordination Group and managed a functioning technical cooperation 
 
                                                
191 A small bilateral cooperation programme of 8 million euro for the period 2007-2010 was 
allocated for medical technical cooperation mostly in Benghazi as a response to the 
HIV/AIDS infection that had affected 400 children. 
192 Yet, the EU also tried to avoid dependence on IOM and UNHCR by funding also separate 
organizations, including the Vienna based International Center for Migration Policy 
Development (ICMPD). 
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programme covering several sectors.193 Other agencies such as UNESCO and FAO 
were also present, all acting largely as pools of expertise and institutional advise for 
the Libyan state, which would pay for the technical assistance mostly with its own 
resources. In this context, the EU relied on the UN for information and access for its 
first explorative missions and tentative steps in Libya. Beyond this, however, 
opportunities for cooperation were limited by the fact that the EU still had very few 
activities in Libya.  
Against this backdrop, the EU sought to open its own office in Tripoli to have a more 
direct presence and manage the increased activities in cooperation, trade and political 
affairs. All this was in preparation as the “Arab Spring” hit Libya by surprise, with the 
uprising starting in Benghazi on the 17 February of 2011 and then spreading rapidly 
to the rest of the country.  
Crisis management - cooperating with the UN 
The 2011 Libyan crisis has increased exponentially the need and opportunity for 
interaction and cooperation between the EU and the UN. The UN played its role both 
as a political forum and as an operational actor and the EU member states involved 
have used extensively the United Nations instruments to achieve their objectives in 
Libya.  
As the crisis started, on 17 February 2011, Europeans tried to achieve a consensus to 
condemn the repression made by the Gaddafi regime, within the EU bodies and 
particularly the PSC. Most member states were quite keen in condemning the 
regime’s violence against the protesters from the outset, as France in particular 
wanted to repair the negative image it had created over its hesitant reaction to the 
Tunisian events the previous month. Italy - together with Malta, with many interests a 
stake and a large number of citizens in Libya was the most reluctant initially to 
 
                                                
193  Direct Observation, Libya 2009, Internal EU document, note by B. Brunet 
(D(2009)F4/100984, 88337), 5 May 2009, Available upon request 
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condemn the regime (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011; koenig 
2011).194 
Table 33. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for the unit of analysis “Libya 
crisis management” 
Case 6: Libya crisis management 2011 
Unity  Integration  
Positional 0 Decision Making Procedure 0 
Operational 1 Institutional Coherence 1 
Total 1 (Low) Total 1 (Low) 
 
An initial compromise was reached on the 21 February when the EU Foreign Affairs 
Council issued a statement condemning the violent crackdown of demonstrations by 
the Gaddafi regime (Council of the European Union 2011b). The key game, however, 
was played in New York and among capitals with France and the UK bypassing the 
hesitancies of the EU by spearheading a first resolution at the UNSC on 26 February 
2011, after securing support also from the Arab League. UNSC Resolution 1970 
called the Gaddafi regime for restraint and imposed targeted sanctions on the regime 
including asset freezes, travel bans and a general arms embargo. This consensus at the 
global level, forced the wider EU membership to follow through quickly and on 28 
February the Council of ministers implemented the UNSC resolution and enforced its 
own additional sanctions.195  
Yet, the situation did not improve on the ground. After intensive violence by its troops 
and Special Forces in Tripoli and western Libya, the Gaddafi regime was able to 
stabilize most of the Tripolitania region and turned towards Eastern Libya and the 
central port city of Misrata. Negotiations efforts by the African Union in particular 
 
                                                
194 There is an extensive and increasing literature on the 2011 Arab Spring. For an evaluation 
of Europe’s response to it, including on the specific case of Libya see the Middle East and 
North Africa chapter of the 2012 ECFR European Foreign Policy Scorecard (Marchesi, 
Korski, and Levy 2012). 
195 Press release of the Council “Libya: EU imposes arms embargo and targeted sanctions”, 
7081/11, 28 February 2011. The decision was latter followed by an implementing regulation, 
see press release 7203/11 of 2 Marc 2011.   
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proved unsuccessful although some argue that more time should have been left for 
mediation (Roberts 2011). The focus on the crisis remained very high. The UN 
Special coordinator was charged with the management of the Humanitarian relief 
operations particularly on the borders with Egypt and Tunisia, where refugees were 
starting to amass. The European Union, allocated 60 million euro in Humanitarian 
Aid to the crisis, an important part of which was disbursed through the UNHCR, 
UNICEF and the WFP, in addition to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and IOM.196  
The United States, after an initial reluctance, became also more vocal in supporting an 
international intervention, which was also considered by the Arab League by the 
beginning of March (Reuters 2011). On 11 March the EU went a step further openly 
stating at the highest level that Gaddafi was no longer considered a legitimate 
interlocutor (European Council 2011). Eventually, on 17 March 2011, UNSC 
Resolution 1973 was adopted giving a very extensive mandate for a No-Flight Zone 
(NFZ) and calling the UN members to carry out “any necessary action” to protect the 
civilian population (UN/DPI 2011a).197 For the first time, the UNSC openly referred to 
the principle of the Responsibility to Protect in a specific crisis, which was considered 
a breakthrough (International Peace Institute 2011; Reike 2012). The compromise was 
reached in New York after intense negotiations with an important if ambiguous 
contribution of the four EU member states present in the Security Council, three of 
which voted in favour (France, the United Kingdom and Portugal), while one, 
Germany, abstained. Importantly, in the run up to the Resolution, information on the 
 
                                                
196 Europa Press Release “EU support to Libya”, MEMO 11/779, 12 November 2011, 
available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/779&format=HTML&a
ged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (2/4/2012) 
197 The imprimatur of the UN was facilitated by the recognition of the Arab league and by a 
series of reckless statements made by Gaddafi and members of its regime, which produced an 
unusual sense of urgency in the international community. 
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negotiations was given by the members of the Security Council to the broader EU 
membership, at the PSC and MAMA working group.198  
The UN maintained a primary role as a political forum at this stage. France and the 
UK, in particular, used it to gather the legitimacy necessary for a more decisive 
intervention in the crisis, including through the military (Euractive 2011). France, also 
used its chairmanship of the G8 to retain a international leadership role, but the UN 
stayed at the center of the effort for reasons of legitimacy and effectiveness. On the 
one hand, in 2011 prominent emerging powers, including Brazil, India and South 
Africa, were seated in the UNSC as non-permanent members, together with Germany 
and Portugal for the EU, which further increased the UNSC’s legitimacy and 
representativeness. The Arab League remained also very supportive of the UN track. 
On the other hand, the ‘constructive abstention’ of both Russia and China over the 
UNSC effort on Libya, allowed this forum to take swift and effective executive 
decisions over the crisis.  
As Resolution 1973 was agreed, the reflection was already well underway on who 
would have implemented the NFZ under the UN mandate. The EU internal division - 
with Germany (but also Poland) staunchly opposed to a military intervention - 
substantially ruled out the use of CSDP for this challenging task.  
The EU did formally launch a CSDP mission on Libya - EUFOR Libya - on 1 April 
2011, which was to be based in the operational headquarters in Rome (Council of the 
European Union 2011a). However, EUFOR Libya was not linked to the enforcement 
of the No-Flight Zone and never became operational. Its mandate, in fact, was to 
support a humanitarian evacuation (perhaps around Misrata) and was largely 
anachronistic by the time it was adopted (Gomes 2011). Evacuations of foreigners 
were mostly concluded by April and the humanitarian situation never completely 
went out of hand, requiring a military operation. Apart from this, EUFOR Libya was 
designed to be at full disposal of the United Nations and in particular OCHA, which 
was supposed to trigger its deployment with an explicit request. Yet the United 
 
                                                
198 Direct observation, MAMA and PSC, March, April 2011.  
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Nations considered such a mission unnecessary at that stage (Traynor 2011) and was 
anyway entangled with its own political and operational difficulties, so the request 
never came.199  
As for the enforcement of the No-Flight Zone, Europe as a whole lacked the 
capabilities to carry out such an operation autonomously, particularly in terms of 
recognizance, intelligence, air refuelling and targeted bombs (Nielsen 2012). This is 
why ensuring the participation of the United States was a crucial condition for a 
sustainable and effective NFZ. In addition to this a campaign was launched towards 
Arab states and the Arab League to ensure the participation of as many countries as 
possible from the region, once again to ensure acceptance and legitimacy.200  
The situation remained suspended for some days, as the troops of Colonel Gaddafi 
were gaining ground against the insurgents on the Eastern front and were approaching 
the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. On 19 March 2011 France organized an 
international meeting in Paris with potential force contributors, with the idea of 
establishing an ad hoc “coalition of the willing,” which was the preferred option of 
France as it would have ensured both visibility and control. At the Summit, French 
President Sarkozy was able to announce that the coalition was already operational and 
that air strikes to establish initial air dominance and enforce the NFZ were already 
underway together with Allies (The Guardian 2011). The US played a crucial role at 
the beginning and throughout, together with the UK. Several EU countries 
participated from the beginning to the operation,201 which was eventually absorbed by 
the NATO in the “Unified Protector” mission on 31 March 2011, following a difficult 
negotiation (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011; Traynor & Watt 2011).  
 
                                                
199  Discussions about possible CSDP deployment in post-conflict Libya, however, did 
resurface after the fall of Gaddafi and different concepts were discussed by member states 
throughout 2012. Direct observation , EU Delegation to Libya, Tripoli, 2012.  
200 Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan eventually participated to the operation in 
various degrees.  
201 EU member states participating to the operation, which was closed on October 2011 were 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden 
(although not a NATO member) and the UK. Information available on the NATO website. 
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The NFZ was established without major problems but it became rapidly clear that the 
interpretation by the intervening countries of the UNSC resolution was quite 
extensive and bordered the ‘regime change’ approach. On these grounds it has been 
criticized as an instrumentalization of the United Nations to the advantage of a 
Western agenda that wanted the disposal of Colonel Gaddafi infringing on the 
principle of neutrality (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2011; Roberts 2011).202  
The situation on the ground evolved substantially in late summer 2011. The rebel 
forces made some breakthroughs in Western Libya starting from the Nafusa 
Mountains and Misurata and then ousted Gaddafi from Tripoli. Then, on 20 October, 
the tyrant was captured and killed in Sirte, his hometown, preluding to the closing of 
the NATO operation. This was hailed as one of the most successful operations by 
NATO and Europe as a whole (although not by the EU) as the objective (implicit and 
explicit) was reached with no casualties and rapidly and with Europeans not having to 
put any troop on the ground.  
While they were largely excluded from the military domain, EU institutions played a 
relevant role in the accessory operations including the humanitarian aid, even during 
the crisis phase. Here again, the United Nations (OCHA) were given a leadership role 
in the coordination of the global effort and indeed the EU itself and its member states 
channelled extensive funds through various UN agencies and programmes with a 
specific mandate in these situations (in particular UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR and 
OCHA)203.  
                                                                                                                                       
See for instance, Operation ‘Unified Protector’ Final Mission Stats, Fact Sheet, 2 November 
2011 
202 This view was supported also by the BRIC countries that had initially abstained from the 
resolution, including Russia, China (to a lesser extent) and Brazil. Germany, on the other 
hand, maintained a low profile throughout the crisis and while not directly supporting the 
operations facilitated them in indirect ways to avoid criticism from the public opinion. 
203 For ECHO the percentage of aid channelled through the UN in this case is around 20%. 
Much more was channelled through the Red Cross and the IOM. The rest through NGOs. 
Source : EDRIS database. Available at : https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/ (13/3/2012) 
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Table 34. EU Humanitarian aid during the Libyan crisis204 
EU Member States and Commission (ECHO) contributions to unrest in Libya 2011 – 2012 
Donor 
Commitments in Euro 
(Cash and in-kind) Donor 
Commitments in Euro 
(Cash and in-kind) 
ECHO 70.574.084 Ireland 1.000.000 
Austria 1.150.000 Italy 6.836.370 
Belgium 2.000.000 Lithuania 14.481 
Bulgaria 139.650 Luxembourg 1.827.700 
Czech Republic 100.000 Malta 730.117 
Denmark 4.978.924 Netherlands 2.500.000 
Estonia 100.000 Poland 910.017 
Finland 4.450.000 Romania 180.000 
France 2.942.584 Slovenia 75.000 
Germany 11.091.053 Spain 7.659.244 
Greece 1.770.752 Sweden 16.381.754 
Hungary 51.200 United Kingdom 13.651.934 
Total EU 151.114.863 
 
Yet, it is once the humanitarian situation stabilized that the European Union - and the 
EEAS- rapidly looked at the possibility of supporting the transition authorities in 
Eastern Libya without waiting for the UN.205 In fact, until 20 September 2011, when 
the NTC was officially recognized as representing Libya at the UN, this was blocked 
operationally by its mandate for impartiality and neutrality and could not act on 
anything going beyond humanitarian aid. On the contrary, the EU set up an office in 
Benghazi and with the support of member states and allocated funding to programmes 
that had were already designed to support the transition to democracy, while 
maintaining the communication channels with the UN. In practice, the EU was 
already looking beyond the crisis phase and its longer relations with Libya. The 
difficult post-conflict peace-building phase had already started but was to intensify. 
This was another area of strong interaction between the EU and the UN. Let see how.  
 
                                                
204 EDRIS database. Available at : https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/ (13/3/2012) 
 
205 Importantly, by early April, the main European players in Libya had agreed politically that 
the NTC was the only legitimate interlocutor. 
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Post conflict - competing with the UN  
As discussed above, beyond the provision of humanitarian aid and the implementation 
of sanctions, the European Union institutions, and particularly CSDP, were excluded 
from the crisis management phase in the Libya uprising, due the internal divisions 
within the EU.  
Yet the European Union was drawn back in quickly with the discussion on the post 
conflict scenario and peace-building as the member states started recognizing the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) as a legitimate counterpart to discuss the future 
of Libya. The NTC, established in Benghazi, played an important role in inducing the 
international community to condemn the Gaddafi regime and establish a coalition to 
protect the civilian population. By mid February 2011, several European member 
states had recognized this provisional body and by March, France, the UK, Italy and 
others, had established a diplomatic presence in Benghazi, in what looked like a race 
by Europeans and the US to show their support to the nascent authorities.  
In this context, while the NATO campaign was in full swing, the member states had a 
major preoccupation: legitimacy.206 The Arab countries, and particularly Qatar, were 
behind the operation and were supporting generously the NTC and the Libyan 
population, seemed to be grateful for the NATO operation, which had interrupted the 
advance of the Gaddafi forces a few kilometres from Benghazi. Yet the front of 
support for the intervention remained fragile with criticism coming rapidly from the 
Arab League, Russia and China. This criticism obviously had repercussions also 
domestically, for instance in Italy, were the support for the military operation was 
rather wavering and some caveats were put on the use of the military assets. For this 
reason, Europeans focussed on showing that the operation had as wide a recognition 
as possible and tried to ensure that the burden of post-conflict peacebuilding would be 
shared among many. They insisted on giving the leadership role in coordination to the 
United Nations and in ensuring the swift implication of EU institutions, from the 
EEAS and the High Representative, to the European Commission. However, at this 
 
                                                
206 Interview n°23 (European NATO member government official), 5 July 2011. 
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operational level, EU-UN cooperation was far from easy, and actually lent itself to 
frequent misunderstandings and competition.  
By mid March 2011, explorative missions by the EU were being launched primarily 
to show support to the transitional authorities and to identify possible venues for 
cooperation. As the financial cooperation portfolio had not been formally suspended, 
the EEAS and the European Commission had the power to modify the few 
programmes already on-going in Libya before the crisis and revert them to the east of 
the country. As the political decision my member states to support the rebels had been 
taken, this could be done swiftly. In mid-April, the High representative started calling 
for the opening of a technical office in Benghazi, which was established in May and 
funds from the Instrument for Stability, the ENPI and the EIDHR/NSA LA were 
allocated in support to the health sector, capacity building, education and support to 
civil society. These operations were meant also to show the commitment of the 
European Union to support the new authorities.207  
The UN, on the other hand, was largely paralysed at this stage, even though 
Europeans continued to put it theoretically at the centre of post-conflict reconstruction. 
In fact, its mandate for impartiality and neutrality prevented it from openly supporting 
the NTC while the NATO operations were still on-going and with the official 
authorities still in Tripoli. The United Nations, for instance, had to maintain a small 
presence in Tripoli, so it was impossible for it to build up a presence in Benghazi. In 
this sense, with the objective of the Europeans moving implicitly from civilian 
protection to regime change, the United Nations was inevitably side-lined. Some 
doubts were also raised about the capacity of the UN to carry out such operations 
given a not too effective management of the humanitarian operations in the previous 
month. Finally, a degree of competition started to surface among bureaucracies, as the 
 
                                                
207 Europa Press Release “EU support to Libya”, MEMO 11/779, 12 November 2011, 
available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/779&format=HTML&a
ged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (2/4/2012) 
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EU and the Commission were keen in having a visible role in coordinating European 
peace-building support.208  
While being excluded from direct intervention during the operations, the UN 
supported the initial capacity building initiatives done by the European Union and 
other donors. And the Secretary General launched the internal preparation for the 
post-conflict assessment, where the United Nations was expected to play a leadership 
role, with the capacity of providing an overarching donor coordination umbrella to 
include also non-European players, particularly from the Arab world. The SG 
nominated a Special Envoy for Libya, Ian Martin, who started the preparation through 
a series of inter-agency thematic groups that would coordinate the post-conflict needs 
assessment (PCNA) process. Then, following the liberation of Tripoli, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 2009 on 16 September 2011 launching the United Nations 
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), designed to assist the political transition and 
post-conflict recovery. A donor meeting was held in Paris in September, where the 
EU, the UN and the WB, designed the main mechanisms of coordination and division 
of labour over different sectors. The EU took charge of border management, civil 
society and media, while the UN maintained overall coordination and took the 
leadership over security sector reform and the DDR of the militias, as well as electoral 
support (BBC News 2011).  
By the mid 2012 the EU had new and on-going programmes contracted for more than 
50 million euros (about 34% of which was implemented through international 
organizations – UNICEF, IOM, UNHCR) and an additional availability of more than 
50 million euros under ENPI and other instruments for the following years (2012-
2013). See table below.  
 
                                                
208 Interview n°24 (EEAS official), 10 September 2011, Direct observation 2011-2012 
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Table 35. EU cooperation portfolio (contracts) in Libya as of Jun 2012209 
EU 
Financial 
Instrument  
Total contracted in Euro 
(On-going projects in June 2012) 
Contracted to 
UN and IOM 
 % contracted to 
UN or IOM 
ENPI  26.800.000   12.300.000  46% 
NSA  3.000.000   0  0 
EIDHR  3.822.000   0  0 
DCI-Migr  15.600.000  5.600.000 36% 
IFS  3.400.000   0  0 
TOTAL  52.622.000   17.900.000  34% 
 
Obviously, the general approach here was supposed to be the less intrusive as possible. 
Libyan authorities were keen to reclaim sovereignty over the post-conflict 
reconstruction and the donors also careful at not creating a situation of donor 
congestion or overlaps in a country, which will eventually have sufficient resources to 
finance its own development.  
Table 36. Configuration of variables (resources) for the unit of analysis “Libya 
post-conflict reconstruction” 
Case 6: Libya post-conflict reconstruction 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 1 Legal Competences 1 
Access 1 Political Support 0.5 
Capabilities 0.5 Acceptance 1 
Policy 1 Reputation 0.5 
Total 3.5 (High) Total 3 (High) 
 
As shown in table 36 on the variables above, in the post-conflict phase the EU was in 
a relative position of strength in Libya. As is typically the case in post-conflict 
situation, the actual human resources on the ground were relatively few and the EU 
Delegation by January 2012 still had barely six staff, none of which was actually 
 
                                                
209  Own elaboration on internal documents (CRIS). Information Available also on the 
webpage for annual programmes of the DG Europeaid website : 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/ap/index_en.htm  
  
171 
permanent. This compared to the big UNSMIL staff on the ground, with around 150 
people supporting the transition (electoral assistance, political affairs, protection and 
humanitarian aid, etc.). However, looking at actual development funding, the EU was 
by far the biggest donor, with projects on-going or in preparation touching already 
almost all sectors of transition and development. In addition, while the mandate of 
UNSMIL was temporary and subject to periodic revision by the UNSC members and, 
potentially, to the resistance by the Libyan authorities, the EU was clearly working 
under a long-term timeframe. The EU perspective in 2011 and 2012 was that of 
establishing a permanent diplomatic and economic presence with a partner and 
neighbourhood, based also on a relatively clear mandate from member states to 
support democratic transition and development. 210  
According to our hypothesis, this different perspective and the rebalancing in the 
positions of power of the EU and the UN as Libya exits the situation of crisis, might 
make the EU’s approach towards working with the UN colder and more dismissive as 
time goes by.211  
6.2.2 Explaining 
The international reaction to the Libyan uprising provides a good overview of the 
different forms of European interaction with the United Nations, of its motivations 
and limits. As for the previous case study, the table below provides an overview of the 
values per each variable for the case study seen as a whole, crisis management and 
post conflict peace-building.  
 
                                                
210 Direct observation. EU delegation to Libya, 2012. See also the Council conclusion of 23 
July 2012, following the elections for the constitutional assembly of July 2012: “The EU 
reiterates its determination to further strengthen its engagement with Libya, a key neighbour 
for Europe with whom the EU wishes to establish long-term and mutually beneficial relations, 
including in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and regional initiatives 
such as the Union for the Mediterranean. The EU further supports enhancing synergies with 
other regional initiatives such as the 5+5 Western Mediterranean Forum (...)”.  
211 This seems coherent with what Axelrod and Keohane have called the “Shadow of the 
future”. The expectation that an actor has of the evolution of the relationship in the future will 
have an impact on cooperation (Axelrod and R. O. Keohane 1985, 231) 
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Table 37. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for Case Study 6 
– Libya 2011 - 
Material Resources  Ideational Resources  
Experience 0 Legal Competences 0.5 
Access 1 Political Support 0.5 
Capabilities 1 Acceptance 0.5 
Policy 1 Reputation 0 
Total 3 (High) Total 1.5 (Medium) 
Integration  Unity  
Decision Making Procedure 0 Positional 1 
Institutional Coherence 0 Operational 1 
Total 0 (Low) Total 2 (Medium) 
 
However, as we have seen, there is considerable variation in the context of the 
variables before, during and after the crisis in Libya. Before the crisis the EU had a 
relatively weak and fragmented presence in Libya. This presence was expanding 
following the slow and uncertain reintegration of Libya within the community of 
nations after a long period of isolation. This expansion was driven predominantly by 
the commercial, security and energy interest of member states (with Italy in a 
dominant position) and was characterized by a contained competition for influence in 
the country, at the frontier of the Euro-Mediterranean policy.  
Just as France and Spain had done it in the Western Maghreb, Italy tried to draw in 
the EU institutions, with the objective to share the burden of cooperation with Libya 
and with an agenda strongly focussed on migration and border control. By 2008, the 
relationship was framed within the broader negotiations for a binding agreement that 
was supposed to “normalise” Europe’s relationship with Libya in an institutionalized 
set-up analogous to the rest of the region. The European Commission played an 
important role. Yet the lack of presence and knowledge of the country and the 
relatively weak expertise in the field of migration and border management, forced the 
EU to build strong cooperation channels with the international organizations present 
in Libya, including the UN and the IOM.  
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Crisis management 
The 2011 crisis broke this pattern, with some EU member states attempting to take a 
leadership role in the ousting of Colonel Gadhafi and therefore in the breaking of the 
existing status quo. The EU military instruments were jammed by the unwillingness 
by Germany to adhere to the UNSC resolution for a NFZ, which had been strongly 
sponsored by the UK and France. The EU however, eventually sponsored the 
activation of NATO, which was needed to aggregate the indispensable American 
military assets. NATO also served to reassure some countries, such as Italy, that were 
looking for a reliable institutional framework as a safeguard from the activeness of 
France and the UK, which was perceived as a threat to its former leadership and 
interests in Libya.  
In this situation of latent mutual suspicion within the EU membership, the UN was the 
key framework for legitimation and a venue to build up an international coalition. The 
UK and France were able to create in the UNSC the international consensus for their 
plan to intervene in Libya.  UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) went as far as to refer to 
the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, an absolute first (International Peace 
Institute 2011).  
In Europe, France and the UK benefitted from the increased visibility and prestige 
given to them by the promotion and the brokering at the UN of a deal over sanctions 
first and then the intervention. At the operational level, the UN mandate allowed 
Germany to promote and implement the sanctions on Libya notwithstanding its 
opposition to the military intervention.212 Even though the EU was openly divided, the 
UN framework still allowed operational engagement in the following months, which 
was accepted by everyone. All the statements by the EU and, most notably, the 
various decisions over sanctions, constantly referred to the mandate given by the 
United Nations.  
 
                                                
212 Although no direct participation to the NATO operations was granted by Germany, its 
passive acceptance of them was clear. See for instance the positive appraisal by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel on the role of NATO in summer 2011 (The Local 2011) 
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Yet, as shown above, the adherence to the UNSC mandate was somehow mystified 
and distorted. NATO progressively interpreted the mandate in a very extensive way 
and was accused of promoting regime change. This had repercussion on the case of 
Syria, where throughout 2011 and 2012 the UNSC was not able to issue a strong 
condemnation on the fear by Russia and China that this would eventually lead to 
another international intervention (Hersh 2012; The Economist 2012). This behaviour 
fits well our characterization of a ‘ceremonial approach’ to cooperation with the UN. 
The United Nations was needed less for its actual capacities and material resources 
than for the formal imprint of international legitimacy that it ensured.213 Access and 
capabilities were available to NATO and experience on Libya was relatively weak for 
everybody, including the United Nations after years of isolation.  
On the other hand, the UN ensured the legality of the action (if not its legitimacy) and 
reinforced the political support domestically for the leading member states, 
particularly France. It also strengthened the regional acceptance in the Arab world 
where the European reputation was at an all time low, against the backdrop of the 
hesitation over the democratic movements that were hitting North Africa.  
Post-conflict peacebuilding 
EU-UN cooperation in the post-conflict phase was prepared carefully, as Europeans 
wanted to have a presence on the ground while avoiding at the same time to be seen 
as playing an excessively intrusive role in peace-building and transition. Coordinated 
assessment missions were therefore launched in Paris and the EU strongly supported 
the deployment of UNSMIL. A division of labour was agreed upon in the Paris 
summit in September, granting a coordinating role to the Libyan authorities and 
acknowledging the experience and capabilities of the UN in the post-conflict phase, in 
security sector reform and electoral assistance. At this stage, the EU could also count 
on the various partnerships and best practices that it had developed with the UN in 
 
                                                
213 France and the UK had the leadership on this particular file while the role of the United 
States and of the Obama Presidency has been characterized as more passive, but still essential 
for the success of the operation. For a debate on the so-called “Leading from behind” doctrine 
see the comment by Remnick for the New Yorker (Remnick 2011). 
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terms of post conflict need assessment as well as electoral assistance. On paper, 
therefore, the organization of donor coordination was improved.  
Yet, Europeans (and particularly the EU institutions) were inevitably looking at a new 
long-term paradigm of EU-Libya relations, where the UN’s role was hard to establish. 
A paradigm, which was already on the brink of being established before the crisis had 
started and envisaged the inclusion of Libya within the broader Euro-Mediterranean 
and neighbourhood framework. What is more, the new transitional Libyan authorities 
themselves started growing uncomfortable with the fact of having a UN political 
mission deployed in the country, creating an impression of crisis, and statelessness.214 
As early as November, an important government reshuffle, including at the prime 
minister level, substantially changed the cards on the table and many of the 
agreements made in Paris had to be reviewed, partially stalling the post-conflict needs 
assessment process. By the end of 2011, Europeans were already beginning to 
complain about “having to wait for the UN.”215 If the situation further stabilizes in the 
medium term and the oil revenues recover to their previous levels, there is therefore 
ground for potential competition between the EU and the UN. It might be exaggerated 
to define ‘dismissive’ the approach of the EU institutions at this stage, but it can be 
predicted that the legitimacy and acceptance that Europe currently has in Libya and its 
totally different perspective on the region, will eventually reduce the incentives for 
cooperation with the UN. This particularly, once the UN’s capacities on immediate 
post-conflict reconstruction will no longer be perceived as essential.  
 
                                                
214 Interview n. 24 (EEAS official), 10 September 2011 
215 Direct observation and informal interviews with European personnel about to deploy to 
Libya, 17-19 January 2012 
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Figure 12. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) in Case Study 6 
 
In this context, it might actually be the UN that adopts a predatory approach on the 
EU. With a lot of funding available but relatively small administrative capabilities to 
execute activities directly (small EU Delegation) and scarcity of implementing 
partners (few NGOs, and still weak national authorities), the EU has few alternatives 
to the UN, which has little or no own funding in Libya but important capabilities 
(particularly until UNSMIL is on the ground). What is more, although the UNSMIL 
mission is temporary and linked to a ‘transition’ situation, the various UN 
programmes and agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF, ect), naturally seek to re-establish 
themselves in the medium to long-term in Libya. In this sense, an initial EU funded 
project can be an excellent way to gain credit and credibility with the Libyan 
authorities for the future.  
6.3 Summing up 
In this chapter I attempted to combine the analysis of two apparently different cases in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Iraq and Libya certainly are very distinctive 
contexts for cooperation between the EU and the UN, yet, as this chapter highlights, 
they present also considerable similarities. Both countries have been pariahs of the 
international community under very rigid sanction regimes throughout the 1990s. As a 
consequence they were not included in the institutionalized schemes that the 
European Union devised towards the region in those years, remaining two frontier 
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areas for European foreign policy. Both countries, in addition were the targets of 
military intervention in 2003 and 2011 to which Europe participated, without its 
military structures of CFSP but with some of its member states. Both cases are also 
examples of the engagement of the international community in peace-building and 
state reconstruction, with the important challenges in terms of national ownership, 
coordination of donors and players, division of labour and prioritization of security 
over development.  
The empirical evidence seems to corroborate the hypothesis underlying our study: 
rational choice explanations linked to the weakness of the European Foreign Policy 
System offer a valid explanation of the motivation of the EU to work with the United 
Nations. In Iraq, where Europe was extremely divided politically by the strong stance 
of the United States and where access and experience and capabilities was very low, 
also due to the security situation, the EU was strongly reliant on the United Nations 
both before and after the crisis. We have characterized this approach as ‘dependent’ 
toward the valuable resources that were offered by the United Nations both during the 
crisis and afterwards. It is undeniable that there was also an ideological and normative 
dimension to the reliance on the United Nations in Iraq, in the height of the contrast 
with the US over multilateralism in international affairs. The European debacle on 
Iraq, in fact, led to a momentous pioneering phase, which saw the adoption of the 
European Security Strategy and the establishment of the European doctrine of 
Effective Multilateralism. Working with the UN, therefore also responded to an 
important identity objective for Europe in contrast to the G.W. Bush administration.  
Yet, the chapter also demonstrate that rationalist motivations amply justified working 
with the UN in the two cases. Europe had no other alternatives to play a role in Iraq 
but to regroup within the legitimacy of the UN umbrella and to take advantage of the 
UN capabilities, access and experience in Iraq, which Europe lacked in 2003-2004. 
The European Commission, in particular, took the opportunity of the division within 
Europe to build up its presence on the ground, in a post-conflict context where any 
activity is at the cross-roads between development and security. As is often the case in 
these situations, the political momentum and the urgency meant that the EC had more 
humanitarian and development funding that it could actually spend directly. So, it 
established a strong working relationship with the UN and the WB. Yet, with the 
years, the situation changed. While Europe became more confident and united on the 
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long-term development of Iraq, it started emancipating itself from the United Nations 
(and WB) intermediation and mentoring and progressively designed its own 
independent strategy and tools, including through CSDP.  
The template is similar in the case of Libya. An important difference here rested on a 
much more limited US role and on a division among member states which was less 
explicit and, importantly, did not involve France and UK, who actually resume their 
“entente cordiale” during the 2011 crisis. Europeans and particularly France and the 
UK played a leading role in the military intervention, although this was launched 
through the NATO structures and not via CSDP. The strongest proximity of Libya to 
the EU and the more stable security environment, at least in the first months after the 
toppling of the Gaddafi regime, meant that Europe’s access and experience in this 
country was higher than in Iraq. As a consequence, while the UN legitimacy was 
sought carefully and the UNSC was constantly acclaimed as the leading player in the 
various summits and contact group meetings on reconstruction, the approach was 
rather ceremonial. The whole donor coordination scheme, which was set up carefully 
and thoroughly during the crisis and in preparation for reconstruction and 
development, was rapidly side-lined as redundant and cumbersome once the regime 
fell. This further shows that, although, policy learning can lubricate and improve 
inter-institutional relations it does not in itself remove the imminently rational factors 
that motivate or inhibit cooperation. If the transition of Libya maintains a certain pace, 
one can expect that EU-UN cooperation will slow down just as Europe attempts to 
normalize its relations with Libya within the broader Euro-Mediterranean context.  
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Chapter 7. Synthesizing the Empirical Findings  
My aim in this chapter is to synthesize the findings coming from the empirical 
analysis carried out so far. Overall, it appears that the analytical framework built in 
chapter 2 has broadly resisted the test of facts. According to this approach, decisions 
on cooperation with the UN can be explained (and are perceived) as rational 
calculations based on self-interest. The key argument is that, given a specific 
interaction opportunity, the EU will cooperate with the UN if it is weak and has a 
particular need to do so in terms of ideational or material resources. The UN therefore, 
plays the function of empowering the EU and its actors in carrying out policies that 
they would be otherwise incapable of maintaining unilaterally. The alternative 
narrative that views cooperation with the United Nations as motivated by normative 
or ideological considerations or conceptualizes the EU as a staunch paladin of 
multilateralism “no matter what” is often contradicted by empirical analysis. 
Normative motivations can be complementary and provide additional insights on a 
decision to work with the UN but they are mostly secondary and are not necessary by 
themselves to the explanation.  
In the next pages I will examine these issues more in detail in three main sections. The 
first two sections will present the key findings against the two main hypotheses. First, 
I will look at the impact of resources (capacities and legitimacy) on EU-UN 
cooperation. Second, I will look at the issue of unity and integration, and how these 
two factors have an impact on our problem. The third section will discuss the 
secondary intervening factors and conditions that have been considered throughout 
the case study and whose role needs to be better qualified. They include geographical 
proximity, institutional reform, socialization and rhetoric.  
Before turning to the major findings, Table 38, below, provides a summary of the 
values for the dependent and independent variables per each of the case study and unit 
of analysis addressed in the preceding chapters. On the basis of these quantifications, I 
have elaborated the illustrative graphs used in the case study chapters and below.  
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Table 38. Summary of the values for all independent variables (resources & 
cohesion) and for the dependent variable (cooperation outcome) 
Case studies Units of 
analysis 
Independent Variables Explanandum 
Material 
resources 
Ideational 
resources Integration Unity 
Cooperation 
Outcome 
Case study 1: 
Development 
cooperation in 
Morocco and 
Algeria 
Total 4 4 4 4 0 
Technical 
assistance 4 4 4 4 0 
Budget Support 4 2,5 4 3 0,25 
Case Study 2: 
Western Sahara 
conflict 
Total 2,5 0 1 0 1 
Political 
mediation 2,5 0 1 1 1 
Peacekeeping 
Minurso 0 0 1 1 1 
Humanitarian 
aid 1 2,5 4 1 0,75 
Case Study 3: 
Development 
cooperation in 
the West Bank 
and Gaza 
Total 2 3 4 3 0,5 
Refugees and 
UNRWA 1 1 4 4 1 
Direct 
budgetary 
assistance 3,5 4 4 4 0,5 
Technical 
assistance on 
Security sector 2 3 2 2 0,5 
Case Study 4:  
Security in the 
Levant 
Total 1,5 1,5 1 2 0,5 
Support to the 
MEPP Quartet 2,5 1,5 0 2 0,5 
CSDP in the 
ME 1,5 2,5 0 3 0,25 
Peacekeeping 
Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) 1,5 1 1 1 1 
Case study 5:  
Iraq 2003-2011 
Total 0 1 0 1 1 
Crisis 
management 1 0 1 0 0,75 
Post-conflict  
peace building 1 1,5 1 2 1 
Case Study 6: 
Libya 2011 
Total 3 1,5 0 2 0,5 
Crisis 
management 2,5 1,5 1 1 0,5 
Post-conflict  
peace building 3,5 3 1 3 0,25 
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7.1 Looking for resources: the UN’s empowering function 
I begin by recalling the first hypothesis behind this study:  
Hypothesis 1:  
! The less the EU has expertise, access, capabilities or legitimacy on a 
particular issue, the more it will seek cooperation with the United Nations.  
The simple idea behind this hypothesis is that the scarcer are the resources of the EU 
on a particular issue or topic the higher will be its inclination to work with the UN. 
This hypothesis stems from a rational-choice and instrumentalist approach to 
cooperation acknowledging the costs inherent to any type of coordination and joint-
decision making, in terms of autonomy, visibility and transaction costs. Within this 
paradigm the willingness of any actor to embark in cooperation is conditioned by the 
existence of a clear need or benefit (Pollack 2006; Snidal 2002). Further, in chapter 2 
I have distinguished within the broad category of “resources”, the material and 
ideational. Material resources can be broadly labelled as capacities. I have identified 
four main factors: experience, access, capabilities and policy. Ideational resources, on 
the other hand, are all related to legitimacy (both internal and international). I have 
used four variables: legal competence, political support, acceptance and reputation. 216 
This hypothesis has proven the most resilient across the various case studies analysed, 
and the variables have all shown a high level of correlation with our dependent 
variable ‘cooperation.’217 The figure below, illustrates this correlation combined for 
 
                                                
216 See Chapter 2. Each of the factors is measured on a 0-0,5-1 scale and introduced into a 
specific matrix. The two main variables (ideational and material resources) then, go from a 
minimum value of 0 to a maximum of 4. 2, is considered a cross-over point from one 
quadrant to the other. The matrix is then used for graphic elaboration and Comparative 
Qualitative Analysis (Ragin 2000). The graphs provided do not aim to give a deterministic 
appreciation of the conditions of EU-UN cooperation but allow informing and illustrating 
better the qualitative analysis. 
217 My own calculations of correlation between independent and dependent variables on the 
basis of the values syntesized in Table 38 above, using Microsoft Excel, resulted in the 
following. Correlation between ‘Ideational Resources’ and dependent variable = - 0.8; 
Correlation between ‘Material Resources’ and dependent variable = - 0.73.  
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ideational and material resources on the basis of the values presented in Table 38, 
above. Cooperation with the UN decreases with the increase in EU legitimacy and 
capacities. 
Figure 13. Overall linear correlation between variable “Legitimacy” and 
explanans “cooperation” 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the hypothesis was used to understand not only what 
motivates cooperation but also the approach by which different EU actors undertake 
cooperation and interaction, along the models that I have designed of “dependent”, 
“ceremonial”, “predatory” and “dismissive”. The figure below shows the relations 
between the two main variables and these models of interaction. 
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Figure 14. Typology of approaches to EU-UN interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1.1 Finding 1: Europe’s main weakness 
The main finding is that the European Union uses the UN and multilateralism to 
empower itself to do things it cannot do unilaterally. Europe’s structural weakness in 
terms of capacities and legitimacy means that it frequently has to rely on the United 
Nations in the MENA region, particularly outside of the Maghreb. Some important 
examples of dependency on the UN have been analysed particularly in areas such as 
crisis management, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. There are no few 
cases in the MENA region, and I have identified at least one such situation in each of 
the chapters on Maghreb, Levant and countries outside of the EMP. 
In the policy areas where the EU is weaker and less capable (particularly in conflict 
situations) it has developed together with the UN a large experience of successful 
interaction and can count on a set of methods and practices that are tested. In some 
cases the dependency is linked to a specific mandate or expertise of an organization 
that becomes indispensible for the EU. There is no going around UNRWA, for 
example, in dealing with the Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza and 
neighbouring Arab countries. Even though the EU has important capabilities and has 
been the leading donor to UNRWA for many years now, it continues to do so 
relentlessly, because otherwise it would not have access to large parts of the 
Predatory Dismissive 
Dependent Ceremonial 
Ideational 
resources 
(Legitimacy) 
Material resources 
(Capacities) 
  
185 
Palestinian territories and population, namely in Gaza, particularly since the boycott 
of Hamas. A similar situation has characterized the EU’s policy in Iraq following the 
2003 US-led invasion. The EU and the Commission in particular was obliged to 
utilize a UN instrument, such as the IRFFI, to channel its development assistance 
because the security situation and the weak presence of Europeans in Iraq after the 
war made it impossible to do otherwise. Finally, on the Western Sahara conflict 
Europe would perhaps have the potential to act in terms of access and capabilities but 
has no policy or legitimacy to do so. It therefore happily passes the buck to the UN 
with its everlasting MINURSO operation.  
Figure 15. Examples of strong “dependency” on the UN 
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with which it has been working and carry out the task independently. This is a typical 
phenomenon in inter-institutional relations (Biermann 2007, Haugevik 2007). This 
general trend cannot be captured fully by the matrix of variables or the graphs 
presented, which are static snapshots. However, it emerges quite consistently from the 
interviews and empirical research and I have tried to articulate it in the narrative and 
historical analysis. One example is the use of the World Bank to channel direct 
budgetary assistance to the Palestinian authorities. In the mid 2004-2005 the EU 
channelled extensive funds through the Bank, gained experience and reputation and 
then developed its own European independent instruments, such as the TIM or Pegase 
in 2006 and 2008. Another example is Iraq, where the EU has progressively 
marginalized the United Nations to build its own direct relationship with the Iraqi 
authorities. This tendency has been discussed by some of the inter-organizational 
literature (Biermann 2007; Koops 2009; Tardy 2011). This literature has, for instance, 
spelled-out the pattern by which a younger, more inexperienced organization, uses a 
more senior one for mentoring, to then become fully independent (Jørgensen 2006, 
206; Biermann 2007, Tardy 2009). This physiological pattern to organizational 
development can produce frustration and rivalry between the two organizations, 
which have to coexist while competing for limited resources, political support and 
visibility, especially when the road to independence and specialization leads itself 
rather to duplication.218  
The second reason behind this within-case variation is explained once more through 
rational-choice. When it is not in a completely dependent position, the EU will 
evaluate the costs and benefits of cooperation based on the specific circumstances and 
will base its policy accordingly. For example, when formulating technical assistance 
projects in the security sector in the West Bank and Gaza, the Commission assesses 
on a case by case basis whether it would bring any added value to work with UN 
agencies or not. UNOPS has served well the purpose of flanking the 
complementary/competing CSDP EUPOL COPPS operation in the police reform area 
 
                                                
218 As noted by Tardy, there is an element of “inherent competition” in any inter-institutional 
relationship (Tardy 2011, 33) 
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and rule of law. This “ad hocism” and selectivity (coupled with demanding reporting 
requirements) can be disruptive for the UN, which prefers long-term predictable 
donor relationships that allow autonomy in planning and implementation (Gourlay 
2009, 85).  
Related to this, is the desire of the EU to diversify its implementation channels, to 
avoid creating a dependency on a particular actor. Commission Headquarters have 
promoted this approach particularly since 2007-2008, following the “UN rush” period, 
which climaxed in 2006-2007 with huge operations implemented in Iraq and the 
Palestinian territories (and Afghanistan). In normal situations international 
organizations need to participate to open calls for proposals or tenders, in competition 
with NGOs and private contractors. This irritates the UN. On the contrary, in crisis 
situations the EU and the Commission have the procedural possibility to quickly grant 
funds to a trusted implementing partner that can ensure results even if at higher costs 
in terms of visibility and autonomy. Therefore, the more the context is characterized 
by high security and implementation risks, the more the EU will turn by default to the 
UN. This explains in part the higher than average percentage of UN channelling for 
emergency instruments such as the Instrument for Stability, or Humanitarian aid.  
7.1.3 Finding 3: legitimacy and capacities, form and substance 
There is a linkage between material resources and legitimacy (ideational resources). 
In most cases analysed a low level of material resources for the EU couples with low 
levels of legitimacy, recognition and credibility. The two variables, however, are not 
completely dependent one from the other, which would lead only to cases in which 
the EU is either completely dependent or completely dismissive of the UN. Instead, 
there are interesting cases where the two sets of variables are inversely distributed.  
Once the decision to cooperate and interact has been taken, this variation in factors 
can provide an explanation for the approach to cooperation and the probability for the 
relationship to last in the long term. Here we introduced the concepts or categories of 
‘ceremonial’ and ‘predatory’ EU behaviour, which have contributed to elucidating our 
puzzle. On conflict resolution in Western Sahara, what the EU and its actors really 
need is legitimacy. They would have the capacities to act and decide, but they are 
hindered by the difficult regional context, the lack of international and domestic 
political support to break the status quo and the internal division. When cooperation 
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takes place in this context, particularly in the security sector, it is largely ‘ceremonial’, 
formalistic and is often not conducive to an important political and material 
investment from the EU. The European contribution to crisis management in Libya 
has followed this template. The EU and particularly some member states have 
committed important resources to this endeavour and have shown willingness to use 
them during the crisis. The UN was used as a political and operational framework to 
maintain a rubber stamp of international legitimacy on the change of regime that 
Europeans have promoted much in excess to the UNSC mandate. The graph below 
shows the values of the variables for ideational and material resources on three issues 
where cooperation takes place but is rather superficial, cosmetic, or as we defined it 
‘ceremonial’.  
Figure 16. Examples of “ceremonial” cooperation 
 
An opposite example can be taken from Palestine, where on development cooperation 
in general the Commission has built up a considerable capital of legitimacy within the 
EU and with the Palestinian authorities. Yet, in the security sector there are specific 
sensitivities. The EU uses the United Nations to carry out definite technical assistance 
projects, often in support to its CSDP operation, in a territory that is hostile to external 
meddling and under the strict supervision of Israel. The case of humanitarian 
assistance the Saharawi refugees in Algeria is an additional example. The EU needs 
the UN to give that aura of impartiality and neutrality to its action and keep the SADR 
Political 
mediation in 
Western Sahara 
Quartet for the 
MEPP 
Crisis 
management in 
Libya 
C
ap
ac
iti
es
 
Legitimacy 
Examples of issues where cooperation with the UN is mostly 
'ceremonial' 
Predatory 
Dependent 
Dismissive 
 Ceremonial 
  
189 
authorities at harms-length. It needs access and policy, more than legitimacy as such. 
Cooperation takes place in all these cases, yet when the variable are so inverted, at 
least in relative term, cooperation is even more instrumental, as the EU actors 
involved can count on an good degree of internal legitimacy and credibility. We have 
defined the type of behaviour that can result from this situation: ‘predatory’. In the 
figure below shows three examples from the one discussed in previous chapters.  
Figure 17. Examples of “predatory” cooperation 
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reconstruction due to its posture before the war. Subsequently, it was one of the most 
eager proponents of EU engagement via the UN in Iraq, while being careful at 
avoiding the legitimization of the US-led military operation. As a club of middle and 
small powers, EU member states are generally all keen in promoting multilateral 
solutions, especially in the security field (Laatikainen 2006; Toje 2010, 29).  
This logic applies also to institutions and not only to states. In areas where the 
institutional context is very dense with actors, both national and supranational, each of 
these actors will be more likely to work with the United Nations than would otherwise 
be the case. A comparison of development in the Maghreb and in the Levant seems to 
corroborate this hypothesis. Where the Commission is faced by the competition of 
CSDP operations (Iraq, Palestine), we have seen it work with the UN to establish a 
position and presence in these operations and potentially complement/coordinate 
member states initiatives. We have mentioned also the case of Western Sahara, where 
the Commission is excluded from the conflict itself and has used the UN to work in 
the refugee camps of Tindouf to have at least an accessory presence on this issue. In 
the Levant, the Commission has gradually established a leading and supportive 
position in the managing board of UNRWA to increase its visibility and coordination 
role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the contrary, interaction with the UN is 
limited to loose coordination and information sharing in Morocco and Algeria, even in 
areas such as governance, post-conflict rehabilitation and the rule of law, where the 
UN has substantive expertise and capabilities. In the Maghreb the European 
Commission is much more established than in the Near East (and the UN is weaker), 
has a stronger mandate stemming from the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Barcelona process and the full backing of the leading member states, which have 
delegated to it the implementation (and formulation to a certain extent) of 
development policy, particularly from the 2000s.  
7.1.5 Finding 5: policy issues and resources 
Findings in terms of policy sectors are mixed. There appears to be an impact on EU-
UN interaction when a policy sector is stabilized and the Commission, for example, 
does not feel threatened by other organizations in its competences. The extreme case 
here is development cooperation in the Maghreb, where exists a strong, resourced, 
long-term strategy promoted by the EU as a whole and clearly delegated to the EC 
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(with the Lisbon reform the EEAS is also strongly involved). In this context, the space 
for the UN is small. References to UN standards and goals as well as loose 
coordination with UN agencies can resurface in a ceremonial way when, as in the case 
of budget support, the Commission is challenged in its policies by some member 
states. In general, EU-UN cooperation on development policy (outside of crisis 
situations) is less common than in the security sector where the EU is weaker, less 
experienced and therefore more reliant on the United Nations. 
The graph below shows how the values for our variables are generally much higher in 
the case of development cooperation than with security. This graph looks at the six 
main case studies analysed in the previous chapters, giving a general combined view 
perhaps over-simplistic but still quite useful.  
Figure 18. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) for all 6 main 
case studies 
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7.2 Unity and integration: keeping it together 
The second hypothesis looks at the influence of EU cohesion on its willingness to 
work with the UN. As argued in Chapter 2 this hypothesis was considered as 
complementary to the first hypothesis, as it applies mainly to the EU as a whole, while 
the first hypothesis can apply both to the EU and to its composing actors. Literature 
(and institutional reform) on EU foreign policy has intensively focussed on the issue 
of coherence and consistency as a key element of actorness and power in international 
relations and a traditional problem for the EU (Nuttal 2005; Toje 2008a). For the 
concept of cohesion I analysed both the level of “unity” or consensus among member 
states on a position or on an action, and the degree of “integration”. Integration was 
assessed as a function of the decision-making procedure used on that issue and of the 
“institutional coherence” in that particular policy area. The idea was that maximum 
cooperation would be experienced in areas that articulate across pillars, where intra-
EU legitimacy is contested and cooperating with the UN can help credibility and 
expertise.219  
The hypothesis stated:  
Hypothesis 2:  
! The more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is 
institutionally coherent, the more it is likely to work with the United Nations.  
The results of the empirical research on this hypothesis are more mixed and the 
interpretation is more complex and sometimes misleading than for hypothesis 1.220 
This is mainly due to the fact that unlike with hypothesis 1, a high level in the 
variables “integration” and “unity” does not exclude EU cooperation with the UN as a 
 
                                                
219 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 above.  
220 As for the variables “Ideational and Material resources” I have calculated the correlation 
between Unity and Integration and the dependent variable on the basis of the values sintesized 
in Table 38 above, using Microsoft excel. This resulted in the following figures, which denote 
a much lower level of correlation as compared with the variables under hypothesis 1. 
Correlation between ‘Unity’ and dependent variable = - 0.65; Correlation between 
‘Integration’ and dependent variable = - 0.33. 
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whole. The causal link is therefore less direct, as compared to the variables linked to 
ideational or material resources. There can be cooperation when the EU is cohesive. 
But these variables will affect the nature of the cooperation, which will be more 
substantial, shrewd and problem-oriented when they are high as opposed to 
ceremonial and formalistic, when they are low. Correlation with “cooperation” is 
therefore less stringent, as mentioned above, but the two variables can still yield some 
interesting findings, if complemented with the previous hypothesis on resources.221  
The overall finding is similar to what comes out of hypothesis 1. Rather than a 
normatively driven staunch promoter of multilateral solutions, the EU can be 
described as a “clumsy multilateralist”: it often uses the UN to dissimulate its internal 
divisions and half-baked institutional structures (Koops 2011, 83–87) and smuggle 
itself into international politics.  
Figure 19. Approaches to interaction (hypothesis 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
221 Each of the factors is measured on a 0-1-2 scale and introduced into a specific matrix. The 
two main variables (Unity and Integration) then, go from a minimum value of 0 to a 
maximum of 4. The matrix is then used for graphic elaboration and Comparative Qualitative 
Analysis. 2, is considered a cross-over point from one quadrant to the other. Note that, 
although specific more undefined models have been identified for this scheme, it can also be 
interesting to combine these with the models elaborated for hypothesis 1 (dismissive, 
ceremonial, dependent, predatory).  
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7.2.1 Finding 6: Policy issues and coherence 
Taking off from where we left in the previous section, the first trend to put in focus is 
that cooperation decisions in the development field are generally harder to take than in 
the security field, where member states are in charge. The graph below gives an 
overall view of the status of the variables in each major case study, showing how 
overall, the factors “unity” and “integration” reinforce the trend already established 
with the primary hypothesis on ideational and material resources.  
Figure 20. Illustration of configuration of variables (cohesion) for all 6 main case 
studies 
 
Obviously, we are looking here at tendencies, and it would be a mistake to interpret 
the graphs as anything more than a visual aid to what remains a qualitative analysis. 
Yet, there is consistency with what was expected and what comes out from the 
“Resources” variables analysed above. For instance, it would seem that the more the 
EU is integrated (e.g. the community method is used and one institution is clearly in 
the lead), the less it will tend to work with the UN.  
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strong on the field but taking only the variables on unity and integration one could 
expect the EU not to cooperate with the UN because the policy field is clearly under 
the control of the European Commission and member states agree on the overall 
policy. In this case, cooperation is explained through the first variables on 
legitimacy/capacity, which had already described the strong dependency of the 
Commission on UNRWA, in terms of both material and ideational resources. 
Working with UNRWA is inevitable. The difference between the Maghreb, where 
cooperation is quite low, and the Levant (where cooperation is overall frequent) can 
be explained with our hypothesis 2 by looking at the larger extent of competition that 
comes to the Commission from member states development agencies in the region 
and with the less unified position of the member states, particularly in areas that touch 
the security sector. Also the crisis situation in the Palestinian territories (even when 
working on long-term development) prevented the EU from centring all its actions 
around the Barcelona processes and on long-term programmes as in the Maghreb. 
Another explanation is linked to the higher need for international legitimacy in the 
Middle East as this is at the centre of global attention with many more actors involved. 
Finally, the UN itself invests to a greater extent in its presence in the Palestinian 
territories (including through the contribution of non-EU donors), as part of its 
mandate towards the refugees, peace-building and towards poverty reduction in 
general.  
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Figure 21. Example of impact of variables “integration” and “unity” on the 
explanatory model (Development cooperation in the Levant) 
 
The unity/integration hypothesis, though, is particularly adapted to the security field, 
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still has a lot to learn in the field of security from the United Nations, as some 
interviewees from the UN have underlined.222 Perhaps Libya is the case where we can 
expect competition and conflict between the EU and the UN to surface more in the 
post-conflict reconstruction phase, due to the fact that the EU member states are 
relatively united around the objective of supporting stabilization. Yet, even in the case 
of Libya, the disagreements and competition that do exist between key member states 
such the UK, Italy and France, are likely to keep the UN into the picture. The UK, for 
instance, has been reluctant to raise the profile of the EU through a CSDP operation. 
7.2.2 Finding 7: Boundaries, opportunities and spill-over 
The distinction between security and development is particularly interesting to the 
impact of integration, one of the two key variables of hypothesis 2. According to our 
argument the transfer of powers to supranational or intergovernmental institution can 
affect cooperation with UN. Different institutions have different preferences and 
motivations towards cooperation with the UN.  
The Council Secretariat seems, overall, keener towards cooperation with the UN. Its 
newer institutions had to gain credibility within the EU foreign policy system in a 
context where member states were sceptical and the European Commission suspicious 
and protective of its prerogatives (Dijkstra 2009; Sabiote 2010, 181). Working with 
the United Nations has helped build this recognition and credibility (ideational 
resources) both internally and externally. High Representative Solana and his team’s 
autonomy from member states remained limited as compared with the Commission, 
but also with the parallel structures in the United Nations, from UNDPA to UNDPKO. 
Similarly, its capabilities (staff and funding) and internal legitimacy (lack of 
parliamentary and judiciary oversight) have been weak, relatively to the 
Commission’s structures. Against this backdrop, they were among the first proponents 
of the “Effective multilateralism” concept and have promoted consistently strong 
cooperation with the UN in the Middle East as an opportunity to represent the EU. 
 
                                                
222 Interviews n°18 and n°10 (UN officials from agencies and programmes active in the 
Middle East) 
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The Commission in comparison can sometimes view cooperation with the UN as a 
failure. An admission on its part that it is incapable of carrying out a particular task 
with its own means. It has been more challenged by the UN partners with which it has 
to interface and struggles to find a common language. 
Yet, the Commission has also promoted the multilateral doctrine since the 2000s. The 
case studies have shown how the Commission has been an important vehicle of 
cooperation with the UN. It has done so opportunistically in cross-pillar issues such as 
peace building, where through the UN it could gain a view and a voice also into CFSP. 
The fact that “boundary areas” are fertile grounds for competition between member 
states and institutions and for functional spill-over has been widely discussed by 
literature (Dijkstra 2009, 437; White 2004, 57) including neo-functionalist scholarship. 
But the impact of UN cooperation on this dynamic is underexplored. This study 
shows how the UN is frequently used to gain ground and promote intergovernmental 
or supranational integration across development and security policy. The Commission, 
for example, uses UN agencies and programmes, as well as donor coordination groups, 
as an opportunity to coordinate or represent member states (Taylor 2006) or, as 
already discussed, to gain voice in areas from which it would be excluded. The case of 
Iraq is particularly telling but also smaller issues, such as the financing of the Quartet 
office for the MEPP, give an insight on the Commission’s motivation (or lack of) in 
working with the UN.  
Policy areas across pillars, where there is ambiguity in competencies and/or a high 
institutional density - more than one institution involved - are those where cooperation 
is more intensive. Even if there is a loss in terms of visibility, EU institutions are 
eager to work with the UN when this can help increase their relative weight in a 
competitive environment or promote a specific supranational or intergovernmental 
integration solution. The leading example of this phenomenon is in the competition 
over the security sector reform of the Palestinian authority between the Commission 
and CSDP structures after 2005, and in how both initiatives strongly rely on the 
United Nations both as a political framework and as an operational partner.  
The graph below illustrate how all the examples analysed that score low on the 
variables for “integration” and “unity” and that lay in between development and 
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security policy, tend to lead to an approach that seeks cooperation with the UN with a 
predominance in the “predatory” quadrant.  
Figure 22. Illustration of examples of EU-UN cooperation laying across policy 
fields  
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military intervention but then hassled with millions of euros around the UN flag on 
reconstruction. In the second case, Europeans were more solidly united in New York 
(beyond the abstention of Germany) on the military intervention and then took a much 
more formalistic approach to cooperation with the UN, which was already showing 
signs of fragility in summer 2011. There is a correlation between lack of European 
unity and solid cooperation with international organizations. In this sense, this study 
contributes to the literature that has linked the EU’s passion for multilateralism to its 
chronic disunity (Bouchard and Peterson 2010; Hill, Peterson, and Wessels 2011). 
Examples are countless in general and are several also within our six case studies, 
ranging from Western Sahara to crisis management in Libya and post-conflict 
reconstruction in Iraq. In general one can count that a disunited Europe will fall back 
at least on a reassuring UN process or reference or that its member states will chip in 
some contribution to a UN operation and “wave the UN flag”. Whether more unity 
could mean consistently less cooperation with the UN is less straightforward. Yet, in 
the cases that we have analysed, where the EU’s member states are capable to reach a 
consensus beyond a lowest common denominator solution, this consensus does not 
necessarily include working with the UN. Long-term development cooperation comes 
again into mind but also Libya, where the European relative success through the 
NATO operation has given it some confidence for the post-conflict phase.   
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Figure 23. Illustration of examples of cooperation where there is strong division 
among member states 
 
This argument/finding is the most difficult to reconcile with the rational-choice meta-
theoretical approach that informs this study. Is the habit of member states to 
dissimulate their divisions with the UN fig leaf really a consequential self-interested 
behaviour? Or, is it rather motivated by preoccupations about the “appropriateness” of 
showing unity in the international stage and about the importance of finding some 
kind of agreement to promote a European identity, however insignificant to the actual 
solution of the problem? I will come back to the problem of appropriateness latter in 
the chapter, as this certainly plays a role in the equation. Yet, at this point it is 
important to show that the “unity” factor does not invalidate the rationalist structure of 
this thesis; on the contrary. The empirical qualitative analysis and the process tracing 
carried out for each of the case study has allowed to elucidate at least in part what are 
the motivations of the individual actors involved in the final decision to cooperate 
with the UN.  
The fragmented, multi-actor, multi-level and contested policy space of European 
foreign policy allows member states to pursue separate interests while promoting a 
multilateral strategy, which often leads a common position or joint action which can 
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be ambiguous or anaemic. As explained in chapter 2, when the UN performs the 
function of dissimulating the EU’s internal divisions member states are actually 
thinking about very concrete benefits. For France and the UK, working with the UN 
immediately translates in a leadership role in New York where they can count on their 
privileged status. So, for instance, the division of the EU on Libya translated in 
French and British activeness in New York in forging a Security Council resolution. 
The strong division on Iraq over the war, still left Europeans with the need and 
appetite to play a role in the future in one of the biggest oil producers in the world. 
The UN was the only way in which the EU states that had remained outside of the 
operations could come back into the game. For those, like the UK, who actually 
participated in the military operations, getting the UN on board was even more crucial 
to help legitimize their position. During the Lebanon crisis in 2006, the EU was 
paralysed and managed to call for a cease-fire only very late. The debate was 
transferred in New York where key member states (including Italy, then serving as 
non-permanent member) could play a visible role in building the consensus for a 
reinforcement of the UNIFIL mission, which was then endorsed in Brussels.  
All these examples concern what Kirchner has defined the “politics of compellence” 
(Kirchner 2010, 29–30) or crisis management requiring the use of hard power. Yet, 
similar situations occur regularly also with frozen conflicts, most notably in the 
Western Sahara, where the low common denominator position of supporting the UN 
process allows France to control the situation without taking too much responsibility. 
Things can rapidly change. Divisions in the short term can sometimes become tacit or 
open agreements on the long-term once post-conflict reconstruction lends itself to 
long-term development cooperation. Once that happens, cooperating with the UN 
closely can become less urgent, less indispensible. Look here at the change in the 
approach of the EU on Iraq after 2007.  
7.3. Intervening factors: space, time and “speed” of 
cooperation 
Having analysed the impact of what we have identified as the primary determinants of 
EU-UN relations, we can turn to three secondary factors that have been sounded 
throughout the study: proximity, integration and the role of institutionalization, 
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socialization and rhetoric.  
7.3.1 Proximity in space 
Proximity is a concept easy to grasp intuitively but difficult to define theoretically 
beyond the obvious indicator of geographic distance. In assimilating the EU to a 
“small power”, Toje notes that one of the characteristics of these actors is that they 
give high importance to logistics and location in defining their interests and deploying 
their policies (Toje 2010, 29–30). In turn, Kirchner notes the role of geography in 
Europe’s security policy (Kirchner 2010, 29-30) shown by the higher investment and 
impact of Europeans in their immediate neighbourhood.223 What does this mean for 
cooperation with the UN?  
While focussed exclusively on the MENA region this study provided some variation 
in terms of proximity. I used geography first of all as a presentation and structuring 
criteria in the treatment of the case studies, which were grouped in the Maghreb 
(chapter 4), the Levant (Chapter 5) and countries outside the EMP framework, one 
from North Africa and the other from the Middle East (Chapter 6). Can one identify 
different patterns when looking at North Africa (including Libya) as compared with 
the Middle East (including Iraq)? The empirical study shows that cooperation is wider 
and deeper in the Middle East than it is in North Africa. Certainly, in the Middle East 
the presence of the UN and of other international organizations is stronger as the 
issues there have higher global security relevance and the Palestinian territories, in 
particular, are extremely dependent on aid. There is therefore more opportunity for 
interaction with the EU as compared to the Maghreb. Still, we found two different 
channels through which geography influences EU-UN cooperation. 
Firstly, Geography indirectly influences the level of reach and “access” of states and 
institutions on a specific problem. For example, it appears that EU-UN post-conflict 
cooperation in Libya is much less substantial and structural than in Iraq after 2003, 
 
                                                
223 See also the work on geographic proximity done from a neo-realist point of view by 
Stephen Walt, who argues that geographic proximity magnifies threat perception and 
therefore has an important impact on foreign policy (Walt 1987, 22–23). 
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with more potential for conflict. After the initial ritualistic (or ceremonial) oaths of 
confidence and friendship, problems, misunderstandings and frustration in Libya were 
already surfacing by summer 2011. Part of the answer comes from geography. 
Logistics in Iraq are much more complex than in Libya, which is just a few kilometres 
from Italian and Maltese territory. Establishing a European presence in Tripoli is 
much cheaper than maintaining it in Baghdad. As a consequence, supporting a strong 
role of the UN in Libya to provide a first entry point in the country is not so essential 
as in the case of Iraq early after the occupation. 
Secondly, foreign policy towards geographically closer countries is typically 
grounded on self-interest in a “sphere of influence” (or “Ring of friends”) approach, 
(Mckinlay and Little 1978; 1977; Walt 1987, 23–24), which has largely inspired 
European policy in the Mediterranean. In North Africa, in particular, the leading 
member states have invested very much on a European framework that would help 
defend their extensive interests and traditional links in a disguised form. France and 
other former colonial powers such as Italy and Spain have Europeanized their policies 
in the Mediterranean through the Barcelona process and the ENP (Morisse-Schilbach 
1999) and this has given a tremendous credibility and confidence to the European 
Commission (and the EEAS) to carry out its policies autonomously, albeit within 
stringent political guidelines. As analysed in Chapter VI, Libya and Iraq have 
remained outside the EMP framework, which reduced the internal authority of 
supranational institutions, as the policy space remained contested between member 
states and the EU. Yet, while EU member states have clearly expressed the wish for 
Libya to be integrated within the EMP framework in the medium-term, this will 
hardly happen for Iraq, also due to geographic location.  
In sum, in cases that are particularly impervious, such as Iraq, the EU has needed the 
support of the UN to access the actors in the ground, share the burden of costs and 
show its own presence. In turn, closer to Europe and particularly around the 
Mediterranean basin, Europeans tend to follow a more Eurocentric approach loosely 
modelled on enlargement. They devise their heavily institutionalized policy 
frameworks of approximation and normative and regulatory diffusion, which have 
little need for the United Nations - and even subtly challenge its role both in security 
and development. In this sense, a stabilization of the West Bank and Gaza with the 
possibility also there to formulate and implement a long-term multiannual 
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development programme could reasonably be expected to lead to a further reduction 
of cooperation with the UN. We are already seeing the hints now, in the progressive 
devising of European mechanisms of direct budgetary assistance to the Palestinian 
authorities and the subsequent marginalization of the World Bank. Similarly, while 
discussions about the expansion of the EMP or the ENP also to Iraq were still 
velleitary in 2011-2012, the ‘normalization’ of development policy with it has already 
led to the closing down of the UN/WB run IRFFI programme. As the EU develops its 
own resources to run its business, one can expect a thorough review before a decision 
is taken to relinquish money, visibility and implementation power to the UN.224  
7.3.2 Integration over time  
A separate question concerned EU internal institutional reform and the degree to 
which this affected EU-UN cooperation. Has EU integration in foreign policy since 
the EPC increased the willingness of the EU to cooperate with the UN?  
The various units of analysis (or examples of interaction) assessed by this study gave 
the opportunity to make a diachronic examination and compare qualitative 
observations across time. All the cases analysed concern the period following 1992. 
However most of these cases are actually grounded in some type of European action 
before the birth of CFSP, particularly under the European Political Cooperation 
framework. Therefore, from the analysis of the background and context of all the 
cases it would appear that while EU cooperation within the UN was certainly less 
developed before 1992,225 cooperation by member states and institutions with the UN 
was not necessarily less pronounced. In the Middle East and on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the European countries have been promoting a stronger role for the United 
Nations, opposed on this by both Israel and the United States, at least since the Venice 
declaration in the 1980 (Müller 2011). The Commission has been funding UNRWA 
since the 1970s. The logic behind it was the same as it is today: European member 
 
                                                
224 The discussions in 2011-2012 on Libya’s transition between the EU, UNSMIL and UNDP 
on these issues are a clear case in point (direct observation, 2011-2012) 
225 See, for instance the increase in coordinated votes at the UN General Assembly since 1992 
(Luif 2003; Rasch 2008) 
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states were excluded from the political process and used the UN to leverage support 
on their participation (access) from the Arab world and Palestinians. Also, the leading 
promoter of a European engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was France, who has 
traditionally used the UN to assert its role in international affairs and in Europe.  
The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam have generated opposing tensions on EU-
UN cooperation. On the one hand, they have increased the competition among 
institutions within the EU in the security field by strengthening the intergovernmental 
paradigm. This has created an incentive to cooperate with the UN to obtain 
recognition, given the UN experience, reputation and mandate in peace and security 
(Ojanen 2011). The Middle East, where since 1996 member states appointed a Special 
Envoy, has been a celebrated theatre of this institutional competition. In addition to 
this, the EU looked for mentoring from more experienced organizations including the 
UN in a context characterized by the infamous capabilities/expectation gap 
(Christopher Hill 1993). 
On the other hand, the Treaties have also created the potential for future competition 
with the UN. With time the consolidation of CSDP structures has started to challenge 
the UN as a venue for channelling member states’ security policies (especially in 
civilian crisis management), particularly at the regional level, in the Balkans, but also 
globally (Attinà 2008; 2010; Tardy 2011). A relevant example is the establishment of 
EUPOL Copps, where the EU decided to deploy its own rule of law and police 
training mission rather than strengthening the existing UN operations. Post revolution 
Libya could perhaps be another example. In the same period, European contributions 
to blue helmets have decreased or have been granted, as in the case of UNIFIL in 
2006, under condition of a tighter oversight.  
The study therefore, has not identified a generally keener tendency to work with the 
UN in parallel to the progressive development of a new and institutionalized 
European foreign and security policy structure. The problems and drivers of 
cooperation remain the same. This is perhaps also because, notwithstanding the many 
reforms since 1992, the characteristic ambiguities of the EU have remained 
remarkably constant, including the multi-layered multi-actor and contested nature of 
foreign policy. Will the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon change this?  
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The Lisbon Treaty 
I have already referred throughout the study to some of the innovations introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty. However I have not focussed specifically on these for two main 
reasons. Firstly, most of the issues examined concern the period until 2010, before the 
entry into force of the Treaty. Secondly, even in the case of crisis management in 
Libya or where the period after 2010 was mentioned, the innovations of Lisbon will 
take some time to sink in completely and affect the operating methods of the 
European foreign policy actors. Even though there was some initial enthusiasm about 
the possible impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU-UN cooperation,226 the full impact of 
the Treaty will be clearer in the course of the next few years, with the EEAS staffing 
completed, a new European Commission nominated and the new 2014-2020 multi-
annual Financial Perspectives adopted.  
Having said this, based on the Treaty provisions and on the first experiences with 
implementation, it is possible to advance some educated guesses on the impact that 
this will have on EU-UN cooperation (Krause and Ronzitti 2012; Van Langenhove 
and Marchesi 2008; Pirozzi, Juergenliemk, and Spies 2011). The general objective 
when drafting and adopting the text was to increase the coherence between the EU 
and the member states (vertical coherence) between institutions (institutional) and 
between policy areas (horizontal). In this sense 2011 was a transition year, where both 
the European Commission and the new European External Action Service (EEAS) 
were undergoing deep transformations difficult to evaluate. Overall, though, 
 
                                                
226 see the speech of 8 February 2011, Speech/11/77 by HR/VP Catherine Ashton at the UN 
Security Council in 2011: “As you know, we have a long-standing commitment to effective 
multilateralism with a strong UN at the core. Regional organisations are building blocks for 
global governance, with a dual responsibility. First, a responsibility to enhance security, 
development and human rights in their own region. And second, to support UN efforts to 
promote these goals around the world. When I spoke to the Security Council last year, I 
updated you on the progress regarding the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
promises this held for strengthening the EU’s contribution to addressing international 
concerns.(…) In our view the Lisbon Treaty and the External Action Service are not just good 
for Europe. They also make us a better partner for the UN. We are grateful for your help in 
recognising this.” 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/77(accessed on 25 
April 2012) 
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leadership, concentration of authority and legitimacy were still lacking.  
At the apex of the structure the new High Representative and Vice President of the 
Commission post seems to catalyse rather than solve all the pervasive ambiguity of 
the system. The first to occupy this post, Baroness Catherine Ashton has made the 
achievement of a “comprehensive approach” in foreign policy a key objective of her 
tenure. At a lower level, the foreign policy, security and crisis management structures 
have all been fitted within the new EEAS. However, confusion, lack of coordination 
and bureaucratic rivalries are still going on in full swing, as the response to the 2011 
“Arab Spring” has shown.227 In development cooperation, the dramatic turf wars that 
were fought by member states, Commission and Parliament during the formulation 
and implementation of the reform, led to the partial undermining of the initial 
objectives of merging the “payer” with the “player”. As a consequence, while the 
EEAS is now responsible for the programming phase in development assistance, it is 
still the Commission at Headquarters and in delegations that is in charge of 
identifying, formulating and implementing the individual programmes under the EU 
budget. This includes the decision on whether or not to channel funding via the United 
Nations. A stronger coordinating role has also been attributed in theory to the EU 
development policy structures over the member states, but how this will translate in 
reality remains to be seen. So, at least for what development cooperation (and 
humanitarian aid) is concerned, the reform has not reduced the fragmentation and 
competition that existed between bureaucratic structures in Brussels. Things are only 
slightly better in the CSDP domain, as even here, the divisions between former 
Council secretariat structures and former Commission structures perdure within the 
EEAS. Also the role of the European Parliament, while generally reinforced, will 
remain ambivalent in foreign policy.  
In this context, one can argue for the applicability of our analytical framework also to 
 
                                                
227 The EEAS organigramme now even includes a Managing Director responsible for “crisis 
response and operational coordination,” which has been quite involved on the Arab Spring. 
However this actor has only a formal coordinating role at the height of the crisis, without 
having the staff nor the funding (humanitarian and development aid still resting firmly in the 
hands of the Commission) to actually increase internal coherence throughout the crisis cycle 
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these changed circumstances. In general, the more the EU foreign policy system is 
coherent and centralized the more the factors under hypothesis 1 (legitimacy and 
capacity) will have to be applied to the EU as a whole rather than its individual 
components.  
The findings from this study on cooperation in the MENA show that coherence is 
likely to reduce the push factors to work with the UN and reinforce a self-interested 
and unilateralist approach to foreign policy.  But we are not there yet. If anything, the 
tendency is not for more coherence, but rather for renationalization (ECFR 2011). The 
MENA is undergoing a period of great instability and competition for external 
influence from actors like Turkey, China, Russia or the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Against this backdrop, the EU will likely maintain its current approach of selective or 
“shrewd” multilateralism (Koops 2011). It will choose whether to work with the UN, 
depending on its relative power in the particular context and challenge at hand.  
7.3.3 Speeding up cooperation? Institutionalization, socialization and rhetoric 
In the introduction I have represented institutionalization as an ambiguous 
characteristic of EU-UN interaction, an “iron cage” that is more the result of 
cooperation than a factor of it (DiMaggio and Powell 1984). Liberal institutionalist 
literature has normally considered institutions as a prerequisite for cooperation among 
states, facilitating, stabilizing and “speeding up” effective interaction on common 
problems (Keohane 1988, 384). In the study I have tried to analyse whether this 
interpretation could be applied to cooperation among organizations rather than states, 
and particularly to EU-UN cooperation. After all, as Tardy puts it: “no other UN-
Regional Organization relationship has reached an equivalent level of inter-
institutional linkages” (Tardy 2011, 29). So I had made the following secondary 
hypothesis:  
! The more institutionalized the relationship between the EU and the UN, the 
more cooperation (inter-organisational coherence). 
The findings tend to show that this is not true necessarily. Institutionalization in a 
context of inter-organizational cooperation can often generate more problems than it 
solves (Biermann 2007; Jonsson 1986; Koops 2009; Tardy 2011). Relationships 
between organizations typically reach a phase of plateau/maintenance (Haugevik 2007, 
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4). The EU and the UN seem to be kept together more by routine and responsabilities 
than by desire...  
Notwithstanding the progressive institutionalization of cooperation between the two 
organizations (Tardy 2009)228, we have not seen a substantive change in the general 
tendency to cooperate with the UN. As shown in Chapter 3, the rapid increase in the 
use of UN structures from 2001 to 2007 has been imposed primarily by the need to 
guarantee the disbursement of vast quantities of reconstruction funds in Iraq, the West 
Bank and Gaza (and Afghanistan), when alternatives were lacking. Operations have 
been facilitated by institutionalized cooperation and the creation of specific legal and 
political mechanisms. Yet, this increase in “channelling” has risen more than an 
eyebrow in European capitals and in the European Parliament and the European 
Commission soon happily accepted to roll back and return to the previous rates. The 
Commission now goes out of its way to ensure that cooperation with the UN is strictly 
restricted to cases where a clear added value in terms of effectiveness exists. Joint 
trainings, regular meetings and other procedures have been designed to speed up 
cooperation when it occurs but, in general, inter-organizational institutionalization has 
not played a decisive multiplying role.229  
Related to this is the issue of socialization. Over the years the EU has increased its 
contacts and knowledge of the UN. However, the socialization of the two 
bureaucracies in a set of common beliefs, values and identities has been limited; even 
within relatively homogenous epistemic communities dealing with technical issues 
such as accountability, accounting, reporting or management standards in 
development cooperation. Rivalries and misunderstandings persist and are grounded 
in an ontological difference between the EU as a regional polity with a global 
ambition and the UN as a universal sovereign-based organization. In our interviews, 
 
                                                
228 For instance the agreement on the FAFA on development assistance in 2002 the various 
partnership agreements with UN agencies and programmes following 2005 or the many joint 
statements on security and crisis management in 2003, 2007 and 2011. 
229 In a way, the effects of inter-organizational institutionalization have been off set by the 
primary need of the EU/Commission to be visible and to manage autonomously its resources. 
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several bureaucrats involved in interacting with other organizations voiced rather 
more frustration and impatience about inter-agency rivalry than a rosy view of 
multilateralism. Conflict includes competition for leadership, recognition and 
resources of member states, turf wars about competences, different administrative 
cultures, excessive formalism and rigidity and quarrels about visibility.  
The EU has created structures that are specialized in dealing with the UN (and the UN 
has opened large offices in Brussels). However, the imperative of cooperation has 
remained circumscribed to the relatively marginalized specialists of EU-UN 
interaction, without trickling down to the operational and geographic services in the 
Commission and EEAS that are responsible for formulating and implementing 
policies and solving problems. The same can be said for the UN. Although there are 
plenty of exchanges and cross-fertilization on issues such as crisis management, 
human security, post-conflict needs assessment, poverty reduction, public finance 
management and electoral observation, officials are encouraged by hierarchy to 
maintain autonomy and independence. The impression from our observation is that 
member states foreign policy bureaucracies are on the whole more sympathetic to the 
United Nations than EU officials. In the years, the European Union has sought to 
consolidate itself as an independent foreign policy actor with its own identity and has 
increasingly competed with the UN as a channel for states’ development and security 
policy. Against this background, stereotypes about the slowness, inefficiency and 
overstretch of UN structures might have even worsened with the increasing contacts. 
These points, however, will need to be further explored by research, including with 
deeper studies on the perception that the EU has of the United Nations. 
Finally, considering the heavy rhetorical commitment to multilateralism and the UN, 
we have tried to sound throughout the study the possible influence of discursive 
entrapment over rational serf-serving calculations by the leading actors. Literature on 
normative institutionalism has explored quite extensively this topic (Schimmelfennig 
and Thomas 2009; Schimmelfennig 2001; Thomas 2011a). The discourse on the 
normative obligation to multilateralism is certainly a very relevant feature of 
                                                                                                                                       
In a similar way, ‘division of labour’ and ‘donor coordination’ are great ideas, just as long as 
they don’t translate in being coordinated by the UN.  
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interaction, particularly in the configurations that we have defined as “ceremonial”. 
As a reminder, these describe the contexts in which the EU and/or its composing 
actors have significant material resources to tackle the problem at hand but lack in 
ideational resources i.e. legitimacy. In these cases cooperation might be more formal 
than substantial, but it is still motivated by a concrete need on the part of the EU, 
rather than being forced by a vague and agreeable normative commitment to the UN. 
The case of Iraq is pertinent. On this case, Lewis has argued that the EU’s decision to 
come together within the UN was justified by a degree of rhetorical entrapment over 
multilateralism and by an acquis of intergovernmental bargaining that has prevailed 
over the differences of the member states, promoting consensus (Lewis 2009). In 
constructivist terms, one could argue that, in that context, working with the UN 
suddenly appeared the appropriate thing to do. Certainly the quickness with which 
member states decided to bridge their differences on Iraq’s post-conflict 
reconstruction was remarkable and demonstrates the resilience of European 
institutions, formal and informal. Yet, as was discussed in the specific case study, the 
decision to work with the UN was very rational in itself. Once it was established that 
some kind of EU presence in Iraq was useful to promote very substantial interests 
from most member states in being there, working through the UN was really the only 
practicable solution. The EU lacked the access, capabilities, the policy and legitimacy 
to be on the ground directly with development assistance.  
7.4 EU-UN cooperation and power 
In this chapter I have analysed the main findings of my research. I argued that the 
EU’s willingness to cooperate with the United Nations tends to be inversely linked to 
its capacities and legitimacy on the one hand and its unity and integration on the other 
hand. Depending on the level of analysis, this lack of resources and cohesion can be 
identified in the single component actors of the EU foreign policy whose role and 
autonomy vary across the system or in the system as a whole. Ultimately, the thesis of 
Robert Kagan that multilateralism is the strategy of the weak might be closer to truth 
than one might think (Kagan 2004). This research shows that the more the EU is weak, 
the more it will be motivated to work with and through the United Nations structures. 
The figure, below, based again on table 38, certainly is an oversimplification but 
provides an illustration of this ‘negative correlation’ existing between “power” – 
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defined indeed as the combined presence of resources (material and ideational) and 
cohesion (unity and integration) and cooperation with the UN.  
Figure 24. Correlation between all the independent variables (Power) and the 
EU-UN Cooperation 
 
The narrative that depicts the European Union as essentially or normatively prone to 
channel its policy through multilateral institutions conceals what is actually a clearly 
self-interested, instrumental and rational behaviour by the various actors participating 
in the European foreign policy system, including member states and institutions. 
Collectively, the EU adopts multilateral strategies of cooperating with the UN, when 
and where it is obliged to do so by the context, when it is divided, inexperienced or 
lacks resources and coherent policies of its own. A comparison of development and 
security policy seems to confirm this. Inter-organizational interaction varies from 
sector to sector, but the tendency to cooperate seems greater in the “high politics” 
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development policy, where EU supranational institutions have a stronger role and the 
pressure to coordinate the member states’ remaining independent policies is lower.  
As argued in the introduction to this work, EU-UN cooperation can be described as a 
resultant of opposing bids for legitimisation both on the world stage (member states) 
and at the internal EU level (European supranational institutions). EU member states 
use the United Nations both to mask their division on a policy and to reinforce their 
independent status and role within the international system. EU institutions, instead, 
tend to use cooperation with the UN to gain ground and voice in areas from where 
they would be otherwise excluded: as a “social lift”.  
More speculative is the question of whether this would work also the other way round. 
Would a powerful, unified and assertive EU consistently snub the United Nations? 
This is a difficult claim to maintain. The analysis does show that when tracking 
cooperation on a specific issue over time, if the variables improved for the EU, this 
was also reflected in a weaker degree of cooperation with the UN. The case of the 
abandonment of the World Bank trust fund in Palestine once the experience with TIM 
and PEGASE had proved successful is a clear case in point. But there are others. 
Reputation and prestige are a very cheap way to acquire authority and power 
(Thompson 2003). 230 Therefore, one could expect that with increasing technical 
expertise cumulated also in the security and peace-building field, the EU will move 
gradually from being fully dependent on the UN to adopting a more selective 
approach, as one can already notice in Libya.  
 
 
                                                
230 I thank Hanna Ojanen for this citation (Ojanen 2011). 
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8. Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis was to explain why and under what conditions the EU and 
the United Nations cooperate in the field of development and security. The core 
underlying issue is a classic puzzle of international relations studies: is cooperation 
driven by shared values or rational interests? More figuratively, is the relationship 
between the EU and the UN really based on Love or Logic? What hides behind the 
much-publicized motto of “Effective Multilateralism”? The short and banal answer to 
these questions is that the EU cooperates with the UN by sheer necessity. So when, 
where and why is it necessary to work with the UN? 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was chosen as a case study for its 
salience to European foreign policy and international affairs and because it offers 
sufficient internal variation to be representative of the general problem. But other 
examples of EU-UN interaction can be found all over the world and in all policy 
fields. They reflect the increasing activeness of the EU (and of the UN) in 
international affairs, the growing interdependence of problems and issues requiring 
joint and multidimensional international responses and the continued reliance of states 
on international organizations to promote their goals in peace, security and 
development.231 This interaction has gradually brought to a bloated institutionalization 
of EU-UN relations. Yet, this has not always resulted in an actual increase of 
cooperation – nor it has produced “harmony” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 226). In 
many cases the dependent variable (EU-UN cooperation) manifests itself in the form 
of neglect, competition and conflict. 
Against this very concrete and evolving backdrop, the research design was built 
around the problem rather than on a particular theory. The broader goal was to 
explore a developing field in international relations but also to push forward the 
 
                                                
231  In acknowledging this interpretation, the theoretical backdrop of this thesis is a 
functionalist and liberal institutionalist one (Haas 1961, Keohane and Nye 2011), although as 
explained in Chapter 2, I used eclectically several other theoretical schools to explain what 
motivates the specific instances of EU-UN cooperation.  
  
216 
understanding of the specific empirical case of European foreign policy in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East from the year 2000 to 2012.  
Authors and practitioners have underlined the fact that the EU’s approach to 
multilateralism is linked to the nature of its multilateral political system, which has 
generated a habit or a normative preference to work through negotiations and 
institutions (Cooper 2004, Manners 2002). My thesis maintains that this “instinct” for 
multilateralism is rather produced by a generalized lack of capacities and legitimacy 
throughout the EU foreign policy system and by the constant division and rivalry 
among member states and institutions. The EU’s cooperation with the United Nations 
can be understood and explained as motivated by its weakness both external and 
internal. As I put it in the Introduction: it is a weak commitment, grounded in 
weakness.  
In these last few pages, I will provide some concluding remarks on the main idea, 
method, limitations and overall significance of this thesis. 
The main idea 
In the first two chapters of this work, I introduced the main themes and questions of 
the thesis, discussed the functions of the UN for EU foreign policy and advanced the 
two main hypotheses through which I tested the argument. Hypothesis 1 linked EU-
UN relations to the lack of material and ideational resources. ‘Resource dependence’ 
is typically listed as one of the main rational motifs for cooperation in inter-
organizational literature (Tardy 2011, 25; Haugevik 2007, 11). In this thesis, I merged 
material and ideational resources into one single hypothesis, while keeping these 
factors distinct to develop an original typology of four approaches to cooperation 
(dependent, ceremonial, predatory and dismissive), which has proven quite useful.232 
Legitimacy and material resources are not always aligned: there are cases where the 
EU has a relatively high level of legitimacy but low capacities and in which it will 
exploit the UN with ad hoc cooperation arrangements (‘predatory behaviour’); cases 
 
                                                
232 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2. 
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where material capacities are copious but legitimacy scarce, in which the EU will, 
instead, adopt a ceremonious and formalistic approach in its relations with the UN.  
Hypothesis 2 complemented the first one by testing the impact of unity and 
integration on the EU-UN relationship. Borrowing again from inter-organizational 
literature, this hypothesis is related to ‘organizational survival’ (Haugevik 2007, p. 9) 
or what I have termed in my second Chapter, the ‘identity function’ of cooperation 
with the UN. In difficult cases, where the EU is divided, undecided or incoherent, 
cooperating with the UN is used to dissimulate the lack of clout and vision as a 
foreign policy actor. Working with the UN in these cases, also allows some member 
states to revert fully to their position of privilege in the ‘Concert of Nations’ and to 
the self-perpetuating system of rituals, practices and relationships that characterizes 
foreign policy in and around New York. Again, delivering through the UN constitutes 
a means for states to ensure the survival of cherished privileges.  
Through these hypotheses, the thesis maintained an eclectic and problem-based 
theoretical approach grounded on two key assumptions. The first one was rationalism. 
Rationalism as a meta-theoretical approach assumes that actors can normally calculate 
the costs and benefits of cooperation even if they are constrained. Consequently, 
agency was assessed as following a specific logic linked to the interest in increasing 
resources and in ensuring survival. This has proven an insightful perspective even in a 
subject – EU and multilateralism - that is intrinsically pervaded by rhetoric, values, 
norms and identities. Acknowledging these complicating factors, I did not take a 
narrow interpretation of rationality but I maintained a systemic and relational 
understanding of it, in which actors specify and identify their own interests on the 
basis of their relations with others within a system of foreign policy (White 2004).233 
In this sense, this research went beyond inter-organizational theory, which focuses 
mostly on unit-to-unit interaction, and looked inside the ‘black box’ of the EU 
 
                                                
233 In particular, I focused on how interests generate a motivation or resistance to work with 
the UN. It is argued in this thesis, that this motivation or resistance is linked to systemic and 
relational considerations about relative power within the EU and towards specific problems. 
When an actor needs capacities or legitimacy it will work with the UN.  
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borrowing insights from bureaucratic politics (e.g. the rivalry between different 
strands of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat in promoting 
cooperation with the UN), institutionalism (e.g. the importance of legal and 
institutional competences in triggering cooperation, the opportunistic behaviour of 
institutions) or even neo-realism (the importance of assessing relative power within a 
given system).  
This multifaceted interpretation of rationality is intimately linked to the second 
assumption underpinning this study: that EU foreign policy can be understood only as 
a multilevel system of governance, where the domestic level, the member states level 
and the European/institutional level constantly interact in generating different foreign 
policy outcomes (M. E. Smith 2004; White 2004). Rationality and agency in the 
decisions to cooperate or not with the UN were looked for often in the actors 
composing the EU, rather than in the EU as a whole. Of course, not all actors have an 
essential role at all times. As discussed in chapter 3, in each policy field there are 
leading actors that have a stronger role in agenda setting, policy formulation and 
implementation. The analysis of cases from development and security policy ensured 
an equal treatment of member states, the European Commission and Council 
Secretariat institutions – now the EEAS, while several mentions were made of the 
European Parliament. 
The method 
My methodology had the ambition to combine a comparative qualitative approach 
with quantitative tools and data. Thanks to my participant observation experience I 
was able to access an important number of original internal documentation on EU-UN 
cooperation as well as interviews, which helped me to ground my qualitative analysis 
of the topic on objectively verifiable and operationalized indicators. In total, I have 
identified 4 factors (Capacities, Legitimacy, Unity, Integration) and 12 variables that 
could be measured (to a certain extent) over a 1-4 scale,234 giving me the possibility to 
 
                                                
234 These are: (1) Material Resources/Capacities (Access, Expertise, Capabilities, Policy); (2) 
Ideational Resources/Legitimacy (Legal competencies, Political Support, Acceptance, 
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carry out some graphical extrapolation.235 Outside of the main hypotheses, in the 
preceding Chapter, I have also assessed the impact of three additional intervening 
factors that have a lot of resonance in the literature: proximity, institutionalization, 
and socialization/rhetoric.  
The EU-UN relationship has progressively gained a central place in the academic 
debate on EU foreign policy and international relations.236 This secondary literature 
offers an array of explanations both empirical and theoretical of why the organizations 
cooperate in this or that domain and also of why this cooperation is often 
dysfunctional. However, such a systematic and unified attempt to analyse and test 
empirically a set of possible explanatory factors that condition and qualify this 
relationship over time and across policies was still missing. Crucially, this remained a 
predominantly qualitative and non-deterministic exercise. I have resisted the 
temptation to make speculations or predictions about the future. 
While this method was applied only to the MENA region and the research design has 
been tailored to this specific context, this approach can be adapted to other contexts. It 
was argued in several sections of the thesis that the logics behind the European 
Neighbourhood and Euro-Mediterranean processes are particularly resistant to the 
demands of global multilateralism. Yet, are the key determinants of EU-UN 
interaction in Asia, in the Balkans or in Africa really so different from those active in 
the MENA? Of course the analysis of the specific regional factors would be essential 
to make the explanation realistic and credible. Yet, the framework developed in this 
thesis can be generalized and could offer some interesting perspectives on when, why 
and how the EU and the UN cooperate.  
Finally, being EU specific, the methodology can be applied also to other international 
organizations and it has indeed been tangentially applied in this research to the World 
Bank or IOM, for example. Obviously, however, few organizations offer the same 
                                                                                                                                       
Reputation); (3) Unity (Positional unity and Operational unity); (4) Integration (Decision-
making procedure and institutional coherence). See Chapter 2 and 7 for more detail.   
235  This included a limited use of linear correlation, putting together dependent and 
independent variables. See Chapter 7, figures 14 and 25 and related footnotes. 
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array of ideational and material resources, challenges and opportunities to the EU as 
the United Nations, so the method would have to be fine-tuned accordingly.  
The plot 
In chapter 4, 5 and 6 I have analysed in detail the case studies from three different 
sub-regions in the MENA. In the Maghreb, the EU can count on an important set of 
assets and resources both in terms of capacities and legitimacy. Its economic and 
political leverage in the region is significant and the long-term management of foreign 
policy is firmly in the hands of supranational institutions such as the European 
Commission and the EEAS. In this context, the EU is dismissive of the UN and rarely 
channels development funding and its foreign policy in general through it. 
Cooperation between the two organizations is limited to loose coordination and some 
information sharing. Sometimes the UN is used as a reference and standard-setter for 
some activities but most of these are rather grounded in Eurocentric norms and 
objectives. In the security field, on the contrary, and particularly on Western Sahara, 
cooperation with the UN is significant. Here, supporting multilateralism has translated 
into actually ‘passing the buck’ to the UN to carry out the political mediation that 
Europe has renounced doing. The divisions on this frozen conflict have generated a 
paralysis of any EU initiative, while at the same time various member states have an 
interest in getting the UN involved. France, in particular, can maintain a leading and 
watchful role on conflict mediation from its position in the UNSC, without taking 
direct responsibility for a solution.  
In the Levant or Near East the situation is different. The sub-region is more central to 
the global peace and security agenda and the United Nations has been involved there 
from the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU, on the other hand, has 
been struggling to build up a presence for itself in the political resolution of the 
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and has instead taken a leadership role in the 
development, humanitarian support and institution building of the emerging 
Palestinian authority. Given this situation the EU, overall, has been supportive of the 
                                                                                                                                       
236 For good reviews see Jorgensen 2009b, Smith and Laatikainen 2006, Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis 2010, Krause and Ronzitti 2012.  
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UN. The UN has given the EU an entry point to play a role in the crisis, through 
agencies such as UNRWA or via the various UNSC resolutions and peace operations 
that have been deployed over the years. This general support has varied quite a lot in 
intensity over time and depending on the specific issue at hand (development or 
security). As expected, the more the EU’s presence and position has strengthened, the 
less the EU has been willing to share decision-making powers or funds with the 
United Nations. As Europeans were consolidating their own image and reputation in 
the region, the initial political, normative and operational dependency on the UN 
slowly metamorphosed into a more limited ceremonial reference to the multilateral 
framework. 
I have also analysed, in Chapter 6, the crisis management and peace-building efforts 
in Iraq and Libya. First, these cases allowed me to control the impact of 
institutionalization and namely the Barcelona process and the ENP on my problem, as 
in these countries the EU had to work outside of these frameworks. Secondly, Iraq 
and Libya are both prominent episodes of cooperation in conflict situations where 
Europe was confronted with the need for hard military power. As expected by 
hypothesis 2, the empirical analysis shows that the lack of consensus among member 
states during a crisis produces reliance on the UN, at the same time as it undercuts the 
use of EU structures or the launch of EU initiatives. In turn, I tested the factors under 
hypothesis 1 in order to explain the nature and degree of cooperation of the EU with 
the UN in these different cases. For example, the low level of both legitimacy and 
material resources explain the high dependency that Europe has had on the UN during 
both crises. By contrast, the two cases differ considerably in post-conflict peace 
building. Iraq is a major case of EU-UN operational cooperation (at least until 2007-
2008), while Libya promises to strain the relationship quite a lot due to the 
competition of the two organizations in coordinating political transition. As compared 
with Iraq, the level of EU assets in Libya is much higher. EU-UN relations are, 
therefore, rather ceremonial and could potentially deteriorate.   
Taking stock of all this, in Chapter 7 I put together eight (8) broadly defined empirical 
findings related to the different factors identified in the conceptual framework and 
illustrated through comparative graphs and figures. As anticipated, power (defined as 
the combined presence of ‘resources’ factors and ‘cohesion’ factors) is inversely 
correlated to cooperation with the UN. In most cases cooperation is based on ad hoc 
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considerations by the relevant actors (or even by specific departments) on whether 
working with the UN in a specific situation will increase capacities, legitimacy or 
both. Importantly, the empowerment function played by the UN is not exclusively 
referred to external objectives, such as “peace and security in the MENA”. Rather, the 
UN is often instrumental to internal goals such as ‘integration objectives’: helping to 
promote a particular vision on the future of EU integration. Similarly, the fragmented, 
multilevel and contested nature of the EU foreign policy system (particularly in the 
security field, or across pillars) provides the incentive to work with the UN, as this 
often becomes a vehicle to increase influence. Having a solid relationship with the 
UN can serve as a “social lift”, increasing the authority, credibility and status of the 
actor involved.237 Finally, a crosscutting finding is that the EU’s inclination to work 
with the UN evolves in time with the increase (or decrease) of its relative capacities, 
legitimacy and cohesion as contexts change and experience is accumulated. This is a 
compelling argument for maintaining a diachronic and dynamic analytical approach.  
The limits and questions ahead  
As for any research, also this one has some clear limitations, which become open 
questions for my future work or for other scholars who might be interested in 
pursuing this exploration.  
A first key weakness lies in the scope of the study. As I had pointed out already in the 
Introduction, taking such an ambitiously broad area of research - encompassing 
different policy areas, organizations and case studies - entailed some sacrifices in 
analytical depth and descriptive precision. Some problems and examples could have 
been better elaborated in order to justify more clearly the quantified values given to 
the variables and the subsequent conclusions. Yet, with the famous metaphor of the 
“Elephant and the blind men”, one could argue that the wide vision provided by this 
thesis is just as essential in getting closer to the truth about EU-UN cooperation, as the 
more detailed case studies about a particular problem, a specific policy area or a short 
timeframe.  
 
                                                
237 Thus, cooperation increases the chances for “organizational survival” (Haugevik 2007, 9). 
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To palliate this weakness and deficiency one can only plea for more studies and 
understanding of the contexts in which EU-UN interaction develops. Area studies and 
case studies about the Middle East and North Africa have been a precious source of 
information for this thesis, but there will never be enough. The MENA, in particular, 
is a region only in the organograms of states, international organizations and 
corporations, but is extremely diverse and heterogeneous. Each sub-region and 
country would therefore deserve a specific study and particularly the Maghreb, which 
has been comparatively more neglected by scholars than the Middle East.   
A second important limit of this research is in its inescapably Eurocentric nature. In 
analysing EU-UN cooperation I have chosen to put the focus decisively on the EU 
side of the equation. To this term, I have given a broad interpretation, including 
institutions, member states and sometimes the idea of ‘Europe’ as a whole. Most of 
the agency and rationality has been attributed to the EU. Although I have made 
several references to the UN’s presence, capabilities and views, I had to forgo 
providing any sophistication on the agents and structures that move the UN, its 
secretariat and its agencies. Since 2010, for instance, there has been a tangible change 
in approach at the UN, in trying to increase its political affairs and conflict prevention 
capabilities, whose impact on cooperation with the EU in areas such as Libya or Syria 
still needs to be understood. 238  Even more concretely, what is the effect on 
coordination with the EU of the UN’s own incoherencies, such as the recurring one 
between the UN long-term “Country Teams” and the supposedly short term “Peace 
Operations”? Why is the “One UN” policy so difficult to apply to the MENA and 
what does that mean for Europe. There is plenty of academic work on the UN as such 
but much more would be needed to better understand the motivations behind its 
relations and reliance on regional organizations and particularly on the EU (Hettne 
and Soderbaum 2006; Graham and Felicio 2006; Sidhu 2009). This is a clear gap, 
 
                                                
238 See the website of the United Nations Department for Political Affairs (UN/DPA) on this 
subject. http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/peacemaking (accessed on 15 
May 2012). See also the article by Richard Gowan on this topic: “Less Bound to the Desk: 
Ban Ki-moon, the UN, and Preventive Diplomacy”, Global Governance, 18 (2012), 387–404. 
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perhaps ascribable to the fact that most scholars addressing this topic – as myself - 
have been coming from EU studies.  
Thirdly, there is the troubling question of external factors. As noted in several 
occasions, the main focus of this concept and research design was internal. Yet, when 
looking at Syria in mid 2012, there is no doubt that the big constrains to cooperation 
lay outside of the EU, in the UNSC structure and in “emerging” international actors 
such as China and Russia. I have left these elements in the background. As discussed 
in the Case Study on Iraq, when the UN is paralysed, then the interaction opportunity 
is missing and no cooperation can take place. However, the analysis of the EU’s 
diplomatic action “within the UN”, and of its influence in getting its vision through, is 
critical to a more refined understanding of EU cooperation “with the UN”. Luckily, 
also this field of study is quickly developing, following the pioneer work of Smith and 
Laatikainen in 2006, and is producing some interesting ideas not only in academia and 
think tanks, but also in practice, as the EU’s presence in the UN evolves following the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
A Weak Link 
In discussing the relevance of the topic, I mentioned in the Introduction the case of the 
international engagement in Libya in 2011, as an example of intensive interaction 
between the EU and the UN in a crisis situation exploding in North Africa.239 The 
developing situation in Syria in mid 2012 is another, even more persuasive example 
of the importance of an effective cooperation between regional organizations and the 
UN. The EU has supported materially the mandate of Mr Kofi Annan to mediate a 
solution to the civil war. Not least – and among other things - by providing a 
considerable number of armoured cars to the UN monitoring mission…240 Yet, by 
summer 2012, the EU member states and the rest of the international community had 
failed to secure a UNSC resolution that would serve the interests of the Syrian people, 
demonstrating the serious shortcomings of the UN system in its current form.  
 
                                                
239 I expanded on this specific Case Study in Chapter 6. 
  
225 
This study did not set out to provide recommendations to improve the standards of 
EU-UN cooperation - let alone the UN system. What it did aim to do was to offer a 
frank analysis of the main structural limits of this relationship in order to better 
understand it and perhaps contribute indirectly to its improvement. Anyone who has 
been involved in this domain as a practitioner or as a scholar is well aware of the day-
to-day difficulties that surround the necessary interaction and coordination between 
the EU and the UN. Many would agree that what is most damaging, both politically 
and operationally, is the excessive expectations that are put on cooperation itself and 
the veil of hypocrisy and rhetoric that surrounds vacuous expressions such as 
“Effective Multilateralism”. It would be more productive to assess realistically where 
and when these two big administrations can cooperate substantially and where, 
instead, the specific pattern of their material and ideational interests makes this 
improbable and even distractive for the attainment of the policy goal. A clearer and 
more stringent division of labour between the two would probably be the best solution 
in these cases. However, the preferred arrangement for member states is often opacity 
and overlap, as this is how they remain involved and they retain the ultimate control.  
In sum, a genuinely strategic, effective and mutually reinforcing partnership between 
the EU and the UN will be hard to achieve. Yet, all hope is not lost. This thesis shows 
how, ironically, the primary insurance on the endurance and reinforcement of the EU-
UN relationship rests safely on the promise of Europe’s perpetual weaknesses. In its 
everlasting incompleteness and ambiguity as a regional integration experiment trying 
to find its place in the international system will continue to lay the EU’s need to 
grudgingly cooperate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
240 See for instance on the Daily Motion: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xqs12m_eu-
sends-amoured-vehicles-to-bolster-un-monitors-in-syria_news (accessed on 5 May 2012).  
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